IDWolf: Entra ID Hygiene Report

Tenant MooseBank Cloud (11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555) · snapshot 2026-09-30 08:00 UTC · IDWolf v1.13 · analysis 0,6s
Synthetic snapshot for testing. No real tenant data.
5/ 100
MooseBank Cloud · 26 users · 8 service principals
Hygiene score
Grade F · Critical exposure
4 Critical21 High28 Medium42 Low
95 finding(s) · 85 of 92 evaluated checks triggered · open the details
How the score is computed

Score = 100 × e−penalty/100, where penalty sums a weight per triggered check at its worst severity (Critical 20, High 8, Medium 3, Low 1), capped by the worst severity present: any Critical check limits the score to 35 (grade E), any High to 65 (grade C). It never reaches zero, so a bad environment and a catastrophic one still rank differently. Per-object counts are shown separately so that many low-impact objects do not hide a single critical exposure.

Attack-path map (toward the admin roles)

Backup Automation -> Admin roles via Tenant-takeover permission [Critical] func-payroll-mi -> Admin roles via Tenant-takeover permission [Critical] func-payroll-mi -> Backup Automation via Owns the app [High] IT on-call -> Admin roles via Access package grants admin [High] Any user -> IT on-call via Request the package (allMemberUsers) [High] user13@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com -> Backup Automation via App admin on the app [High] PIM - Global Admins -> Admin roles via Group holds an admin role [High] Tier 2 security operators -> Admin roles via Group holds an admin role [High] user13@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com -> Tier 2 security operators via Owns the group [High] ConnectSyncProvisioning_SYNC01_8f3a2c -> Admin roles via Entra Connect app credential [High] user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com -> Backup Automation via Owns the app [High] Backup Automation -> Admin roles via Holds an admin role [High] IT resources: user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com -> Admin roles via Catalog holds an admin group [High] IT resources: user14@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com -> Admin roles via Catalog holds an admin group [High] Any user -> Admin roles via No MFA (bob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com) [Critical] Any user -> Admin roles via No MFA (carol.sec@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com) [Critical] Admin roles tenant takeover Any user Any user [entry] - Request the package (allMemberUsers), No MFA (bob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com), No MFA (carol.sec@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com) Backup Automation Backup Automation [serviceprincipal] - Tenant-takeover permission, Privileged app, Holds an admin role func-payroll-mi func-payroll-mi [serviceprincipal] - Tenant-takeover permission, Owns the app ConnectSyncProvisioning_SYN… ConnectSyncProvisioning_SYNC01_8f3a2c [application] - Entra Connect app credential IT on-call IT on-call [accesspackage] - Access package grants admin IT resources: user12@mooseb… IT resources: user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com [catalog] - Catalog holds an admin group IT resources: user14@mooseb… IT resources: user14@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com [catalog] - Catalog holds an admin group PIM - Global Admins PIM - Global Admins [group] - Group holds an admin role Tier 2 security operators Tier 2 security operators [group] - Group holds an admin role user12@moosebank.onmicrosof… user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com [user] - Owns the app user13@moosebank.onmicrosof… user13@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com [user] - App admin on the app, Owns the group

Each box is a principal or object that has a path to an admin role; the arrow is the technique. Colour is the severity. Hover an arrow for the exact path. The dark box Any user is where an attacker starts with no special rights: every arrow out of it needs nothing more than an ordinary account (or, for a guessed password, none). Boxes joined by an arrow are hops of one chain: a principal that holds a right over the next box (or owns it, or is a member of it) and so inherits what it reaches (2 steps at most). Hover a box to light up its whole path. This is derived from the deterministic findings, not a live reachability test.

Regulatory frameworks

Checks with no finding, out of the checks mapped to each control. A clean check is evidence for the technical, directory-side part of a control, not compliance with it. Bars take the colour of the worst finding; the full tables are under Details.

7%clean
NIS2
7 of 92 evaluated checks clean
21(2)(b)Incident handlingno check
21(2)(c)Business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery1/3
21(2)(e)Security in maintenance of systems, vulnerability handling1/6
21(2)(g)Basic cyber hygiene practices5/72
21(2)(h)Cryptography and encryption0/1
21(2)(i)Access control policies and asset management7/92
21(2)(j)Multi-factor or continuous authentication1/17
7%clean
ISO/IEC 27001
7 of 92 evaluated checks clean
A.5.15Access control7/92
A.5.16Identity management5/72
A.5.17Authentication information0/12
A.5.18Access rights7/92
A.8.2Privileged access rights4/38
A.8.5Secure authentication1/26
A.8.8Management of technical vulnerabilitiesno check
A.8.9Configuration management0/2
A.8.13Information backup1/3
A.8.14Redundancy of information processing facilities1/3
A.8.15Loggingno check
A.8.16Monitoring activitiesno check
A.8.20Networks security1/4
A.8.24Use of cryptography0/1
7%clean
DORA
7 of 92 evaluated checks clean
9(2)ICT security policies and tools for resilience, integrity and confidentiality0/2
9(4)(b)Sound network and infrastructure management1/6
9(4)(c)Logical access limited to what is required7/92
9(4)(d)Strong authentication, protection of cryptographic keys1/27
9(4)(f)Patches and updatesno check
10(1)Detection of anomalous activitiesno check
12(1)Backup, restoration and recovery1/3
7%clean
GDPR
7 of 92 evaluated checks clean
32(1)(a)Pseudonymisation and encryption0/1
32(1)(b)Ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience7/92
32(1)(c)Timely restoration of availability and access1/3

Categories

Entra Access Policy
44
44 of 48 check(s) triggered
worst High
Entra Identity
32
25 of 28 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Entra Applications
19
16 of 16 check(s) triggered
worst Critical

Top risks

Critical Privileged role member without MFA registered

A member of a control-plane admin role has no MFA method registered. A single phished or sprayed password yields tenant-level control.

2 objects · T1078.004 · seen in recent attacks · details
Critical Service principal with tenant-takeover permission

A service principal holds a high-risk application permission (e.g. RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory, Directory.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All). A compromise of its credential is equivalent to Global Admin.

2 objects · T1098.001 · seen in recent attacks · details
High Group holding an admin role owned by a non-admin

A group that holds a privileged Entra role (active or eligible) has an owner who is not an admin, or a guest or service principal as owner. The owner can add any account, including their own, to the group and so take the role.

2 objects · T1098.003 · details
High Intune role that can run code on devices given through an unprotected group

An Intune role that can push scripts, apps or configuration to managed devices, or change Intune roles, is assigned to a group that is not role-assignable or has a dynamic membership. Groups Administrators, User Administrators, Intune Administrators and the group's owners can add members to such a group, and a member can run code as SYSTEM on every device in scope, admin workstations included.

2 objects · T1072 · seen in recent attacks · details
High Non-admin manages an entitlement catalog that holds an admin group

An entitlement management catalog holds a group that has a privileged Entra role (active or eligible), and someone who is not an admin is its catalog owner or access package manager (they can put the group in an access package and assign it, to themselves too), or its access package assignment manager while a package of the catalog already hands out the group. Through the catalog they can make themselves a member of the group and take the role.

2 objects · T1098.003 · details
High Security defaults off and no MFA enforced by Conditional Access

Security defaults are disabled and no enabled Conditional Access policy requires MFA. Accounts can sign in with a password alone.

1 object · T1556.006 · details

Tenant charts

Findings by severity
Critical: 4High: 21Medium: 28Low: 4295findings
Critical (4, 4.2%)
High (21, 22.1%)
Medium (28, 29.5%)
Low (42, 44.2%)
Findings by category
Entra Identity: 32Entra Access Policy: 44Entra Applications: 1995findings
Entra Identity (32, 33.7%)
Entra Access Policy (44, 46.3%)
Entra Applications (19, 20%)
Users by type
Members: 24Guests: 226users
Members (24, 92.3%)
Guests (2, 7.7%)
Users by origin
Cloud-only: 5Synced from on-premises AD: 2126users
Cloud-only (5, 19.2%)
Synced from on-premises AD (21, 80.8%)
MFA registration (enabled users)
MFA registered: 23No MFA method: 326users
MFA registered (23, 88.5%)
No MFA method (3, 11.5%)
Enabled users by sign-in activity
Signed in within 90d: 24Inactive 90d+: 226users
Signed in within 90d (24, 92.3%)
Inactive 90d+ (2, 7.7%)
Privileged role assignments
Global Administrator: 3Security Administrator: 3Application Administrator: 17assignments
Global Administrator (3, 42.9%)
Security Administrator (3, 42.9%)
Application Administrator (1, 14.3%)
Service principals
Managed identities: 1Microsoft / third party: 78principals
Managed identities (1, 12.5%)
Microsoft / third party (7, 87.5%)

Tenant at a glance

Directory syncenabled (hybrid)
Domains3 (3 verified)
Security defaultsoff
Conditional Access policies3 (2 enabled)
Entra ID licenceP2, 2 subscription(s)
App registrations4

Regulatory mapping

Which controls the checks of this report give evidence for. The mapping covers the technical, directory-side part of each control: a row with no findings is evidence for that part, not compliance with the control. Policies, processes, people and other systems are outside a directory snapshot.

NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Art. 21(2)

In Italy: Art. 24 of Legislative Decree 138/2024. Running IDWolf on a schedule is also evidence for point (f), assessing the effectiveness of the measures.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
21(2)(b)Incident handling0000No check
21(2)(c)Business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery3022MediumGaps found
21(2)(e)Security in maintenance of systems, vulnerability handling6055MediumGaps found
21(2)(g)Basic cyber hygiene practices7206771CriticalGaps found
21(2)(h)Cryptography and encryption1011LowGaps found
21(2)(i)Access control policies and asset management9208595CriticalGaps found
21(2)(j)Multi-factor or continuous authentication1701619CriticalGaps found

ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A

Periodic runs with -CompareTo support the reviews of A.5.35 and A.5.36.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
A.5.15Access control9208595CriticalGaps found
A.5.16Identity management7206771CriticalGaps found
A.5.17Authentication information1201213HighGaps found
A.5.18Access rights9208595CriticalGaps found
A.8.2Privileged access rights3803441CriticalGaps found
A.8.5Secure authentication2602529CriticalGaps found
A.8.8Management of technical vulnerabilities0000No check
A.8.9Configuration management2022LowGaps found
A.8.13Information backup3022MediumGaps found
A.8.14Redundancy of information processing facilities3022MediumGaps found
A.8.15Logging0000No check
A.8.16Monitoring activities0000No check
A.8.20Networks security4033MediumGaps found
A.8.24Use of cryptography1011LowGaps found

DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

Applies to financial entities. The detailed access-control and authentication requirements sit in the ICT risk management RTS, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
9(2)ICT security policies and tools for resilience, integrity and confidentiality2022LowGaps found
9(4)(b)Sound network and infrastructure management6055MediumGaps found
9(4)(c)Logical access limited to what is required9208595CriticalGaps found
9(4)(d)Strong authentication, protection of cryptographic keys2702630CriticalGaps found
9(4)(f)Patches and updates0000No check
10(1)Detection of anomalous activities0000No check
12(1)Backup, restoration and recovery3022MediumGaps found

GDPR, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 32(1)

Running IDWolf regularly is also evidence for point (d), regularly testing and evaluating the effectiveness of the measures.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
32(1)(a)Pseudonymisation and encryption1011LowGaps found
32(1)(b)Ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience9208595CriticalGaps found
32(1)(c)Timely restoration of availability and access3022MediumGaps found

Each check lists its controls under "Findings by check"; the CSV and the JSON Lines carry them in the Controls / controls field.

Benchmarks (CIS, DISA STIG)

Which benchmark items this report measures, one row each. The list is partial on purpose: an item with no check says why. A row with no findings is evidence for the part a directory snapshot can see, not a passed audit, and IDWolf never turns a benchmark into a score.

CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0

Section 5 is the Microsoft Entra admin center, section 1 holds the admin accounts. The Microsoft 365 workload items (Exchange, Teams, Purview and the rest) are outside an identity snapshot and are not listed. E5 marks items that need an E5 / Entra ID P2 licence. Measured here: 58 of 65 items.

ItemLevelRequirementChecksNot evaluatedFindingsWorstStatus
1.1.1L1Administrative accounts are cloud-onlyentra_admin_synced_from_onprem01HighGaps found
1.1.2L1Two emergency access accounts definedentra_no_emergency_access, entra_global_admins_too_few01MediumGaps found
1.1.3L1Between two and four Global Adminsentra_global_admins_too_few, entra_global_admins_excessive00No findings
1.1.4L1Admin accounts use licences with a reduced application footprintentra_admin_licensed01LowGaps found
1.3.1L1Password expiration policy set to never expireentra_password_expiry_set01LowGaps found
1.3.2L2Idle session timeout for unmanaged devicesentra_idle_timeout_missing01LowGaps found
5.1.2.1L1Per-user MFA disabled in favour of Conditional Access
Admin accounts only: the per-user MFA state costs one Graph call per user.
entra_per_user_mfa_admins01LowGaps found
5.1.2.2L1Third-party integrated applications not allowedentra_users_can_register_apps01MediumGaps found
5.1.2.3L1Non-admin users cannot create tenantsentra_users_can_create_tenants01LowGaps found
5.1.2.4L1Access to the Entra admin center restricted
Manual: no Graph API for this setting.
none00No check
5.1.2.5L2Stay signed in option hiddenentra_kmsi_shown01LowGaps found
5.1.2.6L2LinkedIn account connections disabled
Manual: no Graph API for this setting.
none00No check
5.1.3.1L1Users cannot create security groupsentra_users_can_create_security_groups01LowGaps found
5.1.3.2L2Users cannot use the My Groups features
Manual: no Graph API for this setting.
none00No check
5.1.3.3L1Owners cannot manage membership requests in My Groups
Manual: no Graph API for this setting.
none00No check
5.1.3.4L2Users cannot create Microsoft 365 groupsentra_users_can_create_m365_groups01LowGaps found
5.1.4.1L2Device join restricted to selected usersentra_device_join_unrestricted01LowGaps found
5.1.4.2L1Maximum number of devices per user limitedentra_device_quota_high01LowGaps found
5.1.4.3L1Global Admins not added as local admins on joinentra_device_join_ga_local_admin01LowGaps found
5.1.4.4L1Registering user not added as local adminentra_device_join_user_local_admin01MediumGaps found
5.1.4.5L1LAPS enabled for Entra-joined devicesentra_device_laps_off01MediumGaps found
5.1.4.6L2Users cannot recover their own BitLocker keysentra_users_read_bitlocker_keys01LowGaps found
5.1.5.1L2User consent to applications not allowedentra_user_consent_allowed01MediumGaps found
5.1.5.2L1Admin consent workflow enabledentra_users_can_consent01MediumGaps found
5.1.5.3L2Password (secret) addition blocked for applicationsentra_app_management_policy_weak01LowGaps found
5.1.5.4L1Application secret lifetime 180 days or lessentra_app_management_policy_weak, entra_app_secret_long_lived02LowGaps found
5.1.5.5L1New application secrets are system-generatedentra_app_management_policy_weak01LowGaps found
5.1.5.6L1Application certificate lifetime 180 days or lessentra_app_management_policy_weak01LowGaps found
5.1.6.1L2Guest invitations only to allowed domains
Manual: no supported Graph v1.0 API for the domain allow list.
none00No check
5.1.6.2L1Guest user access restrictedentra_guest_access_not_restricted01LowGaps found
5.1.6.3L2Only administrators can invite guestsentra_guest_invite_open01LowGaps found
5.1.8.1L1Password hash sync enabled for hybrid tenantsentra_password_hash_sync_off01LowGaps found
5.2.2.1L1MFA required for administrative rolesentra_no_ca_mfa_admins, entra_admins_without_mfa03CriticalGaps found
5.2.2.2L1MFA required for all usersentra_security_defaults_off01HighGaps found
5.2.2.3L1Legacy authentication blockedentra_legacy_auth_allowed01HighGaps found
5.2.2.4L1Sign-in frequency and non-persistent browser for adminsentra_admin_sign_in_frequency01LowGaps found
5.2.2.5L2Phishing-resistant MFA strength for adminsentra_no_phishing_resistant_admins01MediumGaps found
5.2.2.6E5 L1User risk policy enabledentra_risk_policies_missing01MediumGaps found
5.2.2.7E5 L1Sign-in risk policy enabledentra_risk_policies_missing01MediumGaps found
5.2.2.8E5 L2Medium and high sign-in risk blockedentra_sign_in_risk_not_blocked01LowGaps found
5.2.2.9L1Managed device required for authenticationentra_no_managed_device01MediumGaps found
5.2.2.10L1Managed device required to register security infoentra_security_info_registration01LowGaps found
5.2.2.11L1Sign-in frequency every time for Intune enrollmententra_intune_enrollment_reauth01LowGaps found
5.2.2.12L1Device code flow blockedentra_device_code_flow_allowed00No findings
5.2.2.13L1Periodic reauthentication for all usersentra_no_periodic_reauth01LowGaps found
5.2.2.14L2Trusted named locations definedentra_no_trusted_locations00No findings
5.2.2.15L2Geographic access restrictions in useentra_no_geo_restriction01LowGaps found
5.2.2.16L2Token protection enforcedentra_token_protection_off01LowGaps found
5.2.2.17L1Authentication transfer blockedentra_auth_transfer_allowed01LowGaps found
5.2.3.1L1Authenticator shows application name and locationentra_authenticator_context_off01MediumGaps found
5.2.3.2L1Custom banned password list in useentra_banned_passwords_off01LowGaps found
5.2.3.3L1Password protection enabled on-premises
Out: needs the password protection agent on the DCs.
none00No check
5.2.3.4L1All member users are MFA capableentra_users_not_mfa_capable01MediumGaps found
5.2.3.5L1SMS and voice call disabled as methodsentra_weak_auth_methods01MediumGaps found
5.2.3.6L1System-preferred MFA enabledentra_system_preferred_mfa_off01LowGaps found
5.2.3.7L2Email OTP disabledentra_weak_auth_methods01MediumGaps found
5.2.3.8L1Account lockout threshold 10 or lessentra_smart_lockout_weak01LowGaps found
5.2.3.9L1Account lockout duration 60 seconds or moreentra_smart_lockout_weak01LowGaps found
5.2.3.10L1Authenticator Lite (companion apps) disabledentra_authenticator_lite_on01LowGaps found
5.2.4.1-5L1/L2Self-service password reset settings
Manual: Graph does not expose the SSPR settings.
none00No check
5.3.1E5 L2PIM manages privileged rolesentra_pim_not_used01MediumGaps found
5.3.2E5 L1Access reviews for guest usersentra_no_guest_access_review00No findings
5.3.3E5 L1Access reviews for privileged rolesentra_no_admin_access_review01LowGaps found
5.3.4E5 L1Approval required for Global Admin activationentra_pim_activation_no_approval01MediumGaps found
5.3.5E5 L1Approval required for Privileged Role Admin activationentra_pim_activation_no_approval01MediumGaps found

Each check lists its items under "Findings by check"; the CSV and the JSON Lines carry them in the Benchmarks / benchmarks field.

Findings by check

CriticalPrivileged role member without MFA registeredentra_admins_without_mfa · Entra Identity2
Why it matters. A member of a control-plane admin role has no MFA method registered. A single phished or sprayed password yields tenant-level control.
Remediation. Require and register phishing-resistant MFA for every admin; add them to a CA policy that enforces it, and prefer PIM eligible over permanent assignment.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Seen in attacks: Password spraying and credential stuffing against admins.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.1
SeverityObjectDetail
Criticalbob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comNo MFA method registered. Roles: Global Administrator.
Criticalcarol.sec@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comNo MFA method registered. Roles: Security Administrator.
CriticalService principal with tenant-takeover permissionentra_app_high_privilege · Entra Applications2
Why it matters. A service principal holds a high-risk application permission (e.g. RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory, Directory.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All). A compromise of its credential is equivalent to Global Admin.
Remediation. Confirm the app truly needs the permission; remove it otherwise. Protect the credential as Tier 0, prefer certificate credentials and workload identity CA.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Seen in attacks: Over-privileged OAuth apps (Midnight Blizzard, 2024).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
CriticalBackup AutomationApplication permissions: RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
Criticalfunc-payroll-miApplication permissions: RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
HighGroup holding an admin role owned by a non-adminentra_privileged_group_owner · Entra Identity2
Why it matters. A group that holds a privileged Entra role (active or eligible) has an owner who is not an admin, or a guest or service principal as owner. The owner can add any account, including their own, to the group and so take the role.
Remediation. Remove those owners: groups that hold roles should be owned by admins of the same tier only (or by nobody, managed through PIM for Groups), and the group must be role-assignable.
Attack it enables. T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighPIM - Global AdminsHolds: Global Administrator (eligible). Owners who can add themselves: eligible owner non-admin user14@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com.
HighTier 2 security operatorsHolds: Security Administrator. Owners who can add themselves: non-admin user13@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com.
HighIntune role that can run code on devices given through an unprotected groupentra_intune_role_weak_group · Entra Identity2
Why it matters. An Intune role that can push scripts, apps or configuration to managed devices, or change Intune roles, is assigned to a group that is not role-assignable or has a dynamic membership. Groups Administrators, User Administrators, Intune Administrators and the group's owners can add members to such a group, and a member can run code as SYSTEM on every device in scope, admin workstations included.
Remediation. Give powerful Intune roles only to role-assignable groups managed by admins of the same tier (or through PIM for Groups), keep their membership assigned rather than dynamic, and narrow the scope tags and scope groups of the assignment.
Attack it enables. T1072 Software Deployment Tools
Seen in attacks: Code execution on all managed devices through Intune.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighPolicy and Profile Manager: Endpoint teamAssignment Endpoint team - profiles (built-in role) is given to group Endpoint team: not role-assignable; 1 owner(s). Scope groups: none listed.
HighWorkstation scripts: Endpoint teamAssignment Endpoint team - scripts (custom role with Microsoft.Intune_DeviceManagementScripts_Assign) is given to group Endpoint team: not role-assignable; 1 owner(s). Scope groups: none listed.
HighNon-admin manages an entitlement catalog that holds an admin groupentra_catalog_role_privileged_group · Entra Identity2
Why it matters. An entitlement management catalog holds a group that has a privileged Entra role (active or eligible), and someone who is not an admin is its catalog owner or access package manager (they can put the group in an access package and assign it, to themselves too), or its access package assignment manager while a package of the catalog already hands out the group. Through the catalog they can make themselves a member of the group and take the role.
Remediation. Keep groups that hold admin roles out of catalogs managed by non-admins: move them to a catalog whose owners and managers are admins of the same tier, or remove those catalog roles. Treat catalog roles on such a catalog as Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighIT resources: user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comCatalog owner (non-admin user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com) on catalog IT resources, which holds Tier 2 security operators (admin role). They can put it in an access package and assign it, to themselves too.
HighIT resources: user14@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comAccess package assignment manager (non-admin user14@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com) on catalog IT resources, which holds Tier 2 security operators (admin role). A package of the catalog already grants it: they can assign it to themselves.
HighSecurity defaults off and no MFA enforced by Conditional Accessentra_security_defaults_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Security defaults are disabled and no enabled Conditional Access policy requires MFA. Accounts can sign in with a password alone.
Remediation. Enable security defaults, or (with Entra ID P1/P2) an enabled CA policy that requires MFA for all users, plus a policy blocking legacy authentication.
Attack it enables. T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.2
SeverityObjectDetail
HighMooseBank CloudSecurity defaults disabled and no enabled CA policy requires MFA for all users.
HighNo Conditional Access policy enforcing MFA on adminsentra_no_ca_mfa_admins · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled CA policy targets directory roles with an MFA grant control. Admin sign-ins are not guaranteed to be challenged.
Remediation. Create an enabled CA policy scoped to admin roles requiring MFA (ideally phishing-resistant).
Attack it enables. T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.1
SeverityObjectDetail
Highadmin rolesNo enabled CA policy with an MFA grant control targets admin roles or all users.
HighLegacy authentication not blockedentra_legacy_auth_allowed · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled CA policy blocks legacy authentication protocols (which cannot enforce MFA and are a primary password-spray target), and security defaults are off.
Remediation. Add an enabled CA policy that blocks legacy authentication for all users.
Attack it enables. T1110 Brute Force
Seen in attacks: Password spraying through legacy authentication.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.3
SeverityObjectDetail
HightenantNo enabled CA policy blocks legacy authentication.
HighGuest account in a privileged roleentra_privileged_guest · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An external (guest) identity holds an admin role: the security of the tenant then depends on an account managed outside it.
Remediation. Remove guests from privileged roles; if unavoidable, convert to a member account governed by tenant policy and PIM.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Highext.partner_gmail.com#EXT#@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comGuest holds: Global Administrator.
HighAdmin account synchronized from on-premises ADentra_admin_synced_from_onprem · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. A privileged role member is synced from on-premises Active Directory. Whoever controls that domain, or the sync server, can take over the account and with it the tenant.
Remediation. Give Entra admin roles to cloud-only accounts, separate from the on-premises identity (CIS 1.1.1).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Seen in attacks: Hybrid identity abuse: synced admins (Entra Connect, SyncJacking, 2025).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 1.1.1
SeverityObjectDetail
Highdave.appadmin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comSynced from on-premises AD. Roles: Application Administrator.
HighService principal owns a privileged applicationentra_privileged_app_sp_owner · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. A service principal or managed identity owns an app that holds an admin role or a tenant-takeover permission. Whoever controls the owner (its credentials, the code or the Azure resource behind a managed identity) can add a credential to the privileged app and act as it.
Remediation. Remove service principals from the owners of privileged apps; give ownership to a small set of admins of the same tier, or none.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Seen in attacks: Escalation through service principal ownership (Entra Agent ID flaw, 2026).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighBackup AutomationOwned by service principal(s): func-payroll-mi. The app holds: role Security Administrator; permission RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
HighAccess package grants admin access through self-request without approvalentra_access_package_grants_admin · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An access package that a broad population can request for itself, without approval, grants a privileged Entra role or membership of a group that holds one. Any account in that population gets admin rights by asking.
Remediation. Require approval (by admins of the same tier) on that policy, restrict who can request it, or remove the privileged resource from the package.
Attack it enables. T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighIT on-callPolicy IT on-call self-service: allMemberUsers can request it for themselves without approval. Grants: group Tier 2 security operators (holds an admin role).
HighApp administrator scoped to a privileged applicationentra_app_scoped_admin_privileged · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. Application Administrator or Cloud Application Administrator is assigned with the scope of a single app, and that app holds an admin role or a tenant-takeover permission. The scoped admin can add a credential to the app and act with its permissions: a delegated "just this app" role that is in fact tenant takeover.
Remediation. Remove the scoped assignment, or move the privileged permission out of that app; treat whoever manages a privileged app as an admin of the same tier.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighBackup AutomationScoped app admin(s): user13@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com (Cloud Application Administrator). The app holds: role Security Administrator; permission RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
HighConditional Access exclusion group anyone can get intoentra_ca_excluded_group_weak · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. A group excluded from an enabled Conditional Access policy is a public Microsoft 365 group (anyone can join), a dynamic group whose rule uses attributes a user or guest can influence, or a group owned by non-admins (who can add anyone). Getting into that group switches the policy off for that account, MFA included.
Remediation. Exclude only dedicated, role-assignable or admin-owned security groups (for example the emergency access accounts), make the group private and assigned, remove non-admin owners, and review the exclusion with an access review.
Attack it enables. T1556.009 Modify Authentication Process: Conditional Access Policies
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighProject Elk teamExcluded from: Block device code flow. public Microsoft 365 group (anyone can join); owners: non-admin user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com.
HighEntra Connect application with extra credentialsentra_connect_app_extra_credentials · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. The ConnectSyncProvisioning application that Entra Connect Sync uses to write to the tenant has more than one certificate, or a client secret. Entra Connect manages a single certificate itself; an extra credential lets someone else act as the sync engine (Directory Synchronization Accounts rights), a known persistence path.
Remediation. Keep only the certificate Entra Connect rotates itself, remove other certificates and every secret, and find out who added them.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Seen in attacks: Entra Connect abuse (Black Hat 2025 research).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighConnectSyncProvisioning_SYNC01_8f3a2c2 certificate(s) and 0 client secret(s) on the Entra Connect provisioning app (expected: one certificate).
HighRegular user owns an app with tenant-takeover permissionsentra_privileged_app_owner · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. A user who is not an admin owns an app (or its service principal) holding permissions such as RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory. An owner can add a secret and act as the app, so that user is effectively a Global Admin.
Remediation. Remove user owners from privileged apps, or treat those owners as Tier 0 (admin roles, phishing-resistant MFA, PIM).
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Seen in attacks: Escalation through app ownership.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighBackup AutomationOwned by non-admin user(s): user12@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com. Permissions: RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
HighCredential added to a Microsoft first-party appentra_first_party_sp_credentials · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. A service principal of a Microsoft-owned application has a secret or certificate added in this tenant. Microsoft apps don't need that; it is a known persistence technique (seen in the SolarWinds intrusion) because these apps carry broad trusted permissions.
Remediation. Find out who added it (audit log, "Add service principal credentials"), remove the credential, and investigate the sign-ins that used it.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighOffice 365 Exchange Online1 credential(s) on a Microsoft-owned app.
HighService principal in an admin roleentra_sp_in_admin_role · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An application holds an Entra admin role. Its secret or certificate is now a Tier 0 credential, usually stored somewhere much less protected than an admin account.
Remediation. Replace the role with the narrowest Graph application permission that does the job, or protect the app as Tier 0 (certificate only, owners limited, workload identity Conditional Access).
Attack it enables. T1098.003 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighBackup AutomationHolds the Security Administrator role.
HighExternal users can get an access package without approvalentra_access_package_external_no_approval · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An entitlement management policy lets external users request an access package and get it straight away. With "all external users", anyone with a Microsoft account can sign up for the groups, apps and sites in that package.
Remediation. Require approval (by a sponsor or the package owner) for external requests, limit the policy to specific connected organizations, and set an expiry.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighProject Elk partnersPolicy 'Partner self-service': requests from allExternalUsers, no approval.
HighIntune device wipes or scripts need no second admin (Multi Admin Approval)entra_intune_no_multi_admin_approval · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. No Intune Multi Admin Approval policy covers device wipes or scripts. One compromised Intune or Global Administrator can then factory-reset every managed device, or run code as SYSTEM on all of them, in a single action: in March 2026 the attack on Stryker was reported to have wiped tens of thousands of devices this way. The policy types are matched by name from the documentation and have not yet been verified on a real tenant.
Remediation. In Intune admin center > Tenant administration > Multi Admin Approval, create access policies for device wipe (and retire/delete), scripts, apps and Intune roles, with an approver group of admins other than the requester. Protect the Multi Admin Approval settings themselves with an access policy as well.
Attack it enables. T1485 Data Destruction
Seen in attacks: Mass device wipe from a compromised Intune admin (Stryker, reported 2026).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
HighIntuneNo Multi Admin Approval for: device wipe, scripts, Intune roles. Policies exist for: app.
MediumAdmin without a phishing-resistant method registeredentra_admin_no_phishing_resistant_method · Entra Identity3
Why it matters. An admin has no FIDO2 key, passkey, Windows Hello or certificate registered, so a phishing-resistant MFA policy can't even be enforced for them.
Remediation. Register a FIDO2 key or passkey for every admin, then require the phishing-resistant authentication strength.
Attack it enables. T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumbob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comRegistered: sms. Roles: Global Administrator.
Mediumcarol.sec@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comRegistered: nothing. Roles: Security Administrator.
Mediumdave.appadmin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comRegistered: microsoftAuthenticatorPush. Roles: Application Administrator.
MediumAll users can register applicationsentra_users_can_register_apps · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. The authorization policy lets any user create app registrations / service principals, a common consent-phishing and persistence vector.
Remediation. Set "Users can register applications" to No; delegate app registration to a controlled group.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.2.2
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumauthorizationPolicydefaultUserRolePermissions.allowedToCreateApps = true.
MediumStanding admin access (PIM not used)entra_pim_not_used · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Admin roles are held permanently instead of being activated just in time. A stolen admin session or token is immediately tenant-level access.
Remediation. Make admin roles eligible in PIM with MFA and approval on activation. Keep permanent Global Admin only for the two emergency access accounts (CIS 5.3.1).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.3.1
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumadmin roles4 principals hold admin roles permanently (expected at most 2 emergency accounts); 2 eligible assignments in PIM. Permanent: alice.ceo@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com, bob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com, ext.partner_gmail.com#EXT#@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com, carol.sec@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com.
MediumAdmins not required to use phishing-resistant MFAentra_no_phishing_resistant_admins · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled Conditional Access policy requires the phishing-resistant authentication strength for admin roles. Push or OTP MFA can still be phished with an adversary-in-the-middle kit.
Remediation. Require the "Phishing-resistant MFA" authentication strength (FIDO2, Windows Hello, certificate) for all admin roles (CIS 5.2.2.5).
Attack it enables. T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
Seen in attacks: Adversary-in-the-middle phishing and session token theft.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.5
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumadmin rolesNo enabled CA policy for admin roles requires the phishing-resistant MFA strength.
MediumNo user-risk / sign-in-risk Conditional Accessentra_risk_policies_missing · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled Conditional Access policy reacts to Entra ID Protection risk. Leaked credentials and risky sign-ins are detected but nothing happens.
Remediation. With Entra ID P2, require a secure password change for high user risk and MFA for medium/high sign-in risk (CIS 5.2.2.6, 5.2.2.7).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.6, 5.2.2.7
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumtenantNo enabled CA policy on user risk.
MediumWeak authentication methods enabledentra_weak_auth_methods · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. SMS, voice call or email one-time codes are enabled. They can be intercepted (SIM swap, mailbox compromise) and are not phishing resistant.
Remediation. Disable SMS, voice and email OTP in the authentication methods policy once users have Authenticator or passkeys (CIS 5.2.3.5, 5.2.3.7).
Attack it enables. T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.5, 5.2.3.7
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumauthenticationMethodsPolicyEnabled: Sms, Email.
MediumInactive admin accountentra_admin_inactive · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An enabled member of an admin role has not signed in for months. Nobody notices when an unused admin account starts being used by someone else.
Remediation. Remove the role, or disable the account. Prefer eligible PIM assignments, which expire on their own.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumext.partner_gmail.com#EXT#@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comLast sign-in: 400 days ago (threshold 90). Roles: Global Administrator.
MediumNo emergency access account excluded from Conditional Accessentra_no_emergency_access · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. No user or group is excluded from every enabled Conditional Access policy. A broken policy or an MFA outage can then lock every admin out of the tenant.
Remediation. Create two cloud-only emergency access accounts with Global Admin, exclude them from Conditional Access, protect them with FIDO2 keys and alert on every sign-in (CIS 1.1.2).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 9(4)(c), 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(b), 32(1)(c)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 1.1.2
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumConditional AccessNo user or group is excluded from all 2 enabled policies.
MediumMembers not capable of MFAentra_users_not_mfa_capable · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Enabled member accounts have no MFA method registered. When MFA is enforced they either get locked out or, worse, an attacker registers a method first.
Remediation. Require registration for everyone, protect the registration itself with Conditional Access, and follow up on the accounts listed (CIS 5.2.3.4).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.4
SeverityObjectDetail
Medium4 usersNot MFA capable: bob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com, carol.sec@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com, user7@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com, user8@moosebank.onmicrosoft.com.
MediumUsers become local admins on the devices they joinentra_device_join_user_local_admin · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Whoever joins a device becomes its local administrator: installed tools, disabled defences, harvested credentials are one click away.
Remediation. Set "Registering user is added as local administrator" to None (CIS 5.1.4.4).
Attack it enables. T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.4.4
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumdeviceRegistrationPolicyRegistering users made local admin: all.
MediumWindows LAPS not enabled for Entra-joined devicesentra_device_laps_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Local admin passwords on Entra-joined devices are not rotated by LAPS, so the same password can open many machines.
Remediation. Enable Microsoft Entra LAPS and push the LAPS policy through Intune (CIS 5.1.4.5).
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.4.5
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumdeviceRegistrationPolicyMicrosoft Entra LAPS is not enabled.
MediumNo Conditional Access requiring a managed deviceentra_no_managed_device · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled policy requires a compliant or hybrid-joined device. A stolen password plus MFA fatigue works from any laptop in the world.
Remediation. Require a compliant or hybrid-joined device for all users (CIS 5.2.2.9).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.9
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumall usersNo enabled CA policy for all users requires a compliant or hybrid-joined device.
MediumAuthenticator prompts lack app name and locationentra_authenticator_context_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Push notifications don't show which app and where the sign-in comes from, so users approve MFA prompts they didn't start (MFA fatigue).
Remediation. Show the application name and the geographic location in Microsoft Authenticator notifications (CIS 5.2.3.1).
Attack it enables. T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.1
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumMicrosoft AuthenticatorApp name: enabled; location: default.
MediumTop admin roles activate without approvalentra_pim_activation_no_approval · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator can be activated in PIM without anyone approving it, so a stolen eligible account becomes a Global Admin on its own.
Remediation. Require approval to activate Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator (CIS 5.3.4, 5.3.5).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.3.4, 5.3.5
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumPIMActivation without approval: Privileged Role Administrator.
MediumThird-party app with risky delegated permissionsentra_risky_delegated_grant · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. An app from another tenant has been granted delegated permissions to read or write mail, files or the directory on behalf of users. That is what an illicit-consent (OAuth) phishing campaign leaves behind, and it survives a password reset.
Remediation. Check who the app belongs to and why it needs this. If nobody can vouch for it, revoke the grant and disable the service principal, then look at the sign-in and audit logs for the app.
Attack it enables. T1528 Steal Application Access Token
Seen in attacks: OAuth consent phishing and over-privileged apps.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumMail Helper ProApp from another tenant, consented by 3 user(s): Mail.Read.
MediumWeak PIM settings on privileged rolesentra_pim_role_settings_weak · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. PIM settings of privileged roles let an admin activate without MFA or an authentication context, keep the role active for more than 8 hours, or receive eligible or active assignments that never expire. Each of these turns just-in-time access back into standing access for whoever holds the account.
Remediation. For every privileged role in PIM: require MFA (or an authentication context bound to phishing-resistant MFA) and a justification on activation, keep the activation at 8 hours or less, and require an end date on eligible and active assignments (except the emergency access accounts).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumPIM role settingsactivation without MFA or authentication context: Privileged Role Administrator. activation longer than 8 hours: Privileged Role Administrator (10 h). active assignments can be permanent: Global Administrator. eligible assignments can be permanent: Global Administrator.
MediumPrivileged application not used for monthsentra_privileged_app_inactive · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. A service principal with an admin role or a tenant-takeover permission has not signed in for more than 180 days. Its permissions and credentials are attack surface nobody uses or watches.
Remediation. Confirm with the owner that the app is still needed; if not, remove its permissions and credentials, then delete it.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumBackup AutomationLast sign-in 400 days ago. Holds: role Security Administrator; permission RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
MediumService principal name with look-alike charactersentra_sp_lookalike_name · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. A service principal name mixes Latin letters with look-alike letters from another script (Cyrillic, Greek, full-width) or hides invisible characters. That is how consent-phishing apps pose as Microsoft or a trusted vendor in consent prompts and in the admin portal.
Remediation. Check who published the app and what it was granted; if it is not a known app, revoke its grants and delete the service principal.
Attack it enables. T1036 Masquerading
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumMicrоsoft Teams ConnectorLatin mixed with Cyrillic or Greek letters in the name; non-ASCII characters at position 5 (U+043E); published by tenant 88888888-8888-8888-8888-888888888888.
MediumDirectory sync has stoppedentra_sync_stale · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. The tenant syncs from on-premises AD but the last sync is over a day old. Disabled or deleted accounts on-premises stay active in the cloud until it resumes.
Remediation. Check the Entra Connect (or Cloud Sync) server and its service, and Entra Connect Health.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 9(4)(c), 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(b), 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumdirectory syncLast sync: 3 day(s) ago.
MediumMFA or device claims trusted from any tenantentra_cross_tenant_mfa_trust · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. The default cross-tenant settings accept MFA (or device compliance) done in any other tenant. Your policies then rely on how well every external tenant protects its accounts.
Remediation. Keep the default inbound trust off and trust MFA only from specific partner tenants you have vetted.
Attack it enables. T1199 Trusted Relationship
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5, A.8.20; DORA 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumcross-tenant defaultAccepted from any external tenant: MFA.
MediumFederated domainentra_federated_domain · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Sign-ins for this domain are handled by an on-premises identity provider (AD FS or similar). Its token-signing key can mint tokens for any user (Golden SAML), so it is Tier 0. Trusting its MFA claim makes that worse.
Remediation. Move to managed authentication (password hash sync or cloud authentication) if you can. Otherwise protect the federation servers as Tier 0 and set federatedIdpMfaBehavior to rejectMfaByFederatedIdp so Entra does the MFA.
Attack it enables. T1606.002 Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediummoosebank.exampleFederated; IdP MFA: acceptIfMfaDoneByFederatedIdp.
MediumB2B direct connect open to every tenantentra_b2b_direct_connect_open · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. The default cross-tenant settings allow B2B direct connect (Teams shared channels) with any external tenant. Those users reach your shared channels without a guest account, so they never show up in your directory, your guest reviews or your Conditional Access. Microsoft ships it blocked.
Remediation. Set B2B direct connect back to blocked in the default cross-tenant settings and allow it only for named partner organizations.
Attack it enables. T1199 Trusted Relationship
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.20; DORA 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumcross-tenant defaultB2B direct connect allowed with any tenant: inbound (their users into your shared channels).
MediumPrivileged apps without workload identity Conditional Accessentra_no_workload_identity_ca · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Apps registered in this tenant hold admin roles or tenant-wide permissions, and no Conditional Access policy covers service principals. A stolen secret or certificate for those apps works from anywhere on the internet.
Remediation. With Workload Identities Premium, add a Conditional Access policy that targets those service principals and blocks sign-ins outside your known locations (and high service principal risk). Without the licence, move them to certificates and managed identities and watch their sign-ins.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Mediumworkload identitiesNo enabled policy targets service principals. Privileged apps of this tenant: Backup Automation.
MediumTemporary Access Pass can be reused or lives longentra_tap_weak · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. The Temporary Access Pass method is on and a pass can be used more than once, or can be issued for longer than the default 8 hours. A TAP counts as strong authentication and can register new methods: a pass that leaks from a help-desk ticket or a chat keeps working for its whole lifetime.
Remediation. In the Temporary Access Pass settings, require one-time use and keep the maximum lifetime at 8 hours or less (1 hour is usually enough); limit the method to the groups that onboard new users.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
MediumTemporary Access PassTemporary Access Pass is on: a pass can be used more than once; maximum lifetime 4320 minutes (over 8 hours).
LowStale guest accountentra_stale_guest · Entra Identity2
Why it matters. An enabled guest has not signed in for a long time. Unused external identities are unmonitored standing access.
Remediation. Review and remove stale guests; use access reviews to expire external access automatically.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowext.partner_gmail.com#EXT#@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comGuest, last sign-in: 400 days ago (threshold 90).
Lowold.guest_outlook.com#EXT#@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comGuest, last sign-in: 300 days ago (threshold 90).
LowApplication credential expired or expiringentra_app_credential_expiring · Entra Applications2
Why it matters. An app registration has a secret or certificate that is expired or close to expiry, which causes outages and, when expired secrets linger, leaves stale credentials configured.
Remediation. Rotate before expiry, remove unused credentials, and prefer certificates over client secrets.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
LowLegacy Sync Appcredential expires in 10 days (2026-10-10).
LowReporting Appcredential expired 5 days ago (2026-09-25).
LowApp still holds permissions on the retired Azure AD Graphentra_app_azure_ad_graph · Entra Applications2
Why it matters. An app registration requests permissions on Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net, resource 00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000), or a service principal was granted some. Microsoft has retired that API: the app either already fails or depends on something that is going away, and permission reviews built on Microsoft Graph do not show what it was allowed to do there (Directory.ReadWrite.All on Azure AD Graph is as strong as on Microsoft Graph).
Remediation. Ask the owner to move the app to Microsoft Graph. Then remove the Azure AD Graph entries from its API permissions and revoke the grants (application permissions and delegated consents) on the Windows Azure Active Directory service principal; delete the app if nobody claims it.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
LowLegacy Sync AppAzure AD Graph: the app registration requests 1 application and 1 delegated permission(s); the service principal has 1 application permission(s) granted.
LowMail Helper ProAzure AD Graph: the service principal has delegated User.Read (consent by 1 user(s)).
LowNon-admins can invite guestsentra_guest_invite_open · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Regular members (or even guests) can invite external users, so the external population grows without anyone deciding it should.
Remediation. Let only admins and the Guest Inviter role send invitations (CIS 5.1.6.3).
Attack it enables. T1136.003 Create Account: Cloud Account
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.6.3
SeverityObjectDetail
LowauthorizationPolicyallowInvitesFrom = everyone (everyone, guests included).
LowConditional Access policy left in report-only / disabledentra_report_only_ca_stale · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. A CA policy is disabled or has been in report-only mode: report-only policies are a testing state, not enforcement, and are easy to forget.
Remediation. Promote validated report-only policies to enabled, or remove policies that are no longer needed.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
LowReport-only MFA testPolicy state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced.
LowAdmin sessions not limitedentra_admin_sign_in_frequency · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled Conditional Access policy limits how long an admin session lasts or stops the browser from keeping it. A stolen admin session stays useful for its full lifetime.
Remediation. Set a sign-in frequency (for example 4 hours) and a non-persistent browser session for admin roles (CIS 5.2.2.4).
Attack it enables. T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.4
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowadmin rolesNo enabled CA policy for admin roles sets a sign-in frequency or a non-persistent browser session.
LowUsers can create tenantsentra_users_can_create_tenants · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Any user can create a new Entra tenant. The creator becomes its Global Admin, outside your policies and monitoring.
Remediation. Set "Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants" to Yes (CIS 5.1.2.3).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.2.3
SeverityObjectDetail
LowauthorizationPolicydefaultUserRolePermissions.allowedToCreateTenants = true.
LowGuest access to the directory not restrictedentra_guest_access_not_restricted · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Guests can browse users and groups in the directory, which helps an external account map the organisation.
Remediation. Set guest user access to "restricted to properties and memberships of their own directory objects" (CIS 5.1.6.2).
Attack it enables. T1087.004 Account Discovery: Cloud Account
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.6.2
SeverityObjectDetail
LowauthorizationPolicyGuest user access: limited (default).
LowCustom banned password list not enforcedentra_banned_passwords_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Only the global banned list is used. Passwords built on the company name, products or city are still accepted and are the first ones sprayed.
Remediation. Enable the custom banned password list with organisation-specific words (CIS 5.2.3.2), and Password Protection on-premises for hybrid tenants.
Attack it enables. T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying
Seen in attacks: Password spraying, the main cloud initial access vector (Microsoft, 2026).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.2
SeverityObjectDetail
LowPassword Rule SettingsCustom banned list enforced: False; entries: 0.
LowSmart lockout weaker than baselineentra_smart_lockout_weak · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. The smart lockout threshold is above 10 attempts or the lockout lasts under 60 seconds, so online guessing is cheaper than it should be.
Remediation. Keep the lockout threshold at 10 or less and the lockout duration at 60 seconds or more (CIS 5.2.3.8, 5.2.3.9).
Attack it enables. T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing
Seen in attacks: Password spraying, the main cloud initial access vector (Microsoft, 2026).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.8, 5.2.3.9
SeverityObjectDetail
LowPassword Rule SettingsLockout threshold 20, duration 30 s (baseline: 10 or less, 60 s or more).
LowUsers can create security groupsentra_users_can_create_security_groups · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Any user can create security groups. Groups that nobody owns or reviews end up granting access to apps and data.
Remediation. Set "Users can create security groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell" to No (CIS 5.1.3.1).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.3.1
SeverityObjectDetail
LowauthorizationPolicydefaultUserRolePermissions.allowedToCreateSecurityGroups = true.
LowNo periodic reauthentication for all usersentra_no_periodic_reauth · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled Conditional Access policy sets a sign-in frequency for everyone, so a stolen session or token keeps working for as long as it lives.
Remediation. Add a Conditional Access policy with a sign-in frequency for all users (CIS 5.2.2.13).
Attack it enables. T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.13
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowall usersNo enabled CA policy for all users sets a sign-in frequency.
LowMedium and high sign-in risk not blockedentra_sign_in_risk_not_blocked · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled Conditional Access policy blocks sign-ins that Entra ID Protection rates medium or high risk; at best they get an MFA prompt.
Remediation. With Entra ID P2, block medium and high sign-in risk (CIS 5.2.2.8), with an exclusion for the emergency access accounts.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.8
SeverityObjectDetail
LowtenantNo enabled CA policy blocks medium and high sign-in risk.
LowAdmin account licensed for mailbox and productivity appsentra_admin_licensed · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An admin account has Exchange, SharePoint or Teams. Reading mail and browsing with an admin account is how admin sessions get phished.
Remediation. Keep admin accounts separate and give them no productivity licence, or only Entra ID P1/P2 (CIS 1.1.4).
Attack it enables. T1566 Phishing
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 1.1.4
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowalice.ceo@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comLicences with mail / productivity apps: SPE_E5. Roles: Global Administrator.
LowLegacy per-user MFA still in useentra_per_user_mfa_admins · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Some admin accounts still use the old per-user MFA setting. It bypasses Conditional Access logic and makes the real policy hard to reason about.
Remediation. Move MFA to Conditional Access and switch per-user MFA off (CIS 5.1.2.1). IDWolf checks admin accounts only.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.2.1
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowbob.admin@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comPer-user MFA: enforced.
LowPassword expiration still configuredentra_password_expiry_set · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. A domain makes passwords expire. Forced changes push people to predictable patterns (Spring2026!, Summer2026!), which are exactly what gets sprayed.
Remediation. Set passwords to never expire and rely on MFA, banned passwords and leaked-credential detection instead (CIS 1.3.1).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 1.3.1
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowmoosebank-cloud.examplePasswords expire after 90 days.
LowNo idle session timeout for Microsoft 365 web appsentra_idle_timeout_missing · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Browser sessions on Microsoft 365 web apps never time out, so an unattended or shared machine stays signed in.
Remediation. Enable idle session timeout (for example 3 hours) for unmanaged devices (CIS 1.3.2).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 1.3.2
SeverityObjectDetail
LowtenantNo activity-based timeout policy.
Low"Stay signed in?" prompt shownentra_kmsi_shown · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Users are offered to stay signed in, which keeps long-lived sessions on shared and personal machines.
Remediation. Hide the "Stay signed in?" option in company branding (CIS 5.1.2.5).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.2.5
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowcompany brandingNo company branding: the prompt is shown by default.
LowUsers can create Microsoft 365 groupsentra_users_can_create_m365_groups · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Anyone can create Microsoft 365 groups, each with its own mailbox, site and team, and nobody reviews who is in them.
Remediation. Restrict Microsoft 365 group creation to a designated group (CIS 5.1.3.4).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.3.4
SeverityObjectDetail
LowGroup.UnifiedEnableGroupCreation is on (or not set).
LowAny user can join devices to Entra IDentra_device_join_unrestricted · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Every user can Entra-join a device. A stolen account can register an attacker machine, which then counts as a corporate device.
Remediation. Allow device join only for a selected group (CIS 5.1.4.1).
Attack it enables. T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.4.1
SeverityObjectDetail
LowdeviceRegistrationPolicyAll users can join devices to Entra ID.
LowHigh device limit per userentra_device_quota_high · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Each user can register many devices, so a compromised account can enrol several attacker machines before anyone notices.
Remediation. Keep the maximum number of devices per user at 10 or less (CIS 5.1.4.2).
Attack it enables. T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.4.2
SeverityObjectDetail
LowdeviceRegistrationPolicyUp to 50 devices per user (baseline 10).
LowGlobal Admins become local admins on joined devicesentra_device_join_ga_local_admin · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Global Administrators are added to the local Administrators group of every Entra-joined device, so their credentials end up on ordinary workstations.
Remediation. Turn off "Global administrator role is added as local administrator on the device" (CIS 5.1.4.3).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.4.3
SeverityObjectDetail
LowdeviceRegistrationPolicyGlobal Administrators are added as local admins on join.
LowUsers can read their own BitLocker keysentra_users_read_bitlocker_keys · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Users can recover the BitLocker keys of their devices themselves. Whoever holds their account holds the disk too.
Remediation. Restrict users from recovering BitLocker keys; route recovery through the help desk (CIS 5.1.4.6).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.4.6
SeverityObjectDetail
LowauthorizationPolicydefaultUserRolePermissions.allowedToReadBitlockerKeysForOwnedDevice = true.
LowPassword hash sync off in a synced tenantentra_password_hash_sync_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. The tenant syncs from on-premises AD without password hash sync, so Entra ID Protection cannot detect leaked credentials and there is no fallback if federation fails.
Remediation. Enable password hash synchronization in Entra Connect (CIS 5.1.8.1).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.8.1
SeverityObjectDetail
LowEntra ConnectDirectory sync is on, password hash sync is off.
LowMFA registration not protectedentra_security_info_registration · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled policy protects the registration of security info. Whoever has a password first can register their own MFA method.
Remediation. Require a managed device (or a trusted location) to register security info (CIS 5.2.2.10).
Attack it enables. T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.10
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowsecurity info registrationNo enabled CA policy protects the "register security information" action.
LowIntune enrollment doesn't require a fresh sign-inentra_intune_enrollment_reauth · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Enrolling a device in Intune can reuse an existing session, so a stolen token is enough to enrol an attacker device.
Remediation. Set sign-in frequency to "every time" for the Microsoft Intune Enrollment app (CIS 5.2.2.11).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.11
SeverityObjectDetail
LowMicrosoft Intune EnrollmentNo enabled CA policy sets sign-in frequency "every time" for Intune enrollment.
LowNo geographic access restrictionentra_no_geo_restriction · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled policy blocks sign-ins from countries you don't operate in, so sprayed passwords work from anywhere.
Remediation. Block sign-ins from countries outside your footprint with a country named location (CIS 5.2.2.15).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.20; DORA 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.15
SeverityObjectDetail
LowtenantNo enabled block policy uses a country location (1 country location(s) defined).
LowToken protection not enforcedentra_token_protection_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled policy binds session tokens to the device. Tokens stolen by infostealers or adversary-in-the-middle kits can be replayed elsewhere.
Remediation. Enforce token protection for supported apps, starting with admins (CIS 5.2.2.16).
Attack it enables. T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
Seen in attacks: Session token theft and replay.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.24; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.16
SeverityObjectDetail
LowtenantNo enabled CA policy enforces token protection.
LowAuthentication transfer not blockedentra_auth_transfer_allowed · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. No enabled policy blocks authentication transfer, which moves a signed-in session from one device to another (desktop to phone).
Remediation. Block authentication transfer for all users (CIS 5.2.2.17).
Attack it enables. T1528 Steal Application Access Token
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.2.17
SeverityObjectDetail
LowtenantNo enabled CA policy blocks authentication transfer.
LowSystem-preferred MFA not enabledentra_system_preferred_mfa_off · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. Users are prompted with whatever method they picked, often SMS, instead of the strongest one they have registered.
Remediation. Enable system-preferred multifactor authentication (CIS 5.2.3.6).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.6
SeverityObjectDetail
LowauthenticationMethodsPolicySystem-preferred MFA: disabled.
LowAuthenticator Lite (companion apps) allowedentra_authenticator_lite_on · Entra Access Policy1
Why it matters. MFA can be approved inside Outlook mobile and other companion apps, with fewer protections than the full Authenticator app.
Remediation. Disable Microsoft Authenticator on companion applications (CIS 5.2.3.10).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i), 21(2)(j); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.2.3.10
SeverityObjectDetail
LowMicrosoft AuthenticatorCompanion apps: default.
LowNo access review for admin rolesentra_no_admin_access_review · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Admin role assignments are never reviewed, so they pile up and nobody remembers why someone has them.
Remediation. Create a recurring access review of privileged role assignments in PIM (CIS 5.3.3).
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.3.3
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowaccess reviews1 active review(s), none covering admin roles.
LowNo tenant-wide rules for app credentialsentra_app_management_policy_weak · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. Nothing stops new client secrets, custom secrets or long-lived credentials on app registrations, so weak credentials keep appearing.
Remediation. Enable the default app management policy: block password addition and custom passwords, cap secret and certificate lifetimes at 180 days (CIS 5.1.5.3 to 5.1.5.6).
Attack it enables. T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.5.3, 5.1.5.4, 5.1.5.5, 5.1.5.6
SeverityObjectDetail
LowdefaultAppManagementPolicythe policy is off.
LowMulti-tenant app without App instance property lockentra_app_instance_lock_off · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. A multi-tenant app registration with credentials does not lock the sensitive properties of its service principals. In a tenant where the app is installed, someone with rights on the service principal can add a credential to it and use the permissions granted there.
Remediation. Enable App instance property lock for all properties (servicePrincipalLockConfiguration) on multi-tenant apps.
Attack it enables. T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
LowLegacy Sync AppSign-in audience AzureADMultipleOrgs, 1 credential(s), App instance property lock not enabled.
LowAdmin password not changed in over a yearentra_admin_password_old · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. An admin account still uses a password set more than a year ago. Old passwords have had more time to be phished, reused or leaked.
Remediation. Move admins to passwordless (FIDO2, Windows Hello); until then, rotate the password and make sure leaked-credential detection is on.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowalice.ceo@moosebank.onmicrosoft.comPassword last changed 500 days ago. Roles: Global Administrator.
LowApp with an insecure redirect URIentra_app_insecure_redirect · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. An app registration sends tokens to a plain-HTTP or wildcard address. Whoever can answer on that address can collect tokens.
Remediation. Use HTTPS redirect URIs on domains you control, no wildcards; remove addresses that are no longer used.
Attack it enables. T1528 Steal Application Access Token
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
LowLegacy Sync AppRedirect URI(s): http://sync.moosebank-cloud.example/callback.
LowApplication secret valid for too longentra_app_secret_long_lived · Entra Applications1
Why it matters. An app registration has a client secret valid for more than the allowed lifetime. Long-lived secrets end up in scripts and config files and outlive the people who knew about them.
Remediation. Prefer certificates or managed identities; keep client secrets to 180 days or less (CIS 5.1.5.4) and rotate them.
Attack it enables. T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. CIS M365 5.1.5.4
SeverityObjectDetail
LowLegacy Sync AppClient secret valid for 730 days (limit 180).
LowAccess package assignments never expire and are never reviewedentra_access_package_no_expiry · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Access granted through this package lasts forever and no access review checks it. People keep it after they change role or the project ends.
Remediation. Set an expiry on the assignment policy (for example 180 or 365 days) or turn on periodic access reviews for it.
Attack it enables. T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
LowFinance sharePolicy 'Finance staff': no expiry, no access review.
LowOn-premises accounts can take over cloud accounts (soft / hard match)entra_sync_hard_match_takeover · Entra Identity1
Why it matters. Directory sync does not block soft match (an on-premises account with the same UPN or e-mail address is joined to an existing cloud account) or hard match onto cloud-only accounts (the on-premises sourceAnchor is matched to a cloud account's immutableId). Whoever can create or edit accounts in AD, or in an OU that is synced, can then take control of a cloud-only account, admins included, and set its password from on-premises.
Remediation. Turn on BlockCloudObjectTakeoverThroughHardMatch and BlockSoftMatch (Update-MgDirectoryOnPremiseSynchronization, or Set-EntraDirSyncFeature) once the initial migration is done; turn soft match back on only for the duration of a planned migration. Keep cloud-only admins out of the reach of sync.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectDetail
Lowdirectory syncSoft match is not blocked (BlockSoftMatch off).

Generated by IDWolf from a read-only Entra ID snapshot. Handle as confidential.