IDWolf: Active Directory Hygiene Report

Domain moosebank.local (MOOSEBANK) · forest moosebank.local · snapshot 2026-09-28 08:00 UTC by MOOSEBANK\auditor from PAW-01 via dc01.moosebank.local · IDWolf v1.14 · analysis 1,5s · AI gemini-3.5-flash-lite in 15,7s
Synthetic snapshot generated for testing and demonstration. No real directory data.
1/ 100
moosebank.local · 71 users and service accounts · 35 computers · 17 Tier 0 principals
Hygiene score
Grade F · Critical exposure
28 Critical93 High86 Medium34 Low
241 finding(s) · 172 of 186 evaluated checks triggered · open the details
How the score is computed

Score = 100 × e−penalty/100, where penalty sums a weight per triggered check at its worst severity (Critical 20, High 8, Medium 3, Low 1), capped by the worst severity present: any Critical check limits the score to 35 (grade E), any High to 65 (grade C). It never reaches zero, so a bad environment and a catastrophic one still rank differently. Per-object counts are shown separately so that many low-impact objects do not hide a single critical exposure.

🤖AI summary and remediation plan

AI-assisted · gemini-3.5-flash-lite · 215 identifiers pseudonymized before sending

The Active Directory domain moosebank.local exhibits an extremely critical security posture with a hygiene score of 1 out of 100, indicating widespread misconfigurations and multiple pathways to complete domain compromise. Intruders can leverage unpatched vulnerabilities like ZeroLogon and noPac alongside severe certificate services misconfigurations (such as ESC1, ESC15, and ESC8 NTLM relay) to rapidly escalate privileges to Tier 0. Furthermore, critical infrastructure weaknesses include writable SYSVOL shares, exposed Group Policy Preferences passwords, and multiple accounts with unrotated credentials or dangerous delegated permissions. Immediate intervention is required to patch domain controllers, harden AD CS templates, secure SYSVOL permissions, and revoke unauthorized administrative and replication rights.

Can the findings be chained into full compromise?

Verdict: likely · least access needed: any domain user

An attacker with standard domain user access can leverage multiple independent paths to achieve full domain compromise, including certificate template abuse (ESC1), Kerberoasting of privileged accounts, and exploiting unpatched domain controller vulnerabilities.

AD CS ESC1 Certificate Escalation from: any domain user confidence: high
adcs_esc1
A standard domain user requests a certificate via Moose ESC1 Vulnerable specifying a Domain Admin principal in the subject alternative name, authenticates via Schannel, and gains Tier 0 control.

Objects: Moose ESC1 Vulnerable
  1. adcs_esc1 Ability to request a certificate as a Domain Admin (Moose ESC1 Vulnerable) · shown by the findings
Break it here: adcs_esc1 · Disabling or reconfiguring Moose ESC1 Vulnerable removes enrollee-supplied subject capability.
Privileged Kerberoasting from: any domain user confidence: medium
privileged_kerberoastable
An attacker requests a service ticket for svc_sql_admin (Domain Admin), cracks the ticket offline, and uses the recovered password to authenticate as a Domain Admin.

Objects: svc_sql_admin
  1. privileged_kerberoastable Kerberos service ticket for a Domain Admin account (svc_sql_admin) · shown by the findings
Break it here: privileged_kerberoastable · Removing SPNs from privileged accounts or enforcing strong, frequently rotated passwords stops offline cracking.
DCSync via Explicit Rights from: MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user confidence: high
dcsync_rights
Compromising backdoor.user allows the principal to invoke directory replication functions against the domain root and extract all domain secrets.

Objects: MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user
  1. dcsync_rights DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights on domain head (MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user) · shown by the findings
Break it here: dcsync_rights · Removing the explicit DCSync ACE from MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user prevents unauthorized replication.
GPO Abuse leading to Domain Controller Code Execution from: MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk confidence: medium
gpo_dangerous_acl → gpo_runs_code_from_share
Members of Helpdesk modify MooseBank DC Extra to execute scripts or tasks on domain controllers during startup, yielding complete control over all DCs.

Objects: MooseBank DC Extra
  1. gpo_dangerous_acl GenericWrite over MooseBank DC Extra linked to Domain Controllers OU (MooseBank DC Extra) · shown by the findings
  2. gpo_runs_code_from_share Execution of arbitrary code on domain controllers (MooseBank DC Extra: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmd) · shown by the findings
Break it here: gpo_dangerous_acl · Revoking GenericWrite permissions on MooseBank DC Extra stops unauthorized GPO modification.

Check by hand (assumptions behind the chains)

  • Are vulnerable AD CS certificate templates (such as Moose ESC1 Vulnerable and Moose ESC15 SchemaV1) actively monitored or restricted by application controls? adcs_esc1 adcs_esc15
  • Is network reachability restricted between workstations and domain controllers for WebDAV/RPC coercion vectors? coercion_unfiltered_dc webclient_on_dc
  • Are the accounts flagged for Kerberoasting (svc_sql_admin, svc_backup) protected by exceptionally long, randomly generated passwords? privileged_kerberoastable kerberoastable_user
  • Is network traffic between domain controllers and member servers subjected to mandatory SMB and LDAP signing in practice? ldap_signing_not_required smb_client_signing_not_required

Chains considered and ruled out

  • Anonymous LDAP Enumeration to Domain Compromise anonymous_ldap_enabled
    While anonymous LDAP operations are enabled via dSHeuristics, anonymous access alone does not grant write or administrative privileges required for domain control without an additional credential or exploit chain.

Quick wins

  • Disable the WebClient service via GPO across all domain controllers to mitigate web-based NTLM coercion vectors.
  • Disable WDigest authentication via GPO on domain controllers to prevent cleartext credential caching in LSASS.
  • Enforce strong Kerberos encryption types and disable RC4/DES where possible across domain controllers.
  • Remove unnecessary accounts from privileged groups such as Domain Admins and Backup Operators.
  • Enable Account Lockout threshold settings in the Default Domain Policy to prevent brute-force attacks.

Suggested remediation order

  1. Harden Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and Disable Vulnerable Templates effort: high
    Removes multiple critical escalation paths (ESC1, ESC2, ESC3, ESC4, ESC8, ESC13, ESC15) that allow low-privileged users to request high-privilege or client-authentication certificates for immediate domain takeover.
    Checks: adcs_esc1 adcs_esc2 adcs_esc3 adcs_esc4 adcs_esc5 adcs_esc6 adcs_esc7 adcs_esc8 adcs_esc9 adcs_esc10 adcs_esc11 adcs_esc13 adcs_esc15 adcs_esc17 adcs_weak_ca_key
    Objects: Moose ESC1 Vulnerable, Moose ESC2 AnyPurpose, Moose ESC3 EnrollAgent, Moose ESC4 WeakACL, Moose ESC9 NoSecExt, Moose ESC15 SchemaV1, Moose ESC13 PolicyLink, MOOSEBANK-CA
    Caveats: Disabling or modifying certificate templates and CA settings may impact applications requiring automated enrollment. Test template modifications in a staging environment before production deployment.
  2. Patch Domain Controllers and Enforce Secure Channels effort: high
    Closes critical execution and impersonation vectors (ZeroLogon, noPac) and prevents NTLM relay attacks against domain controllers by enforcing signing and channel binding.
    Checks: nopac_unpatched_dc netlogon_vulnerable_channel ldap_signing_not_required ldap_channel_binding_off smb1_server_enabled
    Objects: dc02.moosebank.local, Domain Controllers
    Caveats: Enforcing LDAP signing and channel binding can break legacy applications relying on unsigned or unchannel-bound LDAP queries. Audit legacy traffic prior to enforcement.
  3. Secure SYSVOL, GPOs, and Remove Hardcoded Credentials effort: medium
    Stops attackers from modifying Group Policy Objects or planting scripts and credentials in SYSVOL to achieve arbitrary code execution on domain controllers and workstations.
    Checks: sysvol_writable gpp_cpassword gpo_dangerous_acl gpo_autologon_password gpo_runs_code_from_share sysvol_script_secrets
    Objects: NETLOGON (scripts), MooseBank DC Extra, Default Domain Policy, GPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}, GPO {22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222}
    Caveats: Ensure deployment scripts or administrative tools do not rely on writable SYSVOL paths or embedded credentials before revoking permissions.
  4. Revoke Unauthorized Tier 0 Permissions and Clean Up Dangerous ACLs effort: medium
    Eliminates excessive administrative privileges and dangerous access controls (such as unauthorized DCSync rights, AdminSDHolder modifications, and readable gMSA/LAPS secrets) granted to non-Tier 0 principals.
    Checks: dcsync_rights sync_laps_rights dangerous_ace_anywhere dangerous_ace_tier0 kds_root_key_readable laps_readers gmsa_password_readable
    Objects: MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user, MOOSEBANK\MSOL_a1b2c3d4e5f6, MOOSEBANK\svc.dirsync, MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk, MOOSEBANK\IT-Ops, MOOSEBANK\Exchange Windows Permissions, gmsa_sql$
    Caveats: Removing permissions from built-in or integration accounts (such as Exchange Windows Permissions or sync accounts) requires validating proper split-permissions configurations and administrative boundaries.
  5. Rotate and Secure Privileged Credentials and Kerberos Settings effort: medium
    Mitigates Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, and ticket forgery attacks by enforcing strong encryption types (AES), disabling pre-authentication requirements, and rotating long-lived credentials.
    Checks: krbtgt_password_old rodc_krbtgt_password_old cloud_kerberos_trust_key_old privileged_kerberoastable asrep_roastable privileged_password_old privileged_password_never_expires spn_account_rc4 des_enabled
    Objects: krbtgt, krbtgt_12345, krbtgt_AzureAD, svc_sql_admin, svc_backup, adm.gialli, svc_legacy, adm.bianchi
    Caveats: Rotating the krbtgt password twice in succession invalidates all existing Kerberos tickets. Ensure domain replication is healthy before rotation.
  6. Harden Domain Controller Services and Attack Surface Configurations effort: low
    Disables unnecessary services (Print Spooler, WebClient) and insecure authentication features (WDigest, basic WinRM) on domain controllers to prevent coercion and local credential harvesting.
    Checks: always_install_elevated point_and_print_unsafe webclient_on_dc coercion_unfiltered_dc winrm_basic_auth wdigest_cleartext spooler_on_dc
    Objects: Default Domain Policy, Domain Controllers, dc02.moosebank.local, MOOSEBANK-CA
    Caveats: Verify whether printing services or legacy web-based management tools depend on the Print Spooler or WebClient before disabling.

Monitoring until fixed

ChecksEvent IDsGuidance
dcsync_rights sync_laps_rights4662Monitor for Directory Service Access events (4662) where the DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights are requested against the domain object by non-standard accounts.
adcs_esc1 adcs_esc8 adcs_esc154886, 4887Monitor AD CS Certificate Services audit logs for event IDs 4886 (certificate request received) and 4887 (certificate issued), paying attention to requests containing alternative subject names or unusual user principal names.
netlogon_vulnerable_channel nopac_unpatched_dc5827, 5828, 5830, 4741Monitor System and Security logs for Netlogon secure channel establishment attempts using vulnerable cryptographic algorithms or anomalous computer account creation bursts (Event 4741).
privileged_kerberoastable kerberoastable_user4769Detect potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for Kerberos service ticket requests (Event 4769) requesting RC4 encryption (0x17) or high volumes of TGS requests from a single user account in a short timeframe.
coercion_unfiltered_dc webclient_on_dc4624, 4672Monitor for anomalous network logon events (Event 4624 with Logon Type 3) using NTLM authentication against domain controllers, especially originating from unexpected internal hosts or service accounts.

Exploitability triage (fix order for this environment)

#ChecksObjectsWhy
1dcsync_rightsMOOSEBANK\backdoor.user, MOOSEBANK\MSOL_a1b2c3d4e5f6Direct DCSync rights grant immediate ability to extract all domain password hashes and achieve full domain compromise.
2adcs_esc1 adcs_esc15Moose ESC1 Vulnerable, Moose ESC15 SchemaV1Allows low-privileged users to request certificates for arbitrary accounts including Domain Admins.
3nopac_unpatched_dc netlogon_vulnerable_channeldc02.moosebank.local, Domain ControllersUnpatched domain controller vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated attackers to elevate to Domain Admin instantly.
4sysvol_writable gpp_cpasswordNETLOGON (scripts), GPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}Writable SYSVOL and exposed GPP passwords enable trivial code execution and credential theft across the domain.
5privileged_kerberoastable asrep_roastablesvc_sql_admin, adm.gialli, svc_backupExposes privileged service and user accounts to offline brute-force credential recovery.

Attack vectors seen in recent attacks

ChecksVectorPublicly knownWhy it matters here
netlogon_vulnerable_channelZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472)Widely exploited by ransomware groups and threat actors for initial domain takeover via Netlogon cryptographic weakness.Domain controllers have weakened Netlogon secure channel enforcement, permitting immediate exploitation.
nopac_unpatched_dcnoPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)Extensively used in intrusion campaigns to spoof domain controller computer accounts and escalate privileges.Domain controller dc02.moosebank.local lacks the necessary security updates and permits high machine account quotas.
adcs_esc1 adcs_esc8AD CS Certificate Template Abuse & NTLM Relay (ESC1 / ESC8)Core vector in numerous ransomware and APT intrusions involving Active Directory Certificate Services exploitation.Templates allow requester-supplied subject names and web enrollment is active without adequate protection.
gpp_cpasswordGroup Policy Preferences Password HarvestingStandard automated check in nearly all penetration tests and red team engagements targeting Windows domains.Exposed cpassword strings found in SYSVOL files.
privileged_kerberoastable kerberoastable_userKerberoastingPervasive technique in enterprise intrusions through 2026 for extracting service account credentials.Multiple privileged and standard user accounts feature Service Principal Names with old or weak passwords.

Attack paths toward Tier 0

Kerberoasting Privileged Accounts Critical
svc_backup -> Request service ticket for SPN backup/bkp01.moosebank.local → svc_backup -> Offline password cracking → svc_backup -> Tier 0 (assumed)
An attacker with standard domain user access requests a Kerberos service ticket for a privileged service account with a weak password, cracks it offline, and gains administrative control.
AD CS ESC1 Certificate Enrollment Critical
MOOSEBANK\Domain Users -> Enroll in Moose ESC1 Vulnerable with alternate subject name → Moose ESC1 Vulnerable -> Authenticate as Domain Admin using issued certificate → Tier 0 (assumed)
Low-privileged domain users can request certificates from a vulnerable template supplying an arbitrary subject name mapped to a privileged account, achieving full domain compromise.
RBCD Delegation Abuse against Domain Controllers Critical
EVILPC$ -> Configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation on DC01$ → DC01$ -> Impersonate privileged user via S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy → Tier 0 (assumed)
Control over an object with RBCD configured targeting a domain controller allows an intruder to forge authentication tickets for privileged users, leading to Tier 0 control.
DCSync via Direct Domain Rights Critical
MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user -> Invoke DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All on domain head → MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user -> Extract domain credential database → Tier 0
An account holding explicit DCSync replication rights can replicate all domain password hashes directly from the domain controllers, achieving full domain compromise.
GPO Abuse Leading to DC Control Critical
MooseBank DC Extra -> Modify machine startup script or tasks linked to Domain Controllers OU → MooseBank DC Extra -> Execute arbitrary code on domain controllers → Tier 0
Control over a GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU allows an intruder to deploy malicious startup scripts or tasks executed with SYSTEM privileges on all domain controllers.
Unconstrained Delegation Exploitation High
SRV-PRINT01$ -> Wait for privileged user authentication or coerce connection → SRV-PRINT01$ -> Capture TGT from memory cache → Tier 0 (assumed)
Compromise of a non-DC computer configured with unconstrained delegation allows capture of forwarded Kerberos TGTs from administrative users connecting to the host.

Remediation scripts (review before running)

Generated PowerShell using native cmdlets, with object names as placeholders. Treat as a starting point: read it, substitute the real objects, and test in a lab first.

Fix for adcs_esc6
certutil -setreg CA\EditFlags -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
Caveats: Clearing EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 removes requester-supplied SAN support on the CA. Verify that no legitimate applications rely on this flag before executing.
Fix for wdigest_cleartext
Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' -Name 'UseLogonCredential' -Value 0
Caveats: Disables WDigest cleartext credential caching in LSASS. Requires a reboot or service restart to take full effect.
Fix for webclient_on_dc
Stop-Service WebClient -Force Set-Service WebClient -StartupType Disabled
Caveats: Stops and disables the WebClient service to prevent WebDAV-based NTLM coercion.

Generated by a language model from findings computed locally. Verify every recommendation before acting; the deterministic sections of this report are authoritative.

Attack-path map (toward Tier 0)

svc_backup -> Tier 0 via Kerberoastable Tier 0 [Critical] svc_sql_admin -> Tier 0 via Kerberoastable Tier 0 [Critical] adm.gialli -> Tier 0 via AS-REP roastable Tier 0 [Critical] svc_iis_deleg -> Tier 0 via Protocol transition [Critical] SRV-SQL01$ -> Tier 0 via Constrained delegation [Medium] DC01$ -> Tier 0 via RBCD [Critical] EVILPC$ -> DC01$ via Allowed to act on it (RBCD) [Critical] svc_backup -> Tier 0 via Operator group (logon on DCs) [High] RODC01 -> Tier 0 via Tier 0 password cached on RODC [Critical] evil.user -> Tier 0 via Privileged SID history [Critical] dc02.moosebank.local -> Tier 0 via DSRM account logs on over the network [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user -> Tier 0 via DCSync [Critical] MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user -> Tier 0 via Dangerous ACL on Tier 0 [Critical] MOOSEBANK\Exchange Windows Permissions -> Tier 0 via Dangerous ACL on Tier 0 [Critical] MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk -> Tier 0 via Dangerous ACL on Tier 0 [High] MOOSEBANK\IT-Ops -> Tier 0 via Dangerous ACL on Tier 0 [Critical] GPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9} -> Tier 0 via GPP password in SYSVOL [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) NETLOGON (scripts) -> Tier 0 via Writable SYSVOL / NETLOGON [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) mapdrives.bat -> Tier 0 via Password in a SYSVOL script [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk -> Tier 0 via ACL path [High] MOOSEBANK\IT-Ops -> SRV-SQL01$ via ACL path (WriteProperty(User-Account-Restrictions)) [High] Any domain user -> Tier 0 via ACL path [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk -> Tier 0 via Golden gMSA (KDS root key) [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk -> Tier 0 via SCCM System Management [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk -> Tier 0 via Reads LAPS passwords [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) gmsa_sql$ -> Tier 0 via gMSA password read [High] svc_sql_admin -> Tier 0 via Shadow credentials [High] Moose ESC1 Vulnerable -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC1 [Critical] Moose ESC2 AnyPurpose -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC2 [Critical] Moose ESC3 EnrollAgent -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC3 [High] Moose ESC4 WeakACL -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC4 [High] Moose ESC9 NoSecExt -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC9 [High] Moose ESC15 SchemaV1 -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC17 (spoofed update server) [High] Moose ESC15 SchemaV1 -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC15 [High] Moose ESC13 PolicyLink -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC13 [Critical] MOOSEBANK\IT-Ops -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC5 [High] MOOSEBANK-CA -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC6 (SAN in any request) [High] MOOSEBANK-CA -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC7 (CA officer) [High] MOOSEBANK-CA -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC8 (relay to web enrollment) [High] MOOSEBANK-CA -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC11 (relay to RPC) [High] Debug programs -> Tier 0 via Sensitive right on DCs [High] Default Domain Policy -> Tier 0 via Autologon password in a GPO [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) GPO {22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222} -> Tier 0 via Autologon password in a GPO [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Domain Controllers -> Tier 0 via AD CS ESC10 [High] MooseBank DC Extra -> Tier 0 via GPO control -> DCs [Critical] MooseBank DC Extra: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmd -> Tier 0 via GPO runs code from a share [Critical] Workstation Baseline: local Administrators -> Tier 0 via Local admin by GPO [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> svc_backup via Kerberoast [Critical] Any domain user -> svc_sql_admin via Kerberoast [Critical] Any domain user -> adm.gialli via AS-REP roast [Critical] Any domain user -> GPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9} via Read SYSVOL [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> NETLOGON (scripts) via Write logon scripts [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> mapdrives.bat via Read SYSVOL [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> Moose ESC1 Vulnerable via Enroll [Critical] Any domain user -> Moose ESC2 AnyPurpose via Enroll [Critical] Any domain user -> Moose ESC3 EnrollAgent via Enroll [High] Any domain user -> Moose ESC4 WeakACL via Edit the template [High] Any domain user -> Moose ESC9 NoSecExt via Enroll [High] Any domain user -> Moose ESC15 SchemaV1 via Enroll [High] Any domain user -> Moose ESC13 PolicyLink via Enroll [Critical] Any domain user -> MOOSEBANK-CA via Enroll [High] Any domain user -> MOOSEBANK-CA via Coerce a DC, relay [High] Any domain user -> Tier 0 via Zerologon (weak Netlogon secure channel) [Critical] Any domain user -> Tier 0 via noPac (dc02.moosebank.local) [Critical] Any domain user -> Default Domain Policy via Read SYSVOL [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> GPO {22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222} via Read SYSVOL [Critical] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> Workstation Baseline: local Administrators via Already in the group [High] (unverified: the object is not known to lead to Tier 0) Any domain user -> Tier 0 via Coerce a DC, relay to LDAP (RBCD) [High] Any domain user -> svc_iis_deleg via Kerberoast [Medium] Any domain user -> Tier 0 via Breached password (svc_backup) [High] hd.operator1 -> MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk via Member of Helpdesk [High] Tier 0 domain compromise adm.gialli adm.gialli [user] - AS-REP roastable Tier 0 Any domain user Any domain user [entry] - ACL path, Kerberoast, AS-REP roast DC01$ DC01$ [computer] - RBCD Default Domain Policy Default Domain Policy [gpo] - Autologon password in a GPO evil.user evil.user [user] - Privileged SID history EVILPC$ EVILPC$ [computer] - Allowed to act on it (RBCD) GPO {22222222-2222-2222-222… GPO {22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222} [gpo] - Autologon password in a GPO GPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945… GPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9} [gpo] - GPP password in SYSVOL Moose ESC1 Vulnerable Moose ESC1 Vulnerable [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC1 Moose ESC13 PolicyLink Moose ESC13 PolicyLink [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC13 Moose ESC2 AnyPurpose Moose ESC2 AnyPurpose [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC2 MooseBank DC Extra MooseBank DC Extra [gpo] - GPO control -> DCs MooseBank DC Extra: \\fs01.… MooseBank DC Extra: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmd [gpo] - GPO runs code from a share MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user MOOSEBANK\backdoor.user [acl] - DCSync, Dangerous ACL on Tier 0 MOOSEBANK\Exchange Windows … MOOSEBANK\Exchange Windows Permissions [acl] - Dangerous ACL on Tier 0 MOOSEBANK\IT-Ops MOOSEBANK\IT-Ops [acl] - Dangerous ACL on Tier 0, ACL path (WriteProperty(User-Account-Restrictions)), AD CS ESC5 NETLOGON (scripts) NETLOGON (scripts) [file] - Writable SYSVOL / NETLOGON RODC01 RODC01 [dc] - Tier 0 password cached on RODC svc_backup svc_backup [user] - Kerberoastable Tier 0, Operator group (logon on DCs) svc_iis_deleg svc_iis_deleg [user] - Protocol transition svc_sql_admin svc_sql_admin [user] - Kerberoastable Tier 0, Shadow credentials dc02.moosebank.local dc02.moosebank.local [dc] - DSRM account logs on over the network Debug programs Debug programs [gpo] - Sensitive right on DCs Domain Controllers Domain Controllers [gpo] - AD CS ESC10 gmsa_sql$ gmsa_sql$ [msa] - gMSA password read hd.operator1 hd.operator1 [user] - Member of Helpdesk SRV-SQL01$ SRV-SQL01$ [computer] - Constrained delegation mapdrives.bat mapdrives.bat [file] - Password in a SYSVOL script Moose ESC3 EnrollAgent Moose ESC3 EnrollAgent [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC3 Moose ESC4 WeakACL Moose ESC4 WeakACL [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC4 Moose ESC9 NoSecExt Moose ESC9 NoSecExt [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC9 Moose ESC15 SchemaV1 Moose ESC15 SchemaV1 [certtemplate] - AD CS ESC17 (spoofed update server), AD CS ESC15 MOOSEBANK-CA MOOSEBANK-CA [ca] - AD CS ESC6 (SAN in any request), AD CS ESC7 (CA officer), AD CS ESC8 (relay to web enrollment) Workstation Baseline: local… Workstation Baseline: local Administrators [gpo] - Local admin by GPO MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk [acl] - Dangerous ACL on Tier 0, ACL path, Golden gMSA (KDS root key)

Showing the 35 highest-severity sources and the boxes their paths run through; 15 more escalation source(s) are in the findings tables below.

Each box is a principal or object that has a path to Tier 0; the arrow is the technique. Colour is the severity. Hover an arrow for the exact path. The dark box Any domain user is where an attacker starts with no special rights: every arrow out of it needs nothing more than an ordinary account (or, for a guessed password, none). Dashed arrows: the right is real but the object it is held over is not known to lead to Tier 0, so that step is an assumption; check those first. Boxes joined by an arrow are hops of one chain: a principal that holds a right over the next box (or owns it, or is a member of it) and so inherits what it reaches (2 steps at most). Hover a box to light up its whole path. This is derived from the deterministic findings, not a live reachability test.

Trust map

partner.example Inbound external legacy-forest.local BiDirectional forest moosebank.local

Red = a trust with a weak setting (RC4, no SID filtering, or TGT delegation). Dashed = forest trust. See the Domain Configuration findings for detail.

Tier 0 members (17)

These principals already hold Tier 0 rights, so they are the target of the paths above, not a source. Compromising any of them is domain compromise.

PrincipalKindStatusLast logonPassword ageTier 0 through
SRV-BACKUP01$computerenabled3 d ago10 dAdministrators (builtin)
foreigndisabledneverAdministrators (builtin)
svc_backupservice accountenabled1 d ago700 dBackup Operators
svc_sql_adminservice accountenabled1 d ago1200 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.bianchiuserenabled2 d ago400 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.exdipendenteuserdisabled300 d ago500 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.ferrariuserenabled1 d ago50 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.gialliuserenabled3 d ago100 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.neriuserenabled1 d ago20 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.olduserenabled200 d ago900 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.rossiuserenabled1 d ago60 dDomain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin)
adm.verdiuserenabled1 d ago30 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
Administratoruserenabled5 d ago800 dDomain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners
dns.adminuserenabled5 d ago90 dDnsAdmins
helpdesk.leaduserenabled1 d ago80 dAccount Operators
hidden.adminuserenabled4 d ago40 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)
loop.useruserenabled1 d ago40 dDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)

Regulatory frameworks

Checks with no finding, out of the checks mapped to each control. A clean check is evidence for the technical, directory-side part of a control, not compliance with it. Bars take the colour of the worst finding; the full tables are under Details.

7%clean
NIS2
14 of 186 evaluated checks clean
21(2)(b)Incident handling1/4
21(2)(c)Business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery1/14
21(2)(e)Security in maintenance of systems, vulnerability handling11/106
21(2)(g)Basic cyber hygiene practices13/127
21(2)(h)Cryptography and encryption3/20
21(2)(i)Access control policies and asset management10/117
21(2)(j)Multi-factor or continuous authenticationno check
7%clean
ISO/IEC 27001
14 of 186 evaluated checks clean
A.5.15Access control5/90
A.5.16Identity management2/27
A.5.17Authentication information6/53
A.5.18Access rights5/90
A.8.2Privileged access rights3/68
A.8.5Secure authentication6/53
A.8.8Management of technical vulnerabilities1/10
A.8.9Configuration management11/104
A.8.13Information backup1/14
A.8.14Redundancy of information processing facilities1/14
A.8.15Logging1/4
A.8.16Monitoring activities1/4
A.8.20Networks security1/25
A.8.24Use of cryptography3/20
7%clean
DORA
14 of 186 evaluated checks clean
9(2)ICT security policies and tools for resilience, integrity and confidentiality11/104
9(4)(b)Sound network and infrastructure management11/104
9(4)(c)Logical access limited to what is required5/90
9(4)(d)Strong authentication, protection of cryptographic keys8/67
9(4)(f)Patches and updates1/10
10(1)Detection of anomalous activities1/4
12(1)Backup, restoration and recovery1/14
7%clean
GDPR
14 of 186 evaluated checks clean
32(1)(a)Pseudonymisation and encryption3/20
32(1)(b)Ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience14/177
32(1)(c)Timely restoration of availability and access1/14

Categories

Kerberos
39
17 of 17 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Privileged Access
42
19 of 19 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Account Hygiene
26
18 of 20 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Domain Configuration
26
23 of 29 check(s) triggered
worst High
Operational Health
10
10 of 10 check(s) triggered
worst High
Permissions
23
16 of 17 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Certificate Services
17
17 of 19 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Host Hardening
50
47 of 50 check(s) triggered
worst Critical
Password Quality
8
5 of 5 check(s) triggered
worst Critical

Top risks

Critical Dangerous permission on Tier 0 object

A non-default principal holds control rights (GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, member / SPN / key credential writes, forced password reset) on the domain head, AdminSDHolder, the Domain Controllers OU or a privileged group.

4 objects · T1098 · details
Critical Dangerous permission held by a non-privileged principal

A non-privileged principal holds a control right (GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, member/SPN/key-credential write, forced password reset) over a user, computer, group or OU. This is a delegation path to whatever that object controls. Found only with a deep ACL sweep.

3 objects · T1098 · details
Critical Privileged account with SPN (Kerberoastable)

Any authenticated user can request a service ticket for an account with a servicePrincipalName and crack it offline. When that account is Tier 0, a cracked password means domain compromise.

2 objects · T1558.003 · seen in recent attacks · details
Critical Kerberos pre-authentication disabled (AS-REP roastable)

With DONT_REQ_PREAUTH set, anyone who can reach a DC (no credentials needed) can request an AS-REP for the account and crack it offline.

2 objects · T1558.004 · seen in recent attacks · details
Critical Resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD) configured

msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity lets the listed principals impersonate any user to this object. Often left behind by attacks (e.g. via MachineAccountQuota + relay).

2 objects · T1550.003 · details
Critical sIDHistory populated

sIDHistory adds the listed SIDs to the logon token. Legitimate after a migration, a persistence technique otherwise. A SID of this same domain, or of a privileged group, is never legitimate.

2 objects · T1134.005 · details

Directory at a glance

Findings by severity
Critical: 28High: 93Medium: 86Low: 34241findings
Critical (28, 11.6%)
High (93, 38.6%)
Medium (86, 35.7%)
Low (34, 14.1%)
Findings by category
Kerberos: 39Privileged Access: 42Account Hygiene: 26Domain Configuration: 26Permissions: 23Certificate Services: 17Host Hardening: 50Password Quality: 8Operational Health: 10241findings
Kerberos (39, 16.2%)
Privileged Access (42, 17.4%)
Account Hygiene (26, 10.8%)
Domain Configuration (26, 10.8%)
Permissions (23, 9.5%)
Certificate Services (17, 7.1%)
Host Hardening (50, 20.7%)
Password Quality (8, 3.3%)
Operational Health (10, 4.1%)
Tier 0 composition
Active admins: 11Dormant (90d+): 1Service accounts: 2Disabled: 1Computers: 1Foreign / unresolved: 117Tier 0
Active admins (11, 64.7%)
Dormant (90d+) (1, 5.9%)
Service accounts (2, 11.8%)
Disabled (1, 5.9%)
Computers (1, 5.9%)
Foreign / unresolved (1, 5.9%)
Enabled users by activity
Logon within 180d: 60Inactive 180d+: 2Never logged on: 264enabled users
Logon within 180d (60, 93.8%)
Inactive 180d+ (2, 3.1%)
Never logged on (2, 3.1%)
All accounts
User accounts: 59Service accounts: 7Disabled (users and MSAs): 5Computers: 35106accounts
User accounts (59, 55.7%)
Service accounts (7, 6.6%)
Disabled (users and MSAs) (5, 4.7%)
Computers (35, 33%)
Password age (enabled accounts)
Changed within 90d: 5191 to 365 days: 5Over 1 year: 1066accounts
Changed within 90d (51, 77.3%)
91 to 365 days (5, 7.6%)
Over 1 year (10, 15.2%)
Password settings (enabled accounts)
Expires normally: 58Never expires: 6Password not required: 266accounts
Expires normally (58, 87.9%)
Never expires (6, 9.1%)
Password not required (2, 3%)
Computers by operating system
11 Enterprise: 20Server 2022 Standard: 4Server 2019 Standard: 3Unknown: 210 Pro: 1Other: 535computers
11 Enterprise (20, 57.1%)
Server 2022 Standard (4, 11.4%)
Server 2019 Standard (3, 8.6%)
Unknown (2, 5.7%)
10 Pro (1, 2.9%)
Other (5, 14.3%)
Enabled computers by activity
Seen within 90d: 31Stale 90d+: 2Never logged on: 235computers
Seen within 90d (31, 88.6%)
Stale 90d+ (2, 5.7%)
Never logged on (2, 5.7%)
Groups by scope
Global: 16Domain local: 7Universal: 528groups
Global (16, 57.1%)
Domain local (7, 25%)
Universal (5, 17.9%)
Password quality (enabled accounts)
No weakness found: 55Empty password: 1Cleartext stored: 1Breached password: 2Default / username: 2Shared password: 566accounts
No weakness found (55, 83.3%)
Empty password (1, 1.5%)
Cleartext stored (1, 1.5%)
Breached password (2, 3%)
Default / username (2, 3%)
Shared password (5, 7.6%)

Summary by category

CategoryCriticalHighMediumLowChecks triggered
Kerberos62012117
Privileged Access21225319
Account Hygiene1710818
Domain Configuration089923
Operational Health046010
Permissions9131016
Certificate Services3122017
Host Hardening610211347
Password Quality17005

Regulatory mapping

Which controls the checks of this report give evidence for. The mapping covers the technical, directory-side part of each control: a row with no findings is evidence for that part, not compliance with the control. Policies, processes, people and other systems are outside a directory snapshot.

NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Art. 21(2)

In Italy: Art. 24 of Legislative Decree 138/2024. Running IDWolf on a schedule is also evidence for point (f), assessing the effectiveness of the measures.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
21(2)(b)Incident handling4033MediumGaps found
21(2)(c)Business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery1401313HighGaps found
21(2)(e)Security in maintenance of systems, vulnerability handling106095104CriticalGaps found
21(2)(g)Basic cyber hygiene practices1270114130CriticalGaps found
21(2)(h)Cryptography and encryption2001722HighGaps found
21(2)(i)Access control policies and asset management1170107171CriticalGaps found
21(2)(j)Multi-factor or continuous authentication0000No check

ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A

Periodic runs with -CompareTo support the reviews of A.5.35 and A.5.36.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
A.5.15Access control90085138CriticalGaps found
A.5.16Identity management2702534CriticalGaps found
A.5.17Authentication information5304785CriticalGaps found
A.5.18Access rights90085138CriticalGaps found
A.8.2Privileged access rights68065111CriticalGaps found
A.8.5Secure authentication5304785CriticalGaps found
A.8.8Management of technical vulnerabilities100910CriticalGaps found
A.8.9Configuration management104093101CriticalGaps found
A.8.13Information backup1401313HighGaps found
A.8.14Redundancy of information processing facilities1401313HighGaps found
A.8.15Logging4033MediumGaps found
A.8.16Monitoring activities4033MediumGaps found
A.8.20Networks security2502426HighGaps found
A.8.24Use of cryptography2001722HighGaps found

DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

Applies to financial entities. The detailed access-control and authentication requirements sit in the ICT risk management RTS, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
9(2)ICT security policies and tools for resilience, integrity and confidentiality104093101CriticalGaps found
9(4)(b)Sound network and infrastructure management104093101CriticalGaps found
9(4)(c)Logical access limited to what is required90085138CriticalGaps found
9(4)(d)Strong authentication, protection of cryptographic keys6705999CriticalGaps found
9(4)(f)Patches and updates100910CriticalGaps found
10(1)Detection of anomalous activities4033MediumGaps found
12(1)Backup, restoration and recovery1401313HighGaps found

GDPR, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 32(1)

Running IDWolf regularly is also evidence for point (d), regularly testing and evaluating the effectiveness of the measures.

ControlRequirementChecksNot evaluatedChecks triggeredFindingsWorstStatus
32(1)(a)Pseudonymisation and encryption2001722HighGaps found
32(1)(b)Ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience1770163232CriticalGaps found
32(1)(c)Timely restoration of availability and access1401313HighGaps found

Each check lists its controls under "Findings by check"; the CSV and the JSON Lines carry them in the Controls / controls field.

Benchmarks (CIS, DISA STIG)

Which benchmark items this report measures, one row each. The list is partial on purpose: an item with no check says why. A row with no findings is evidence for the part a directory snapshot can see, not a passed audit, and IDWolf never turns a benchmark into a score.

DISA Active Directory Domain STIG, V3R6 (5 January 2026)

The domain STIG, not the Windows Server one: its 36 requirements are about the directory itself. About half are procedural or about the network around AD (cross-domain solutions, VPN, IDS, contingency plans) and cannot be read from a snapshot; those are listed with the reason. The severities are the STIG ones (CAT I / II / III). Measured here: 18 of 36 items.

ItemLevelRequirementChecksNot evaluatedFindingsWorstStatus
V-243466CAT IMembership of Enterprise Admins restricted to forest management accountsschema_enterprise_admins_populated02MediumGaps found
V-243467CAT IMembership of Domain Admins restricted to domain management accountsprivileged_group_oversized, privileged_kerberoastable, privileged_computer_member04CriticalGaps found
V-243468CAT IISeparate accounts for managing domain member servers
Procedural: a snapshot cannot tell which account is used where.
none00No check
V-243469CAT IISeparate accounts for managing domain workstations
Procedural: a snapshot cannot tell which account is used where.
none00No check
V-243470CAT IDelegation of privileged accounts prohibitedprivileged_account_delegable013HighGaps found
V-243471CAT IILocal administrator accounts do not share the same passwordlaps_not_deployed, laps_missing, laps_stale04MediumGaps found
V-243472CAT IISeparate smart cards for Enterprise Admin and Domain Admin accounts
Out: the card behind a certificate mapping is not in the directory.
none00No check
V-243473CAT IISeparate accounts for public facing and internal servers
Procedural.
none00No check
V-243475CAT IIDomain controllers blocked from Internet access
Out: network state, not directory state.
none00No check
V-243476CAT IINT hash of smart-card accounts rotated at least every 60 days
IDWolf uses -PasswordMaxAgeDays (365 by default): pass -PasswordMaxAgeDays 60 for the STIG threshold.
smartcard_password_not_rotated01MediumGaps found
V-243477CAT IIDomain administrators are members of Protected Usersprotected_users_empty, privileged_logon_unrestricted015MediumGaps found
V-243478CAT IIDomain-joined systems other than DCs are not trusted for delegationunconstrained_delegation02HighGaps found
V-243479CAT IIDSRM password changed at least annually on each DC
Out: the DSRM password age is not exposed by AD. dsrm_logon_behavior covers the logon behaviour, a different requirement.
none00No check
V-243480CAT IIDomain functional level still supported by Microsoftfunctional_level_outdated01MediumGaps found
V-243481CAT IIAccess to need-to-know information restricted
Procedural.
none00No check
V-243482CAT ICross-domain solution for trusts between classification levels
Procedural.
none00No check
V-243483CAT IControlled interface between DoD and non-DoD systems
Procedural.
none00No check
V-243484CAT IISID filtering configured on external and forest truststrust_sid_filtering_disabled, sid_history04CriticalGaps found
V-243485CAT IISelective Authentication enabled on outgoing forest truststrust_no_selective_auth02LowGaps found
V-243486CAT IIAnonymous Logon and Everyone not in Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Accesspre_win2000_anonymous01HighGaps found
V-243487CAT IIMembership of Group Policy Creator Owners and Incoming Forest Trust Builders limited
Partial: members of Group Policy Creator Owners count as Tier 0 throughout the report, but no check reports the group on its own.
none00No check
V-243488CAT IIIDelegated accounts removed from built-in administrative groupsoperator_groups_populated02HighGaps found
V-243489CAT IIRODC architecture and configuration comply with directory requirementsrodc_prp_too_broad, rodc_tier0_revealed, rodc_tier0_unprotected, rodc_krbtgt_password_old04CriticalGaps found
V-243490CAT IIUse of administrative accounts is monitoredaudit_policy_insufficient, audit_advanced_policy_missing01MediumGaps found
V-243491CAT IIRemote logons with local accounts are monitored
Out: event monitoring, not a directory setting.
none00No check
V-243492CAT IIRemote desktop logons are monitored
Out: event monitoring, not a directory setting.
none00No check
V-243493CAT IIActive Directory data backed up daily
IDWolf flags a backup older than 7 days; the STIG asks for daily, weekly where availability is categorised low.
ad_backup_overdue01HighGaps found
V-243494CAT IIICross-directory authentication configuration documented
Procedural.
none00No check
V-243495CAT IIVPN protects directory traffic across enclave boundaries
Out: network state.
none00No check
V-243496CAT IIOutside accounts removed from highly privileged groupsprivileged_foreign_member01HighGaps found
V-243497CAT IIInter-site replication enabled and occurring at least dailyreplication_stale, replication_failures02MediumGaps found
V-243498CAT IIVPN traffic inspected by the network IDS
Out: network state.
none00No check
V-243499CAT IIIActive Directory added to the organization contingency plan
Procedural.
none00No check
V-243500CAT IIActive Directory supported by multiple domain controllerssingle_dc00No findings
V-243501CAT IIIImpact of CPCON changes on cross-directory authentication documented
Procedural.
none00No check
V-269097CAT IIKerberos logging enabled on DCs hosting AD CS
Out: that registry value is read on the DC, not from the directory.
none00No check

Each check lists its items under "Findings by check"; the CSV and the JSON Lines carry them in the Benchmarks / benchmarks field.

Findings by check

CriticalDangerous permission on Tier 0 objectdangerous_ace_tier0 · Permissions4 objects
Why it matters. A non-default principal holds control rights (GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, member / SPN / key credential writes, forced password reset) on the domain head, AdminSDHolder, the Domain Controllers OU or a privileged group.
Remediation. Remove the ACE. For AdminSDHolder, SDProp will propagate the fix to all protected accounts within 60 minutes.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMOOSEBANK\backdoor.useraclTarget: AdminSDHolder. GenericAll.
CriticalMOOSEBANK\Exchange Windows PermissionsaclTarget: DomainRoot. WriteDacl on domain head. Exchange group: without split permissions it can grant itself DCSync (PrivExchange); remove the ACE with Exchange's split-permissions setup or the published fix.
CriticalMOOSEBANK\IT-OpsaclTarget: DomainControllersOU. WriteProperty(gPLink).
HighMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclTarget: DomainRoot. ExtendedRight(User-Force-Change-Password) on descendant user objects.
CriticalDangerous permission held by a non-privileged principaldangerous_ace_anywhere · Permissions3 objects
Why it matters. A non-privileged principal holds a control right (GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, member/SPN/key-credential write, forced password reset) over a user, computer, group or OU. This is a delegation path to whatever that object controls. Found only with a deep ACL sweep.
Remediation. Remove the ACE or scope the delegation to the minimum needed. Prioritize ACEs over Tier 0 or over objects that lead to Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalNT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersaclWriteDacl over organizationalUnit 'Servers'.
HighMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclGenericAll over user 'adm.bianchi'.
HighMOOSEBANK\IT-OpsaclWriteProperty(User-Account-Restrictions) over computer 'SRV-SQL01$'.
CriticalPrivileged account with SPN (Kerberoastable)privileged_kerberoastable · Kerberos2 objects
Why it matters. Any authenticated user can request a service ticket for an account with a servicePrincipalName and crack it offline. When that account is Tier 0, a cracked password means domain compromise.
Remediation. Remove the SPN from the privileged account, or move the service to a gMSA. Privileged identities should never run services.
Attack it enables. T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Seen in attacks: Kerberoasting of a privileged account, seen in ransomware intrusions through 2026.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243467
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticalsvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators. SPN: backup/bkp01.moosebank.local. Password age: 700 days.
Criticalsvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin). SPN: MSSQLSvc/sql01.moosebank.local:1433. Password age: 1200 days.
CriticalKerberos pre-authentication disabled (AS-REP roastable)asrep_roastable · Kerberos2 objects
Why it matters. With DONT_REQ_PREAUTH set, anyone who can reach a DC (no credentials needed) can request an AS-REP for the account and crack it offline.
Remediation. Clear "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" unless a documented legacy dependency exists; if it does, enforce a long random password.
Attack it enables. T1558.004 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: AS-REP Roasting
Seen in attacks: AS-REP roasting.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticaladm.gialliuserPre-authentication disabled on a privileged account (Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin)). Password age: 100 days.
Highsvc_legacyuserPre-authentication disabled. Password age: 1000 days.
CriticalResource-based constrained delegation (RBCD) configuredrbcd_configured · Kerberos2 objects
Why it matters. msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity lets the listed principals impersonate any user to this object. Often left behind by attacks (e.g. via MachineAccountQuota + relay).
Remediation. Verify each allowed principal is expected. Clear the attribute if unknown. Any RBCD on a domain controller must be treated as an active compromise indicator.
Attack it enables. T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalDC01$computerPrincipals allowed to act on behalf of other identities: EVILPC$. Target is a DOMAIN CONTROLLER.
MediumSRV-APP01$computerPrincipals allowed to act on behalf of other identities: SRV-WEB01$.
CriticalsIDHistory populatedsid_history · Account Hygiene2 objects
Why it matters. sIDHistory adds the listed SIDs to the logon token. Legitimate after a migration, a persistence technique otherwise. A SID of this same domain, or of a privileged group, is never legitimate.
Remediation. Clear sIDHistory once the migration is complete and resource ACLs have been re-permissioned.
Attack it enables. T1134.005 Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243484
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticalevil.userusersIDHistory: S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512. S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512 is a privileged SID (RID 512).
Mediummigrated.userusersIDHistory: S-1-5-21-777777777-888888888-999999999-1234.
CriticalNon-default principal with DCSync rightsdcsync_rights · Permissions2 objects
Why it matters. Replicating Directory Changes All on the domain head lets the principal retrieve every password hash, including krbtgt.
Remediation. Remove the right unless it belongs to a documented synchronization account; protect any such account as Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMOOSEBANK\backdoor.useraclRights on domain head: ExtendedRight(DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All).
HighMOOSEBANK\MSOL_a1b2c3d4e5f6aclRights on domain head: ExtendedRight(DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All). Looks like an Entra Connect / sync account: expected, but it is a Tier 0 credential and must be protected as such.
CriticalAutologon password stored in a GPOgpo_autologon_password · Host Hardening2 objects
Why it matters. A GPO writes the Winlogon DefaultPassword (registry value or Group Policy Preferences registry item). GPO files sit in SYSVOL, readable by every domain user, so the password of the autologon account is in clear text for anyone.
Remediation. Remove the DefaultPassword setting from the GPO, change the password of that account, and use a kiosk / assigned-access setup or LAPS-style local accounts instead of autologon.
Attack it enables. T1552.006 Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalDefault Domain PolicygpoAutologon password in Winlogon DefaultPassword registry value; AutoAdminLogon = 1. Value not collected. GPO linked to the domain root.
CriticalGPO {22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222}gpoAutologon password in Group Policy Preferences registry item. Value not collected. GPO not found among the GPO templates. File: \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\Policies\{22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222}\Machine\Preferences\Registry\Registry.xml
CriticalGPO runs a script or task from a share outside SYSVOLgpo_runs_code_from_share · Permissions2 objects
Why it matters. A GPO starts a script or a scheduled task from a network path that is not SYSVOL or NETLOGON. Whoever can write to that share runs code on every machine the GPO applies to, often as SYSTEM, and SYSVOL's protections don't cover it.
Remediation. Move the script into the GPO's folder in SYSVOL, or make sure only Tier 0 admins (for GPOs on DCs or the domain root) can write to that share and file. Check share and NTFS permissions both.
Attack it enables. T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMooseBank DC Extra: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmdgpoMachine Startup script: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmd. GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.
MediumWorkstation Baseline: \\fs01\inventory\agent.exegpoMachine scheduled task 'Inventory': \\fs01\inventory\agent.exe. GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).
Criticalkrbtgt password not rotatedkrbtgt_password_old · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. The krbtgt key signs every TGT in the domain. Until it is rotated twice, any Golden Ticket forged with a previously stolen key stays valid, including after an incident is considered closed.
Remediation. Rotate the krbtgt password twice, waiting for full replication (and at least the maximum TGT lifetime, 10h by default) between the two resets. Use Microsoft's New-KrbtgtKeys.ps1 or an equivalent procedure, then schedule a recurring rotation (e.g. every 180 days).
Attack it enables. T1558.001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticalkrbtgtuserkrbtgt password last set 1500 days ago (threshold 180 days, critical above 365).
CriticalConstrained delegation with protocol transitionconstrained_delegation_protocol_transition · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION lets the account obtain a ticket for any user (including admins) to the listed services without that user ever authenticating (S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy). The service part of the SPN is not protected, so any service on the target host is reachable.
Remediation. Use Kerberos-only constrained delegation where possible, restrict the target list, and protect the source account as Tier 0 when the targets are sensitive.
Attack it enables. T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticalsvc_iis_deleguserProtocol transition (any-auth) to: cifs/dc01.moosebank.local, cifs/DC01. Targets include domain controller services: cifs/dc01.moosebank.local, cifs/DC01.
CriticalTier 0 credentials cached on a read-only domain controllerrodc_tier0_revealed · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. msDS-RevealedList of an RODC shows that the password of a Tier 0 account has been replicated to it. Anyone who gets local admin or the disk of that RODC can extract the hash and use it against the whole domain. When the RODC is administered (managedBy) by a principal that is not Tier 0, that principal is already one step from domain admin.
Remediation. Reset the password of every Tier 0 account listed (twice for krbtgt-like accounts), fix the password replication policy so it cannot happen again, and keep RODC administration (managedBy) out of reach of non-Tier 0 principals.
Attack it enables. T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243489
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalRODC01dcPassword of Tier 0 account(s) cached on RODC RODC01: adm.neri. Administered (managedBy) by Helpdesk, not Tier 0.
CriticalNon-standard primaryGroupIDhidden_primary_group · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. Membership through primaryGroupID is not stored in the group's member attribute, so it is invisible in most consoles and reviews. A classic persistence trick when set to a privileged group.
Remediation. Set primaryGroupID back to Domain Users (513) / Domain Computers (515) and review how it was changed.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticalhidden.adminuserprimaryGroupID = 512 (Domain Admins): privileged group membership not visible in the member attribute.
CriticalGroup Policy Preferences password in SYSVOLgpp_cpassword · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. cpassword values are encrypted with a key Microsoft published (MS14-025): any domain user can read SYSVOL and decrypt them.
Remediation. Delete the preference item, remove the XML, and change the password of the referenced account everywhere it is used.
Attack it enables. T1552.006 Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences
Seen in attacks: Group Policy Preferences passwords in SYSVOL, routinely harvested in intrusions.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalGPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}gpocpassword found in \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\Machine\Preferences\Groups\Groups.xml
CriticalNETLOGON or SYSVOL Policies folder writable by non-Tier 0 principalssysvol_writable · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. A principal outside Tier 0 can write to the NETLOGON scripts folder or the SYSVOL Policies folder. Logon scripts and GPO files there run on every computer and for every user in scope, so write access is code execution across the domain, DCs included.
Remediation. Remove the write, modify or full control entries for that principal from the folder (and check the files below it), keeping the defaults: Administrators, SYSTEM, Server Operators, CREATOR OWNER and read-only for Authenticated Users.
Attack it enables. T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalNETLOGON (scripts)fileWrite access for: MOOSEBANK\Domain Users (Modify, Synchronize). Folder: \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\scripts
CriticalTemplate allows requester-supplied subject with client-auth (ESC1)adcs_esc1 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A published template lets a low-privileged enroller supply an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name, issues a certificate usable for client authentication, and requires neither manager approval nor an enrollment agent signature. Anyone who can enroll can obtain a certificate as any account, including a domain admin.
Remediation. Remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT, or require manager approval, or restrict enrollment to a trusted group. Re-issue affected templates.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Seen in attacks: AD CS certificate template abuse (ESC1), common in ransomware intrusions.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMoose ESC1 VulnerablecerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set; client-auth EKU; no manager approval; no enrollment-agent signature.
CriticalTemplate with Any Purpose or no EKU enrollable by low-privileged users (ESC2)adcs_esc2 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A published template grants the Any Purpose EKU (or no EKU at all, a subordinate-CA-equivalent certificate) to low-privileged enrollers with no approval. The resulting certificate can be used for almost anything, including impersonation.
Remediation. Constrain the template EKUs to what the use case needs, require approval, and restrict enrollment.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Seen in attacks: AD CS certificate template abuse (ESC2).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMoose ESC2 AnyPurposecerttemplateEnrollable by NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users; Any Purpose EKU; no manager approval.
CriticalTemplate with an issuance policy linked to a group (ESC13)adcs_esc13 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. The template carries an issuance policy (msPKI-Certificate-Policy) whose OID is linked to an AD group via msDS-OIDToGroupLink. A certificate from this template grants the holder the rights of that group for the certificate lifetime. When the template is enrollable by low-privileged users and the linked group is privileged, enrolling is a direct privilege escalation.
Remediation. Remove the msDS-OIDToGroupLink on the issuance-policy OID, or restrict enrollment on the template to trusted principals. Review why a certificate issuance policy is bound to a group.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMoose ESC13 PolicyLinkcerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; issuance policy 'High Assurance Policy' linked to group 'Domain Admins' (privileged): the certificate grants that group's rights.
CriticalNetlogon secure channel enforcement disabled (ZeroLogon exposure)netlogon_vulnerable_channel · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO explicitly turns off Netlogon secure-channel enforcement (FullSecureChannelProtection = 0 or RequireStrongKey = 0). This re-opens CVE-2020-1472 (ZeroLogon) and insecure netlogon channels, which allow resetting a DC machine password and taking over the domain.
Remediation. Remove the GPO weakening and keep FullSecureChannelProtection = 1 and RequireStrongKey = 1 (the enforced default since the August 2020 updates).
Attack it enables. T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Seen in attacks: ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), still exploited.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalDomain ControllersgpoNetlogon enforcement weakened (FullSecureChannelProtection = n/a, RequireStrongKey = 0).
CriticalDomain controller missing the noPac fix (CVE-2021-42278 / 42287)nopac_unpatched_dc · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. The build of the DC (read live: build number and update revision) is older than the November 2021 cumulative update. Any user who can create or control a computer account can rename it after a DC, get a ticket for it and impersonate a domain admin (noPac / sAMAccountName spoofing). With the default machine account quota every user can do it.
Remediation. Install the current cumulative update on every DC (the fix shipped in November 2021: KB5008380 / KB5008602 and the matching cumulative updates). Set ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to 0 as defence in depth.
Attack it enables. T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Seen in attacks: noPac (CVE-2021-42278/42287), still used by ransomware operators.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticaldc02.moosebank.localdcBuild 17763.2237, fixed from 17763.2300. Machine account quota: 10, so any user can exploit it.
CriticalAlwaysInstallElevated set by a GPOalways_install_elevated · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO sets AlwaysInstallElevated = 1. When both the machine and the user side are set, any user can install an MSI package as SYSTEM, a one-step local privilege escalation on every computer in scope.
Remediation. Remove AlwaysInstallElevated from the GPO on both sides (Computer and User Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Installer) and deploy software with a management tool instead.
Attack it enables. T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalDefault Domain PolicygpoMachine-side AlwaysInstallElevated = 1; the user side is set too (in this or another GPO): any user gets SYSTEM. GPO linked to the domain root.
CriticalPoint and Print lets non-admins install printer drivers (PrintNightmare)point_and_print_unsafe · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. An effective GPO sets RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators to 0, which undoes the August 2021 PrintNightmare fix (CVE-2021-34527): any user can install a printer driver, and a malicious driver runs as SYSTEM. With NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall = 1 or UpdatePromptSettings set to skip the prompt, it happens silently.
Remediation. Remove the setting or set RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators to 1, and allow Point and Print only from an approved list of print servers (PackagePointAndPrintServerList).
Attack it enables. T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Seen in attacks: PrintNightmare (Point and Print).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalDomain ControllersgpoRestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators = 0; NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall = 1; UpdatePromptSettings = not configured (drivers install with no prompt).
CriticalNon-privileged principal can edit a GPO linked to Tier 0gpo_dangerous_acl · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. A non-privileged principal holds write/control rights (GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, WriteProperty, or ownership) on a Group Policy object that is linked to the Domain Controllers OU or the domain root. Whoever can edit that GPO can push settings, scripts or scheduled tasks to the domain controllers, which is equivalent to domain compromise (BloodHound GPO control path).
Remediation. Remove the write permission from the GPO (gpcFileSysPath and the GPC object), or re-scope the delegation. GPOs linked to the DC OU or domain root must be editable only by Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
CriticalMooseBank DC ExtragpoMOOSEBANK\Helpdesk holds GenericWrite on this GPO, linked (enabled) to the Domain Controllers OU.
CriticalAccount with an empty passwordpwq_empty_password · Password Quality1 object
Why it matters. The account has a blank password and can be logged into with no secret.
Remediation. Set a compliant password immediately and clear PASSWD_NOTREQD.
Attack it enables. T1078 Valid Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Criticaltemp.useruserEmpty password.
HighPrivileged account can be delegatedprivileged_account_delegable · Kerberos13 objects
Why it matters. Tier 0 account neither marked "sensitive and cannot be delegated" nor in Protected Users: its credentials can be captured and replayed through any delegation-enabled host it touches.
Remediation. Add the account to Protected Users (after testing: it disables NTLM, DES/RC4 and delegation for it) or set NOT_DELEGATED.
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243470
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highadm.bianchiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highadm.ferrariuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highadm.gialliuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highadm.neriuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highadm.olduserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highadm.verdiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
HighAdministratoruserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highdns.adminuserMember of DnsAdmins; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highhelpdesk.leaduserMember of Account Operators; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highhidden.adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highloop.useruserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highsvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
Highsvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.
HighPrivileged account password not changedprivileged_password_old · Privileged Access5 objects
Why it matters. An old password on a Tier 0 account increases exposure to reuse, past leaks and offline cracking of previously captured hashes.
Remediation. Reset the password and enforce rotation (or smart card / passwordless) for privileged accounts.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highadm.bianchiuserPassword last set 400 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
Highadm.olduserPassword last set 900 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
HighAdministratoruserPassword last set 800 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners.
Highsvc_backupuserPassword last set 700 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Backup Operators.
Highsvc_sql_adminuserPassword last set 1200 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
HighUser account with SPN (Kerberoastable)kerberoastable_user · Kerberos4 objects
Why it matters. Service account whose ticket can be requested and cracked offline by any domain user. Risk grows with password age and weak encryption types.
Remediation. Migrate the service to a gMSA. If not possible, set a random password of 25+ characters, enforce AES only (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 24) and rotate it regularly.
Attack it enables. T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Seen in attacks: Kerberoasting, seen in ransomware intrusions through 2026.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highsvc_webuserSPN: HTTP/web01.moosebank.local. Password age: 500 days (over 365 days).
Mediumsvc_appuserSPN: HTTP/app01.moosebank.local, HTTP/app01. Password age: 100 days.
Mediumsvc_iis_deleguserSPN: HTTP/iis01.moosebank.local. Password age: 50 days.
Mediumsvc_smsa$msaStandalone managed service account (sMSA) with SPN and a settable password. SPN: MSSQLSvc/legacy.moosebank.local:1433.
HighSPN account without AES-only encryptionspn_account_rc4 · Kerberos4 objects
Why it matters. An SPN account whose msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is unset or lacks AES can receive RC4-encrypted service tickets, which crack orders of magnitude faster than AES.
Remediation. Set msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes to 24 (AES128+AES256) after verifying the service supports AES, then reset the password so AES keys are generated.
Attack it enables. T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Seen in attacks: Kerberoasting with RC4 tickets (faster offline cracking).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.24; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highsvc_backupusermsDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 4: no AES, only RC4/DES tickets.
Mediumsvc_appusermsDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes not set: encryption type falls back to domain/DC defaults, RC4 possible.
Mediumsvc_smsa$msasMSA msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 4: RC4 possible.
Mediumsvc_sql_adminusermsDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes not set: encryption type falls back to domain/DC defaults, RC4 possible.
HighUnconstrained delegation on non-DC principalunconstrained_delegation · Kerberos2 objects
Why it matters. Hosts trusted for unconstrained delegation cache the TGT of every user that authenticates to them. Combined with coercion (e.g. printer bug, PetitPotam) this yields a DC TGT and full domain compromise.
Remediation. Replace with constrained or resource-based constrained delegation. Add Tier 0 accounts to Protected Users or mark them "sensitive and cannot be delegated".
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243478
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighSRV-PRINT01$computerTRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION set on a computer that is not a domain controller. OS: Windows Server 2019 Standard.
Highunconstrained.useruserTRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION set on a user that is not a domain controller.
HighBuilt-in operator group populatedoperator_groups_populated · Privileged Access2 objects
Why it matters. Account, Server, Print and Backup Operators can log on to DCs and have rights (service control, backup of NTDS.dit, driver loading, modifying most accounts) that lead to domain admin. They are Tier 0 in practice.
Remediation. Empty these groups and replace them with narrowly delegated permissions.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243488
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highhelpdesk.leaduserMember of Account Operators via: Account Operators > helpdesk.lead. Account enabled.
Highsvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators via: Backup Operators > svc_backup. Account enabled.
HighPassword not required (PASSWD_NOTREQD)password_not_required · Account Hygiene2 objects
Why it matters. The account may have, or be set to, an empty password regardless of domain policy.
Remediation. Clear PASSWD_NOTREQD (Set-ADAccountControl -PasswordNotRequired $false) and set a compliant password.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highadm.ferrariuserPASSWD_NOTREQD set on a privileged account.
Mediumprinter.svcuserPASSWD_NOTREQD set.
HighPossible password in descriptionpassword_in_description · Account Hygiene2 objects
Why it matters. The description attribute is readable by every authenticated user. The collector masked the value.
Remediation. Remove the credential from the description and reset the password: consider it disclosed.
Attack it enables. T1552 Unsecured Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highprinter.svcuserDescription (masked): '[masked by collector: 31 chars]'. Enabled: True.
HighWKS-018$computerDescription (masked): '[masked by collector: 28 chars]'. Enabled: True.
HighUnsupported operating systemobsolete_os · Account Hygiene2 objects
Why it matters. Enabled computer running an operating system out of vendor support: no security updates.
Remediation. Upgrade or decommission; if it must stay, isolate it and restrict what can authenticate to it.
Attack it enables. T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.8; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighSRV-OLD2008$computerWindows Server 2008 R2 Standard 6.1 (7601).
MediumWKS-W7-01$computerWindows 7 Professional 6.1 (7601) (also stale).
HighWeak fine-grained password policyfgpp_weak · Domain Configuration2 objects
Why it matters. A Password Settings Object is weaker than the configured baseline. Worse when it applies to privileged principals.
Remediation. Align the PSO with the baseline or narrow its scope.
Attack it enables. T1110 Brute Force
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighPSO-AdminsfgppMinimum length 10 (baseline 12), precedence 10. Applies to privileged principals: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=moosebank,DC=local.
MediumPSO-ServiceAccountsfgppMinimum length 6 (baseline 12), precedence 20.
HighTrust without SID filteringtrust_sid_filtering_disabled · Domain Configuration2 objects
Why it matters. SIDs coming from the trusted side are not filtered: an admin of the other domain can forge sIDHistory with privileged SIDs of this domain.
Remediation. Enable quarantine on external trusts (netdom trust /quarantine:yes) and disable SID history on forest trusts unless required by a migration.
Attack it enables. T1134.005 Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243484
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highlegacy-forest.localtrustForest trust (BiDirectional) with SID history enabled (TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL): SIDs with RID >= 1000 from the other forest are accepted.
Highpartner.exampletrustExternal trust (Inbound) without quarantine (SID filtering).
HighGPO makes everyone a local administrator or RDP usergpo_broad_local_group · Privileged Access2 objects
Why it matters. Through Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences, a GPO adds Everyone, Authenticated Users, Domain Users, Domain Computers or Users to a local Administrators or Remote Desktop Users group. Any account in the domain then gets admin rights or remote logon on those machines: lateral movement for free.
Remediation. Replace the broad group with a dedicated, small group per machine tier (or use LAPS for local admin access), and remove the broad entry from the GPO.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighWorkstation Baseline: local AdministratorsgpoDomain Users added to local Administrators through Group Policy Preferences.
MediumWorkstation Baseline: local Remote Desktop UsersgpoAuthenticated Users added to local Remote Desktop Users through Restricted Groups.
HighAccounts sharing the same passwordpwq_duplicate_passwords · Password Quality2 objects
Why it matters. Multiple accounts use an identical password (credential-stuffing / spray amplifier: one cracked password unlocks the whole cluster). Detected from a DSInternals report; IDWolf never sees the password itself.
Remediation. Reset the shared password on all accounts in the cluster with distinct values; investigate why they matched (shared build, scripted provisioning).
Attack it enables. T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
High2 accounts incl. user001clusterSame password: user001, user002.
High3 accounts incl. svc_appclusterSame password: svc_web, svc_app, svc_legacy.
HighAccount with a default or username-equal passwordpwq_default_password · Password Quality2 objects
Why it matters. The account password equals the username or a known default. Trivial to guess in a spray.
Remediation. Force a password change and enforce a banned-password policy.
Attack it enables. T1078 Valid Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highnew.hireuserPassword equals username or a known default.
Highprinter.svcuserPassword equals username or a known default.
HighAccount using a known-breached passwordpwq_breached_password · Password Quality2 objects
Why it matters. The password appears in a breach corpus (e.g. HaveIBeenPwned) checked offline by DSInternals. Prime spray/stuffing target.
Remediation. Force a change and enable banned-password filtering (Entra Password Protection on-prem).
Attack it enables. T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highmario.rossi.olduserPassword found in the breach corpus.
Highsvc_backupuserPassword found in the breach corpus.
HighSeamless SSO key (AZUREADSSOACC$) not rolled overazuread_sso_key_old · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. With Entra Seamless SSO, the AZUREADSSOACC$ computer account holds the Kerberos key that Entra ID uses to accept on-premises tickets. Whoever has read that key (DCSync, an old backup) can forge a ticket for any synced user and sign in to the cloud as them, MFA rules for trusted networks included. The key never changes by itself.
Remediation. Roll over the Seamless SSO decryption key (Update-AzureADSSOForest from the Entra Connect server) at least every 30 days, as Microsoft recommends, and protect the AZUREADSSOACC$ object like a Tier 0 account. If Seamless SSO is no longer used, turn it off in Entra Connect and delete the account.
Attack it enables. T1558.002 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighAZUREADSSOACC$computerSeamless SSO key last rolled over 400 days ago (Microsoft recommends every 30 days).
HighDES Kerberos encryption enableddes_enabled · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. DES keys are trivially brute-forceable. Enabled via USE_DES_KEY_ONLY or msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes.
Remediation. Clear USE_DES_KEY_ONLY and the DES bits, then reset the password.
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.8, A.8.24; DORA 9(4)(d), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highsvc_legacyuserUSE_DES_KEY_ONLY: True; msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes: not set.
HighRODC allowed to cache privileged or domain-wide credentialsrodc_prp_too_broad · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. The password replication policy of a read-only domain controller (msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup) allows a Tier 0 principal or a domain-wide group (Domain Users, Domain Computers, Authenticated Users, Everyone) to be cached, or its denied list (msDS-NeverRevealGroup) no longer holds the Denied RODC Password Replication Group. An RODC sits in a less protected site: whoever compromises it, or administers it through managedBy, extracts every cached credential and can forge tickets with the RODC krbtgt key for the accounts the policy allows (RODC golden ticket, Kerberos key list).
Remediation. Limit the Allowed list of each RODC to the users and computers of its site, never Tier 0 and never a domain-wide group, and keep the Denied RODC Password Replication Group in its denied list.
Attack it enables. T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243489
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighRODC01dcRODC RODC01: allowed list contains the domain-wide group Domain Users. Administered (managedBy) by Helpdesk, not Tier 0.
HighInactive privileged account still enabledprivileged_inactive · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. An enabled privileged account nobody uses is an unmonitored credential with full rights.
Remediation. Disable and remove from privileged groups after confirming with the owner. Keep break-glass accounts documented and monitored.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highadm.olduserLast logon: 200 days ago (threshold 90 days). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
HighComputer account in privileged groupprivileged_computer_member · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. SYSTEM on that host acts as a Tier 0 principal: compromising the machine compromises the domain.
Remediation. Remove the computer account from the group and grant only the specific rights required.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243467
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighSRV-BACKUP01$computerMember of Administrators (builtin) via: Administrators > SRV-BACKUP01$.
HighForeign or unresolved principal in privileged groupprivileged_foreign_member · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. A principal from another domain or forest (or one that cannot be resolved) holds Tier 0 rights here: the security of this domain then depends on the other one.
Remediation. Remove cross-domain members from privileged groups, or treat the trusted domain as part of the same Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243496
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighPARTNER\ext.adminforeignMember of Administrators (builtin) via: Administrators > PARTNER\ext.admin.
HighPassword stored with reversible encryptionreversible_encryption_account · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. The cleartext password is recoverable by anyone able to read the NTDS database (e.g. via DCSync).
Remediation. Clear the flag and reset the password.
Attack it enables. T1556.005 Modify Authentication Process: Reversible Encryption
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.24; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highrevers.useruserENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED set.
HighWeak explicit certificate mapping on an account (ESC14)altsecid_weak_mapping · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. altSecurityIdentities maps a certificate to the account by subject, issuer + subject or e-mail (RFC822) only. Whoever gets a certificate with that subject or e-mail, which is often easy to request, can authenticate as the account. Full strong certificate binding enforcement rejects these weak mappings for Kerberos; when it is relaxed by GPO, they work again. High on Tier 0 accounts.
Remediation. Replace the mapping with a strong one (X509:<I>issuer<SR>serial, <SKI> or <SHA1-PUKEY>), or remove it, and keep StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 2 on the DCs.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highsc.bianchiuserWeak altSecurityIdentities mapping(s): SubjectOnly (values not collected). StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 1 by GPO, so the mapping is honoured.
HighUNIX password attribute populatedunix_password_present · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. The account has a userPassword or unixUserPassword attribute set. These attributes are often world-readable or weakly protected and can store a recoverable or hashed credential, a classic forgotten exposure from NIS/identity-management integrations. The collector records only that a value exists, never the value.
Remediation. Clear userPassword / unixUserPassword, and move UNIX identity integration to a mechanism that does not store a readable secret in the directory.
Attack it enables. T1552 Unsecured Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5, A.8.24; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highsvc_appuseruserPassword / unixUserPassword attribute is populated (value not collected). Enabled: True.
HighAnonymous LDAP operations allowedanonymous_ldap_enabled · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. dSHeuristics 7th character is 2: anonymous users can perform LDAP operations and enumerate the directory.
Remediation. Reset the 7th character of dSHeuristics to 0.
Attack it enables. T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highmoosebank.localdomaindSHeuristics = '0000002'.
HighTGT delegation enabled across forest trusttrust_tgt_delegation · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Unconstrained delegation hosts in the other forest can capture TGTs of this forest's users.
Remediation. Disable TGT delegation across the trust (netdom trust /EnableTGTDelegation:No).
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highlegacy-forest.localtrustForest trust (BiDirectional) with TGT delegation enabled.
HighSchema class lets any user or computer create containersschema_class_poss_superior · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. A schema class inherits from container and lists user or computer in possSuperiors. Any account (or any computer, which a user can create through the machine account quota) can add an object of that class under itself and then create users or computers inside it without restriction. msExchStorageGroup is the known case (CVE-2021-34470) and stays exploitable after Exchange is uninstalled.
Remediation. Remove user and computer from possSuperiors of the class (schema change, Schema Admins). For msExchStorageGroup apply the Exchange CVE-2021-34470 update or the published schema fix script.
Attack it enables. T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighmsExchStorageGroupschemaclasspossSuperiors includes computer; inherits from container. Known as CVE-2021-34470.
HighDNS zone allows non-secure dynamic updatesdns_insecure_updates · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. An AD zone accepting non-secure dynamic updates lets any host (even unauthenticated) create or overwrite records, enabling spoofing of services and name-based poisoning.
Remediation. Set the zone dynamic update policy to "Secure only" for AD-integrated zones.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highmoosebank.localdnszoneDynamicUpdate = NonsecureAndSecure.
HighDangerous DNS record (wildcard / WPAD / ISATAP)dns_dangerous_record · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. A wildcard, WPAD or ISATAP record lets an attacker redirect proxy or tunnel traffic. WPAD in particular is a classic credential-interception path; a wildcard answers every unknown name.
Remediation. Remove the record unless explicitly required, and use the DNS global query block list for WPAD and ISATAP.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highwpad (moosebank.local)dnsrecordA record 'wpad' in zone moosebank.local.
HighFSMO role held by a server that is not a DCfsmo_holder_invalid · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. An operations master role points to a server that is no longer a domain controller (usually one that was removed without moving its roles). Password changes, new objects or schema updates depending on that role will fail.
Remediation. Move the role to a healthy DC (Move-ADDirectoryServerOperationMasterRole), or seize it if the old DC is gone for good, then run a metadata cleanup.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighInfrastructureMasterfsmoInfrastructureMaster is held by dc-old.moosebank.local, which is not one of the current domain controllers.
HighCore service stopped on a domain controllerdc_service_stopped · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. A service the DC depends on (NTDS, ADWS, KDC, Netlogon, DNS, DFSR, W32Time...) is set to start but isn't running.
Remediation. Find out why it stopped (event logs), start it, and check replication and logons afterwards.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highdc02.moosebank.localdcNot running: DFSR.
HighActive Directory backup overduead_backup_overdue · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. The last successful system-state / AD backup of the domain naming context is older than the expected window. Without a recent backup, recovery from ransomware or a bad change (or an authoritative restore) is not possible within objective.
Remediation. Restore a working, tested backup schedule for the domain controllers (system state), and store copies offline.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243493
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highmoosebank.localdomainLast AD backup of the domain naming context was 45 days ago (threshold 7).
HighDSRM administrator allowed to log ondsrm_logon_behavior · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. DsrmAdminLogonBehavior is 2 on a domain controller: the Directory Services Restore Mode local administrator (a password that never expires and is not managed by AD) can log on while the DC runs normally. It is a classic Tier 0 persistence foothold that survives a domain password reset.
Remediation. Set HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior to 0 (or 1) on the DCs, and rotate the DSRM password (for example with ntdsutil "set dsrm password").
Attack it enables. T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highdc02.moosebank.localdcDsrmAdminLogonBehavior = 2: the DSRM local administrator can log on while the DC runs normally.
HighNon-default principal can read confidential attributes through DirSyncsync_laps_rights · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. The principal holds DS-Replication-Get-Changes together with DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set on the domain head, without Get-Changes-All. With the DirSync control it can read confidential and RODC-filtered attributes of every object, including legacy LAPS passwords (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) and BitLocker material, without any read right on the objects themselves (BloodHound SyncLAPSPassword).
Remediation. Remove both extended rights unless the principal is a documented synchronization or backup product, and protect any such account as Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK\svc.dirsyncaclHolds DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set on the domain head.
HighNon-default owner of Tier 0 objectnonstandard_owner_tier0 · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. The owner of an object can always rewrite its ACL.
Remediation. Set the owner back to Domain Admins.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK\adm.oldaclOwner of Group:Domain Admins is MOOSEBANK\adm.old (S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1205).
HighPossible credential in a SYSVOL logon scriptsysvol_script_secrets · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. A script in SYSVOL (bat/cmd/ps1/vbs) contains a password-like string. SYSVOL is readable by every authenticated user, so any credential embedded in a logon or deployment script is exposed domain-wide. The collector records only the file path, never the content.
Remediation. Remove the credential from the script (use a gMSA, LAPS, or a secret store), then rotate the exposed password.
Attack it enables. T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highmapdrives.batfilePassword-like string in SYSVOL script: \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\scripts\mapdrives.bat
HighNon-Tier 0 principal can read a KDS root key (Golden gMSA)kds_root_key_readable · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. A principal outside Tier 0 can read a KDS root key, or can grant itself that right. With the root key and a few public attributes it can compute the password of every gMSA and dMSA in the forest, offline and for the lifetime of the key (Golden gMSA). Rotating the gMSA passwords does not help.
Remediation. Remove the ACE from the root key (CN=Master Root Keys,CN=Group Key Distribution Service,CN=Services in the Configuration partition); by default only Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins and SYSTEM have access. If a non-admin may already have read it, create a new root key and move the gMSAs to it.
Attack it enables. T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Seen in attacks: Golden gMSA / Golden dMSA: managed service account passwords from the KDS root key (2025).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclGenericRead on KDS root key(s): 3f1c8e2a-5d4b-4c1e-9a7f-2b6d0e8c4a11.
HighNon-site-server principal can write to the SCCM System Management containersccm_system_management_writable · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. SCCM / MECM site servers publish their sites and management points in CN=System Management,CN=System, and clients use what is published there to find a management point. A principal that is neither Tier 0 nor a site server (a computer account, or a group of computer accounts only) can create or change objects there: it can publish a rogue management point that clients will contact, and collect their authentication or the network access account. Site servers themselves hold Full Control by design, so the detail lists them: they control every client of the site and belong in Tier 0 when DCs or admin workstations are among those clients.
Remediation. Remove the write, create, WriteDacl and WriteOwner rights of everyone but the site server computer accounts (or a group that contains only them) and Tier 0 from the System Management container; give each site server Full Control as Microsoft documents, nothing more. Protect the site servers and the SCCM admins at the tier of the most sensitive client they manage.
Attack it enables. T1072 Software Deployment Tools
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclCreateChild on CN=System Management. Site servers with rights there: MOOSEBANK\SRV-APP01$. Management points published: srv-app01.moosebank.local (site MB1).
HighNon-Tier 0 principal can read LAPS passwordslaps_readers · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. A principal that is not Tier 0 holds rights to read the local administrator password (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd or msLAPS-Password) on one or more computers, via GenericAll, All Extended Rights, or a read delegation on the LAPS attribute. Reading a LAPS password gives local admin on that machine, a lateral-movement step. Found only with a deep ACL sweep.
Remediation. Scope LAPS read rights (msLAPS / ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) to the dedicated admin tier for each machine set; remove broad or non-Tier 0 readers.
Attack it enables. T1098 Account Manipulation
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclNon-Tier 0 principal can read the LAPS password of 1 computer(s).
HighPre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access includes Anonymous/Everyonepre_win2000_anonymous · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. The Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group grants broad read of the directory. With Anonymous Logon or Everyone as a member, an unauthenticated attacker can enumerate accounts and groups.
Remediation. Remove Anonymous Logon (S-1-5-7) and Everyone (S-1-1-0) from the group once no legacy system depends on it.
Attack it enables. T1087 Account Discovery
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243486
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighPre-Windows 2000 Compatible AccessgroupMembers include Anonymous Logon or Everyone: CN=S-1-5-7,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=moosebank,DC=local.
HighgMSA password readable by a non-Tier 0 principalgmsa_password_readable · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. msDS-GroupMSAMembership (PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword) lets the listed principals retrieve the managed password of this group managed service account. When that principal is not Tier 0, anyone who controls it can recover the gMSA credential and impersonate the service (BloodHound ReadGMSAPassword edge).
Remediation. Restrict PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword to the specific host or Tier-matched group that runs the service. Remove broad or non-Tier 0 principals.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highgmsa_sql$msaPassword retrievable by non-Tier 0 principal(s): Helpdesk.
HighKey credential set on a privileged account (possible Shadow Credentials)shadow_credentials_present · Permissions1 object
Why it matters. The privileged account has one or more msDS-KeyCredentialLink entries. A key credential allows PKINIT/NGC logon with an attacker-held private key, a common persistence and takeover technique (Shadow Credentials / Whisker). Windows Hello for Business and Azure AD join set this legitimately, so each entry on a Tier 0 account must be confirmed.
Remediation. Verify every key credential on the account against the expected device/registration. Remove unexpected entries and review who holds the write-to-key-credential right on the object.
Attack it enables. T1556.003 Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules
Seen in attacks: Shadow Credentials (msDS-KeyCredentialLink).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highsvc_sql_adminuser1 key credential(s) on a Tier 0 account (member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin)). Confirm each against an expected Windows Hello / device registration, or treat as Shadow Credentials persistence.
HighEnrollment Agent template enrollable by low-privileged users (ESC3)adcs_esc3 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A published template grants the Certificate Request Agent EKU with no approval to low-privileged enrollers. An enrollment agent certificate can request certificates on behalf of other users.
Remediation. Restrict enrollment-agent templates to a dedicated trusted group and require manager approval.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Seen in attacks: AD CS enrollment agent abuse (ESC3).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMoose ESC3 EnrollAgentcerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; Certificate Request Agent EKU; no manager approval.
HighCertificate template with a dangerous ACL (ESC4)adcs_esc4 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A non-privileged principal can modify the template object itself (WriteDacl, WriteOwner, WriteProperty, GenericWrite, GenericAll, Owner). Whoever controls the template can turn it into an ESC1-style template on demand.
Remediation. Remove write permissions on certificate templates for non-administrators; the template DACL should match a known-good baseline.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Seen in attacks: AD CS template ACL abuse (ESC4).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMoose ESC4 WeakACLcerttemplateModifiable by non-administrators: MOOSEBANK\Domain Users: WriteDacl.
HighTemplate without the SID security extension (ESC9)adcs_esc9 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. The template sets CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION (msPKI-Enrollment-Flag 0x80000), so the issued certificate omits the szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT SID binding. Combined with an account whose UPN or mapping can be changed, an attacker can obtain a certificate that authenticates as another user even with strong certificate mapping enforced. The template is published, enrollable by low-privileged users and requires no manager approval.
Remediation. Clear CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION on the template unless a documented interoperability need exists, enforce strong certificate mapping (KB5014754 Full enforcement) and restrict enrollment.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMoose ESC9 NoSecExtcerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION set (no SID binding); client-auth EKU; no manager approval.
HighWSUS over HTTPS and a template that issues server certificates for any name (ESC17)adcs_esc17 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A GPO points Windows Update at a WSUS server over HTTPS, and a published certificate template lets low-privileged users enroll with a subject they supply, for server authentication (or any purpose), without approval. Anyone in that population can get a certificate for the WSUS host name that every client trusts, put themselves in the path (an ADIDNS record, ARP or DHCP spoofing) and serve updates that run as SYSTEM: HTTPS no longer protects WSUS (ESC17, TROOPERS26).
Remediation. Remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT from the template, or restrict its enrollment to the servers that need it, or require manager approval. Issue the WSUS certificate from a template that builds the subject from AD. Keep ADIDNS record creation restricted so the WSUS name cannot be taken over.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMoose ESC15 SchemaV1certtemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users with a supplied subject, server authentication EKU, no approval. WSUS over HTTPS: https://wsus02.moosebank.local:8531 (GPO MooseBank DC Extra).
HighSchema v1 template with requester-supplied subject (ESC15 / EKUwu, CVE-2024-49019)adcs_esc15 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A schema version 1 certificate template published and enrollable by low-privileged users allows the requester to supply the subject. On v1 templates the application policies are not fixed, so a requester can inject an arbitrary application policy (for example Client Authentication) into the request and obtain a certificate usable for authentication, even when the template EKUs do not grant it.
Remediation. Replace v1 templates with v2+ equivalents, remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT, require manager approval, restrict enrollment, and apply the November 2024 AD CS updates.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Seen in attacks: AD CS EKUwu (ESC15, CVE-2024-49019, 2024).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMoose ESC15 SchemaV1certtemplateSchema v1 template enrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set; no manager approval: an arbitrary application policy (e.g. client auth) can be injected into the request.
HighNon-privileged principal controls an AD CS object (ESC5)adcs_esc5 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A principal outside Tier 0 holds control rights (GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, WriteProperty, or ownership) on a PKI object in the Configuration partition: the Public Key Services container and its Certificate Templates, Enrollment Services, Certification Authorities, AIA, CDP and OID containers, the NTAuthCertificates store, a CA object, or the computer account of a CA. Control of these objects means adding a trusted root or an NTAuth CA, publishing a vulnerable template, or taking over the CA host: each one ends in certificates for any account.
Remediation. Remove the ACE or the ownership. PKI objects in the Configuration partition and the CA servers are Tier 0: only Enterprise Admins, Domain Admins of the forest root and the CA computer accounts should hold write rights there.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK\IT-OpsaclControl of PKI objects: WriteDacl on CA:MOOSEBANK-CA.
HighCA certificate uses a weak key or signatureadcs_weak_ca_key · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. The CA certificate has an RSA key shorter than 2048 bits or is signed with SHA-1. A weak CA key or signature undermines every certificate the CA issues, including those used for authentication.
Remediation. Re-key the CA with a 3072-bit (or stronger) RSA key and a SHA-256 signature, then reissue subordinate and end-entity certificates. Plan this as a CA migration.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK-CAcaCA certificate weakness: RSA key 1024 bits. Host: ca01.moosebank.local.
HighCA accepts a requester-supplied SAN on any request (ESC6)adcs_esc6 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 is set in the CA policy module: every request may add a subject alternative name, so any template a user can enroll in becomes an ESC1. Since the 2022 strong-mapping updates it still leads to impersonation when the SID extension is missing (ESC16) or certificate mapping is weak (ESC10).
Remediation. certutil -config "<CA>" -setreg policy\EditFlags -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2, then restart CertSvc. Check that no template needs it.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK-CAcaEditFlags = 0x15014E includes EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 (0x40000).
HighNon-Tier 0 principal can manage the CA (ESC7)adcs_esc7 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A principal outside Tier 0 holds Manage CA or Issue and Manage Certificates on the CA. Manage CA can turn on ESC6 or enable any template; Issue and Manage Certificates can approve a pending request for a domain admin certificate.
Remediation. Remove the right from the CA security settings (certsrv.msc > Properties > Security), and keep CA administration in Tier 0.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK-CAcaNon-Tier 0 CA officers or managers: MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk (Issue and Manage Certificates).
HighWeb enrollment on the CA (ESC8 NTLM relay)adcs_esc8 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. Certification Authority Web Enrollment or the Certificate Enrollment Web Service is installed on the CA. Over HTTP, or HTTPS without Extended Protection for Authentication, a coerced DC authentication can be relayed to it for a DC certificate and domain takeover (PetitPotam + ESC8). IDWolf cannot read the IIS settings, so HTTPS and EPA must be confirmed by hand.
Remediation. Remove web enrollment if it is not needed. Otherwise require HTTPS, enable Extended Protection for Authentication and disable NTLM on the CertSrv / CES sites.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Seen in attacks: NTLM relay to AD CS web enrollment (ESC8), common in ransomware intrusions.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK-CAcaInstalled on ca01.moosebank.local: Certification Authority Web Enrollment. Confirm HTTPS with Extended Protection for Authentication on the site.
HighCA does not require encrypted RPC requests (ESC11)adcs_esc11 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST is not set in InterfaceFlags, so certificate requests over RPC (ICPR) can be sent without packet privacy and an NTLM authentication can be relayed to the CA, like ESC8 over RPC.
Remediation. certutil -config "<CA>" -setreg CA\InterfaceFlags +IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST, then restart CertSvc (check old clients first).
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Seen in attacks: NTLM relay to AD CS RPC enrollment (ESC11).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighMOOSEBANK-CAcaInterfaceFlags = 0x41 without IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST (0x200).
HighLDAP server signing not requiredldap_signing_not_required · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. The DCs do not require LDAP signing (LDAPServerIntegrity < 2). LDAP is a common NTLM-relay target for privilege escalation (e.g. relay to LDAP then RBCD).
Remediation. Set "Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements" to "Require signing" once clients support it.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Seen in attacks: NTLM relay to LDAP on the DCs.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDomain ControllersgpoLDAPServerIntegrity = not configured (2 = require).
HighWinRM allows Basic authentication or unencrypted trafficwinrm_basic_auth · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO lets the WinRM service or the WinRM client use Basic authentication or send unencrypted traffic. Basic carries the password base64-encoded, and unencrypted WinRM carries the whole session in clear: whoever sits on the path to a domain controller reads the credential and replays it.
Remediation. Set AllowBasic and AllowUnencryptedTraffic to Disabled for both the WinRM service and the WinRM client, and leave the authentication to Kerberos (CIS 18.10.89).
Attack it enables. T1021.006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDomain ControllersgpoService AllowBasic = 1.
HighSensitive privilege granted to a non-privileged principal on DCsdangerous_privilege_right · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO on the Domain Controllers OU grants a Tier 0 equivalent user right (SeDebug, SeBackup/Restore, SeTakeOwnership, SeTcb, SeLoadDriver, SeEnableDelegation, "Log on as a batch/service") to a principal that is not a default Tier 0 group.
Remediation. Remove the assignment or scope it to a dedicated admin group; these rights on a DC are equivalent to domain compromise.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDebug programsgpoGPO 'MooseBank DC Extra' grants SeDebugPrivilege to: S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1103.
HighWDigest cleartext credential caching enabledwdigest_cleartext · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. UseLogonCredential = 1 makes LSASS keep cleartext passwords in memory, so a single dump on a DC or server yields plaintext credentials.
Remediation. Set WDigest UseLogonCredential to 0 (the modern default) via GPO.
Attack it enables. T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDomain ControllersgpoWDigest UseLogonCredential = 1 (cleartext credentials cached in LSASS).
HighWebClient (WebDAV) service enabled on a domain controllerwebclient_on_dc · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. The WebClient service is installed and not disabled on the DC (read live over CIM). Coercion (PetitPotam, PrinterBug) can then make the DC authenticate over HTTP, which is not protected by SMB signing and can be relayed to LDAP or to AD CS web enrollment (ESC8) for domain takeover. A running service is the worst case; Manual can still be started by a trigger.
Remediation. Disable the WebClient service on the DC (or remove the WebDAV Redirector / Desktop Experience feature), and enforce it with a GPO.
Attack it enables. T1187 Forced Authentication
Seen in attacks: Coercion over WebDAV for NTLM relay to LDAP or AD CS.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highdc02.moosebank.localdcWebClient service: start mode Manual, state Running.
HighCoercion interfaces open on a domain controllercoercion_unfiltered_dc · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. Any domain account can make the DC authenticate to a host it picks through MS-EFSR (PetitPotam), MS-DFSNM (DFSCoerce) or MS-EVEN, and no RPC filter for those interfaces was found. The authentication is then relayed (LDAP, AD CS) or captured by a host with unconstrained delegation. High when a relay target is open in this domain. Read-only: the interfaces are not probed, only the services behind them and the RPC filter store are read.
Remediation. Add RPC filters (netsh rpc filter) that block or require Kerberos/packet privacy for the MS-EFSR, MS-DFSNM and MS-EVEN interface UUIDs on the DCs, and close the relay targets: LDAP signing and channel binding, HTTPS + EPA on AD CS web enrollment, IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST on the CA.
Attack it enables. T1187 Forced Authentication
Seen in attacks: Coercion of a DC (PetitPotam family) feeding NTLM relay (CVE-2025-24054 exploited in 2025).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highdc02.moosebank.localdcOpen: MS-EFSR (EFS service Manual/Stopped), MS-DFSNM (DFS Namespace running), MS-EVEN (EventLog running); no RPC filter for these interfaces. Relay targets open: LDAP signing not required; LDAPS channel binding not enforced; AD CS web enrollment on MOOSEBANK-CA (ESC8); AD CS RPC enrollment on MOOSEBANK-CA (ESC11).
HighWindows Update server over HTTPwsus_http · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO points clients at a WSUS server with an http:// address. Anyone who can intercept that traffic can inject a malicious "update" that runs as SYSTEM (WSUSpect / WSUS attacks).
Remediation. Publish WSUS over HTTPS (SSL on the WSUS site and an https:// WUServer / WUStatusServer in the GPO).
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDefault Domain PolicygpoWUServer = http://wsus01.moosebank.local:8530. GPO linked to the domain root.
HighGPO weakens User Account Controluac_weakened · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO turns UAC off (EnableLUA = 0), sets LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1, or lets administrators elevate without any prompt (ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = 0). LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy gives every local administrator a full token over the network, so one local admin hash works for pass-the-hash on every machine in scope; with UAC off every admin process runs elevated. Only values in registry.pol or the security template are read: a Group Policy Preferences registry item is not visible here.
Remediation. Remove the setting from the GPO: keep EnableLUA = 1, leave LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy unset or 0 ("Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons" from the Microsoft security baseline), and set ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 2 (prompt for consent on the secure desktop).
Attack it enables. T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighClient HardeninggpoLocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1 (full admin token for local accounts over the network); ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = 0 (admins elevate without a prompt). GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).
HighGPO turns Windows Firewall offfirewall_disabled_gpo · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO sets EnableFirewall = 0 for a Windows Defender Firewall profile. Every machine in scope then accepts any inbound connection on that profile: SMB, RPC, WinRM and RDP are reachable from the whole network, which helps lateral movement and coercion. High when the domain profile, the one used on the corporate network, is turned off.
Remediation. Set EnableFirewall = 1 on every profile and open only the ports each tier needs with inbound rules scoped to admin and management hosts.
Attack it enables. T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighClient HardeninggpoEnableFirewall = 0 for the domain, public profiles. GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).
HighSMBv1 not disabled on domain controllerssmb1_server_enabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No effective GPO disables the SMBv1 server (mrxsmb10 driver start or SMB1 parameter). SMBv1 is obsolete, exploitable (EternalBlue / MS17-010) and should not run on a domain controller.
Remediation. Disable the SMBv1 server and client via GPO (set mrxsmb10 Start to 4 and SMB1 to 0), then confirm no legacy client still needs it.
Attack it enables. T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDomain ControllersgpoSMBv1 enabled via GPO (mrxsmb10 Start = n/a, LanmanServer SMB1 = 1).
HighWeak certificate binding on domain controllers (ESC10)adcs_esc10 · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. An effective GPO sets Kdc StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement to 0 (Disabled) or 1 (Compatibility), or enables weak Schannel UPN certificate mapping. With weak binding a certificate without the SID security extension can authenticate as another account, the second half of ESC9/ESC10. Only detectable here when the value is pushed through a GPO security template; a value set locally on the DC is not visible in the snapshot.
Remediation. Set StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement to 2 (Full Enforcement) on the domain controllers and remove weak Schannel certificate mapping, after confirming all certificates carry the SID extension.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
HighDomain ControllersgpoStrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 1 (0 = disabled, 1 = compatibility; 2 = full enforcement).
HighPassword recoverable in cleartext (reversible encryption)pwq_cleartext_stored · Password Quality1 object
Why it matters. DSInternals recovered a cleartext password (reversible encryption enabled for the account). Anyone with NTDS access reads it directly.
Remediation. Disable reversible encryption and reset the password.
Attack it enables. T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Highrevers.useruserCleartext recoverable (reversible encryption).
MediumPrivileged account logs on with a reusable passwordprivileged_logon_unrestricted · Privileged Access14 objects
Why it matters. An enabled Tier 0 account is neither in Protected Users nor required to log on with a smart card, so it authenticates with a reusable password (NTLM/Kerberos RC4 or AES long-term key) that can be phished, sprayed or replayed. Tier 0 logons should be bound to a smart card and/or Protected Users.
Remediation. Add Tier 0 human accounts to Protected Users (after a pilot: it disables NTLM, DES/RC4 and delegation) and/or set "smart card is required for interactive logon". Keep break-glass accounts documented with compensating controls.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243477
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumadm.bianchiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumadm.ferrariuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumadm.gialliuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumadm.neriuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumadm.olduserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumadm.rossiuserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumadm.verdiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
MediumAdministratoruserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumdns.adminuserMember of DnsAdmins; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumhelpdesk.leaduserMember of Account Operators; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumhidden.adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumloop.useruserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumsvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
Mediumsvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).
MediumPrivileged account with password never expiresprivileged_password_never_expires · Privileged Access4 objects
Why it matters. DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD on a Tier 0 account removes the only built-in guarantee that its password is ever changed.
Remediation. Clear the flag, or document the exception (break-glass) with compensating controls.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumadm.olduserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
MediumAdministratoruserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners.
Mediumsvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators.
Mediumsvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
MediumComputer without LAPS passwordlaps_missing · Account Hygiene3 objects
Why it matters. Enabled Windows computer with no LAPS expiration timestamp: LAPS policy is not applied to it.
Remediation. Check GPO/Intune scope and client-side processing for this machine.
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243471
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumEVILPC$computerNo LAPS expiration timestamp. OS: Windows 10 Pro.
MediumSRV-OLD2008$computerNo LAPS expiration timestamp. OS: Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard.
MediumWKS-016$computerNo LAPS expiration timestamp. OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.
MediumSchema / Enterprise Admins not emptyschema_enterprise_admins_populated · Privileged Access2 objects
Why it matters. Microsoft guidance is to keep Schema Admins and Enterprise Admins empty and populate them only for the duration of a change.
Remediation. Remove permanent members and use a just-in-time procedure to add them when needed.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243466
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumadm.rossiuserMember of Enterprise Admins via: Enterprise Admins > adm.rossi. Account enabled.
MediumAdministratoruserMember of Enterprise Admins via: Enterprise Admins > Administrator. Account enabled.
MediumRODC krbtgt account not rotatedrodc_krbtgt_password_old · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. Each RODC has its own krbtgt_NNNNN account. A stale key extends the impact of a compromised branch-office RODC.
Remediation. Rotate the RODC krbtgt_NNNNN account with the same double-reset procedure.
Attack it enables. T1558.001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243489
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumkrbtgt_12345userRODC krbtgt password last set 400 days ago.
MediumCloud Kerberos trust key (krbtgt_AzureAD) not rotatedcloud_kerberos_trust_key_old · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. The krbtgt_AzureAD account (Entra Kerberos server object, used by Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust and FIDO2 sign-in to on-premises resources) holds the key Entra ID uses to issue partial TGTs for this domain. Like the RODC krbtgt keys, a stolen copy keeps working until it is rotated.
Remediation. Rotate the key with Set-AzureADKerberosServer -RotateServerKey (AzureADHybridAuthenticationManagement module) on a regular schedule, like krbtgt.
Attack it enables. T1558.001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumkrbtgt_AzureADuserEntra Kerberos server key last set 250 days ago (threshold 180 days).
MediumConstrained delegation configuredconstrained_delegation · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. The account can impersonate users to the listed services. Critical when the targets are domain controllers.
Remediation. Review the business need and target list. Delegation to DC services (ldap, cifs, host) is equivalent to domain admin.
Attack it enables. T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumSRV-SQL01$computerKerberos-only constrained delegation to: MSSQLSvc/sql02.moosebank.local:1433, cifs/srv-files-old.moosebank.local.
MediumConstrained delegation to an SPN no account holds (SPN-jacking)delegation_orphan_spn · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. An account is allowed to delegate (msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo) to a service on a host of this domain, but no user, service account or computer in the snapshot holds that SPN or that host name. Whoever can write a servicePrincipalName (WriteSPN, or a computer created through the machine account quota) can register the orphan SPN on an account they control. The delegating service then obtains tickets for any user to that account, and the unprotected service name in the ticket can be rewritten to reach any service on the attacker's host (ghost SPN-jacking).
Remediation. Remove the stale entry from msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo (it usually points to a decommissioned server), or recreate the target with its SPN. Restrict who can write servicePrincipalName and set ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to 0.
Attack it enables. T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumSRV-SQL01$computerDelegation targets held by no account in the snapshot: cifs/srv-files-old.moosebank.local.
MediumProtected Users group is emptyprotected_users_empty · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. Protected Users gives privileged accounts non-configurable protections (no NTLM, no delegation, no RC4/DES, 4h TGT). It is unused.
Remediation. Add Tier 0 human accounts to Protected Users after a pilot. Do not add service accounts or computer accounts.
Attack it enables. T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243477
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumProtected UsersgroupProtected Users has no members while 17 principal(s) hold Tier 0 group membership.
MediumToo many Domain Adminsprivileged_group_oversized · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. Every Domain Admin is a direct path to the domain. A large group usually means privileges used for daily administration instead of delegated roles.
Remediation. Reduce to break-glass and a few dedicated Tier 0 accounts. Move day-to-day tasks to delegated groups with least privilege.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243467
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain Adminsgroup11 enabled effective members (threshold 5): Administrator, adm.rossi, adm.bianchi, adm.verdi, adm.old, svc_sql_admin, adm.ferrari, hidden.admin, adm.neri, adm.gialli, loop.user.
MediumTier 0 accounts not protected from RODC credential cachingrodc_tier0_unprotected · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. A read-only domain controller exists, but the Denied RODC Password Replication Group no longer contains the key privileged principals (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, krbtgt). A compromised or stolen RODC could then cache and expose those credentials.
Remediation. Keep Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, krbtgt and the other default protected groups in the Denied RODC Password Replication Group, and keep the Allowed group minimal.
Attack it enables. T1207 Rogue Domain Controller
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243489
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDenied RODC Password Replication GroupgroupRODC present; these Tier 0 principals are not in the Denied RODC Password Replication Group: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, krbtgt.
MediumDnsAdmins populateddnsadmins_populated · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. DnsAdmins members can configure the DNS service running on DCs; historically this allowed loading an arbitrary DLL as SYSTEM on a DC. Treat as Tier 0.
Remediation. Keep DnsAdmins empty or restricted to Tier 0 accounts.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumdns.adminuserMember of DnsAdmins via: DnsAdmins > dns.admin. Account enabled.
MediumBuilt-in Administrator (RID 500) hygienebuiltin_administrator_hygiene · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. The RID 500 account cannot be locked out and is a known target. It should be a vaulted break-glass account, not used day to day.
Remediation. Vault the password, rotate it after each use, and alert on every logon of this account.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumAdministratoruserRID 500 account: used 5 days ago (routine use suspected); password 800 days old.
MediumSmart-card-only account whose password is never rotatedsmartcard_password_not_rotated · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. A smart-card-only account still has an NT hash, derived from a random password set when the flag was enabled. Users never change it, so whoever steals that hash once can pass-the-hash (or get the NTLM fallback through PKINIT) for years.
Remediation. Turn on automatic rotation (domain functional level 2016: msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts, "Enable rolling of expiring NTLM secrets") or reset the hash by toggling "Smart card is required for interactive logon" off and on.
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243476
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumsc.bianchiuserSmart card required; password (NT hash) last set 900 days ago (threshold 365 days). Domain automatic rotation: off.
MediumUsers can join computers to the domainmachine_account_quota · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota > 0 lets any user create computer accounts, a key building block of relay and RBCD attacks.
Remediation. Set ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to 0 and delegate domain join to a dedicated group.
Attack it enables. T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediummoosebank.localdomainms-DS-MachineAccountQuota = 10.
MediumComputer account with password not requiredprecreated_computer_account · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. An enabled computer account with PASSWD_NOTREQD can be joined or taken over with the predictable default machine password (usually the lowercase account name). Pre-created or pre-staged computer objects left in this state let an attacker who knows the name authenticate as the machine and set its password.
Remediation. Clear PASSWD_NOTREQD, complete or remove the pre-staged account, and reset the computer password. Delegate pre-staging to a controlled process.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumPRESTAGE01$computerPASSWD_NOTREQD set on an enabled computer account (predictable default machine password). OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard.
MediumPre-staged computer account still on the password set at creation (Timeroasting)timeroast_computer_password · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. An enabled computer account has never logged on and its password was last set when the account was created: no machine ever joined with it, so the password is whatever the person or script that pre-staged it chose, often the lowercase name or a shared value. Without any credential, an attacker can ask a DC for an MS-SNTP time response signed with that password (Timeroasting) and crack it offline, then authenticate as the computer.
Remediation. Join the machine (the join replaces the password with a random one), or reset the account password to a long random value, or delete the pre-staged account if it is no longer needed. Pre-stage with a random password, never the name.
Attack it enables. T1110.002 Brute Force: Password Cracking
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumKIOSK-PRE01$computerNever logged on; password set 60 days ago, when the account was created. No OS recorded (never joined).
MediumShort minimum password lengthpassword_policy_short · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Default Domain Policy minimum length below the configured threshold.
Remediation. Raise the minimum length (14+ for users; longer or passwordless for admins) and add banned-password filtering.
Attack it enables. T1110 Brute Force
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDefault Domain PolicypolicyMinimum length 8 (baseline 12).
MediumNo account lockoutpassword_policy_no_lockout · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Lockout threshold is 0: online password spraying is unlimited.
Remediation. Set a lockout threshold (e.g. 10) with a short duration, and monitor 4625/4771 events for spraying.
Attack it enables. T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDefault Domain PolicypolicyLockout threshold = 0.
MediumDomain controller machine password not rotateddc_password_old · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. A domain controller normally rotates its machine account password about every 30 days. A much older pwdLastSet means automatic rotation is disabled or the DC is not healthy, which keeps an old DC key valid far longer than it should (relevant to Golden/Silver and DC-key attacks).
Remediation. Investigate why the DC is not rotating its machine password (DisablePasswordChange, replication or health issues) and restore normal rotation.
Attack it enables. T1207 Rogue Domain Controller
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDC02$computerDC machine password last set 200 days ago (expected rotation ~30 days, threshold 90).
MediumSYSVOL still replicated by FRSsysvol_frs · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. SYSVOL is replicated by the deprecated File Replication Service instead of DFSR. FRS is unsupported on current Windows Server, blocks raising the functional level, and its failure modes can leave GPOs and logon scripts inconsistent across DCs.
Remediation. Migrate SYSVOL replication from FRS to DFSR (dfsrmig), then raise the functional level.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9, A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f), 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(b), 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediummoosebank.localdomainSYSVOL is still replicated by FRS (no DFSR content set found). Migrate to DFSR.
MediumOutdated domain functional levelfunctional_level_outdated · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Functional levels below 2016 miss security features such as automatic NTLM secret rolling for smart-card-only accounts and PAM features.
Remediation. Raise the domain and forest functional level once all DCs run a supported OS.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243480
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediummoosebank.localdomainDomain mode: Windows2012R2Domain; forest mode: Windows2012R2Forest.
MediumTrust uses RC4trust_rc4 · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. The trust key uses RC4 instead of AES for inter-realm tickets.
Remediation. Enable AES on both sides of the trust and reset the trust password.
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumpartner.exampletrustUsesRC4Encryption: True; UsesAESKeys: False. Trust object (and key) last changed 400 days ago.
MediumDNS zone transfer allowed to any serverdns_zone_transfer_allowed · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. The zone allows zone transfer to any server, which hands an attacker the full list of hosts and services for reconnaissance.
Remediation. Restrict zone transfers to named secondary servers, or disable them where AD replication is used.
Attack it enables. T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediummoosebank.localdnszoneSecureSecondaries = TransferToAnyServer.
MediumAny user can create records in a DNS zonedns_zone_create_child · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Broad principals (Authenticated Users by default) can create child objects in the AD-integrated zone, so any domain account can register a name that does not exist yet (WPAD, a mistyped server, a wildcard) and redirect traffic to itself (ADIDNS spoofing).
Remediation. Remove the Create all child objects right of Authenticated Users (or Everyone, Domain Users, Domain Computers) on the zone. Let DHCP register records with a dedicated account, and pre-create the names clients need.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediummoosebank.localdnszoneCreate child objects (new DNS records) granted to: Authenticated Users.
MediumDomain controller not answeringdc_unreachable · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. A DC registered in AD did not answer an LDAP query (through ADWS) from the machine that ran the collection. It may be down, firewalled, or a leftover that was never cleaned up.
Remediation. Check the DC and its ADWS service (TCP 9389). If it was decommissioned, remove it with a metadata cleanup.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumrodc01.moosebank.localdcNo LDAP answer from the collecting machine: Unable to contact the server.
MediumDomain controllers' clocks disagreedc_time_skew · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. The clocks of the DCs differ by more than a minute. Kerberos rejects tickets beyond 5 minutes of skew, so logons start failing in ways that are hard to diagnose.
Remediation. Make the PDC emulator of the forest root sync with a reliable NTP source and let every other DC follow the domain hierarchy (w32tm /config /syncfromflags:domhier on the others).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumdomain controllersdcClocks differ by 95.4 s between dc01.moosebank.local and dc02.moosebank.local (Kerberos fails beyond 300 s).
MediumLow disk space on a domain controllerdc_low_disk · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. The system drive of a DC is nearly full. When the disk holding NTDS.dit fills up, AD stops accepting changes and the DC can stop working.
Remediation. Free space or extend the volume; keep at least 10% (and several GB) free on the DCs.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumdc02.moosebank.localdcC: has 3.5 GB free of 59.4 GB (5.9%).
MediumActive Directory replication failingreplication_failures · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. A domain controller reports consecutive replication failures with a partner. Broken replication means security changes (password resets, group changes, disables) do not propagate, so a compromised or stale DC can keep serving old state, and recovery is harder.
Remediation. Investigate the failing replication link (repadmin /showrepl, DNS, time, firewall) and restore healthy replication.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243497
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumdc02.moosebank.localdc6 consecutive replication failure(s) with partner dc01.moosebank.local.
MediumActive Directory replication stalereplication_stale · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. A replication partner has not had a successful replication in over a day. Even without hard errors, stale replication delays the propagation of security-relevant changes across DCs.
Remediation. Check the replication topology and connectivity; force and verify replication (repadmin /syncall).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c); ISO27001 A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(c)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243497
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumrodc01.moosebank.localdcLast successful replication with dc01.moosebank.local: 3 days ago.
MediumDHCP server running on a domain controllerdhcp_on_dc · Operational Health1 object
Why it matters. An authorized DHCP server is also a domain controller. DHCP on a DC runs dynamic DNS registration as the DC machine account (the DnsUpdateProxy / record-ownership problem) and widens the DC attack surface; it is a long-standing Microsoft anti-pattern.
Remediation. Move the DHCP role off the domain controllers to dedicated member servers.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.13, A.8.14, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(b), 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumdc02.moosebank.localdcAuthorized DHCP server dc02.moosebank.local (10.0.0.12) is a domain controller.
MediumClient-auth template enrollable by all usersadcs_low_priv_enroll · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A published template that allows client authentication can be enrolled by Domain Users / Authenticated Users. Not exploitable on its own, but it is the surface every ESC technique builds on, and worth reviewing.
Remediation. Restrict enrollment to the groups that actually need each template.
Attack it enables. T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumMoose Web ServercerttemplateClient-auth template enrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users. Review whether such broad enrollment is needed.
MediumCA certificate expiring or expiredadcs_ca_cert_expiring · Certificate Services1 object
Why it matters. A CA certificate is close to expiry or already expired. Expiry disrupts every certificate the CA issues (auth, VPN, LDAPS).
Remediation. Plan CA certificate renewal well ahead; expiry of an issuing or root CA is a major outage.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9, A.8.13, A.8.14, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d), 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b), 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumMOOSEBANK-CAcaCA certificate expires in 120 days (2027-01-26). Host: ca01.moosebank.local.
MediumLDAP channel binding not enforcedldap_channel_binding_off · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. LdapEnforceChannelBinding is not set to Always. Channel binding blocks relaying LDAPS authentication.
Remediation. Set LDAP channel binding to "When supported" then "Always" after validating clients.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Seen in attacks: NTLM relay to LDAPS on the DCs.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoLdapEnforceChannelBinding = not configured (2 = always).
MediumLDAP client signing not requiredldap_client_signing_not_required · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO sets the LDAP client signing requirement to None (LDAPClientIntegrity = 0), so a client accepts an unsigned LDAP session and its authentication can be relayed. Left alone Windows negotiates signing, so only an explicit 0 is reported.
Remediation. Set "Network security: LDAP client signing requirements" to "Negotiate signing" or "Require signing" (CIS 2.3.11.8).
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoLDAPClientIntegrity = 0 (0 = none, 1 = negotiate, 2 = require).
MediumMachine account password changes disabled or too raremachine_password_rotation_off · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO stops domain members from changing their machine account password, or lets it live far longer than the 30-day default. That password is the key of the computer account: once it is stolen it stays valid, and it signs silver tickets for every service of that host.
Remediation. Leave "Domain member: Disable machine account password changes" disabled and keep "Domain member: Maximum machine account password age" at 30 days (CIS 2.3.6.1 and 2.3.6.2).
Attack it enables. T1558.002 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoDisablePasswordChange = 1: machine account passwords never change.
MediumWeak LM/NTLM compatibility levelntlm_weak_lmcompat · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. LmCompatibilityLevel is below 5, so the DCs may accept LM/NTLMv1 authentication, which is weak and relayable.
Remediation. Set "Network security: LAN Manager authentication level" to "Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM" (level 5) after auditing NTLMv1 usage.
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Seen in attacks: NTLMv1 downgrade and relay.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoLmCompatibilityLevel = 3 (5 = NTLMv2 only, refuse LM & NTLM).
MediumAnonymous SAM / share enumeration allowedanonymous_sam_enum · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. RestrictAnonymousSAM is not enforced, or a GPO opens null sessions (RestrictAnonymous = 0, Everyone includes Anonymous, RestrictNullSessAccess = 0, anonymous shares or extra anonymous named pipes). Anonymous enumeration of accounts and shares feeds password spraying and recon.
Remediation. Enable "Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts" and "...of SAM accounts and shares", disable "Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users", keep "Restrict anonymous access to Named Pipes and Shares" enabled, and empty the anonymous shares list and the extra anonymous pipes.
Attack it enables. T1087 Account Discovery
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoRestrictAnonymousSAM = not configured; EveryoneIncludesAnonymous = 1; NullSessionShares = COMCFG, DFS$; extra NullSessionPipes = BROWSER.
MediumAdvanced audit policy gaps on domain controllersaudit_policy_insufficient · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. Key audit subcategories that the CIS benchmark expects on DCs are not set to log Success and/or Failure. Without them, attacks like Kerberoasting, DCSync, account and group changes and privilege abuse leave little or no trace for the SIEM.
Remediation. Configure the Advanced Audit Policy on the Domain Controllers OU for the listed subcategories (Success and Failure where noted), and forward the events to your SIEM.
Attack it enables. T1562.002 Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(b), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.15, A.8.16; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 10(1); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243490
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain Controllersgpo12 subcategory gap(s): Kerberos Authentication Service (need Success+Failure, have None); Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (need Success+Failure, have None); User Account Management (need Success+Failure, have Success); Computer Account Management (need Success, have None); Security Group Management (need Success, have None); Directory Service Access (need Failure, have None); Directory Service Changes (need Success, have None); Special Logon (need Success, have None); Sensitive Privilege Use (need Success+Failure, have None); Audit Policy Change (need Success+Failure, have None); Security System Extension (need Success, have None); System Integrity (need Success+Failure, have None).
MediumKerberos encryption allows RC4 or DES on domain controllerskerberos_rc4_allowed · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. The effective "Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos" GPO still permits RC4 (or DES). RC4 service tickets crack far faster than AES, making Kerberoasting cheap.
Remediation. Set the allowed Kerberos encryption types to AES128 + AES256 only, after confirming no legacy client or trust needs RC4.
Attack it enables. T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoSupportedEncryptionTypes = 7 allows DES/RC4.
MediumLSASS not running as a protected process (RunAsPPL)lsass_not_protected · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. RunAsPPL is not enforced, so credential-theft tools can open LSASS and dump secrets more easily on the DCs.
Remediation. Enable "Configure LSASS to run as a protected process" (RunAsPPL = 1) after checking driver/AV compatibility.
Attack it enables. T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoRunAsPPL = not configured.
MediumSMB client signing not requiredsmb_client_signing_not_required · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. The SMB client does not require signing, which allows an attacker to relay or tamper with outbound SMB authentication from the DCs.
Remediation. Set "Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)" to Enabled via GPO.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Seen in attacks: NTLM relay and reflection over SMB (CVE-2025-33073, 2025).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoLanmanWorkstation RequireSecuritySignature (client) = not configured.
MediumLLMNR not disabledllmnr_enabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution is not disabled (DNSClient EnableMulticast not set to 0). LLMNR lets an attacker on the same subnet answer name queries and capture or relay NTLM credentials (Responder-style poisoning).
Remediation. Disable LLMNR via GPO (Turn off multicast name resolution = Enabled), together with NBT-NS hardening.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoDNSClient EnableMulticast = not configured (0 = LLMNR disabled).
MediummDNS not disabledmdns_enabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. Multicast DNS is on by default on current Windows and no GPO turns it off (Dnscache EnableMDNS not set to 0). Like LLMNR, an attacker on the same subnet can answer mDNS queries and capture or relay NTLM credentials.
Remediation. Set HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters\EnableMDNS = 0 through a GPO, together with disabling LLMNR and NBT-NS.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoDnscache EnableMDNS = not configured (on by default) (0 = mDNS disabled).
MediumNetBIOS over TCP/IP enabled on a domain controllernbtns_enabled_dc · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A network adapter of the DC has NetBIOS over TCP/IP on (explicitly, or "from DHCP", which means on with a static address), read live over CIM. NBT-NS answers can be spoofed like LLMNR to capture or relay credentials, and NetBIOS keeps legacy name resolution and session services exposed.
Remediation. Set "Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP" on every adapter of the DCs (NIC settings, or NetbiosOptions = 2 under NetBT\Parameters\Interfaces through a GPO or script), after checking that no legacy client still needs it.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediumdc02.moosebank.localdcNetBIOS over TCP/IP on: vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter (default: from DHCP).
MediumRDP Network Level Authentication turned offrdp_nla_disabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO sets UserAuthentication = 0: RDP sessions start before the user authenticates, exposing the logon screen and the RDP stack to unauthenticated users (BlueKeep-class bugs, user enumeration).
Remediation. Set "Require user authentication for remote connections by using Network Level Authentication" to Enabled.
Attack it enables. T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumMooseBank DC ExtragpoTerminal Services UserAuthentication = 0 (NLA not required). GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.
MediumRDP Restricted Admin mode enabledrdp_restricted_admin · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO sets DisableRestrictedAdmin = 0. Restricted Admin keeps credentials off the target, but it lets anyone holding an NT hash log on over RDP (pass-the-hash to RDP).
Remediation. Prefer Remote Credential Guard. If Restricted Admin is needed, limit it to admin workstations and Tier 0 jump hosts.
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumMooseBank DC ExtragpoLsa DisableRestrictedAdmin = 0 (Restricted Admin allowed). GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.
MediumIPv6 left on without a GPO against rogue DHCPv6 (mitm6)ipv6_dhcpv6_takeover · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO disables IPv6 (DisabledComponents = 0xFF). Windows prefers IPv6 and asks for DHCPv6, so a host on the LAN can become the DNS server of every client (mitm6) and relay their authentication. Medium when a relay target is open (LDAP signing not required, or users can add computers). A firewall rule blocking inbound DHCPv6 also closes it and is not visible here.
Remediation. Block inbound DHCPv6 and router advertisements with Windows Firewall rules, or disable IPv6 where it is not used; require LDAP signing and channel binding and set the machine account quota to 0.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Mediummoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets Tcpip6 DisabledComponents = 0xFF; relay targets: LDAP signing not required, machine account quota 10. A firewall rule blocking DHCPv6 would also do, and is not read.
MediumGPO adds a trusted root certificate from outside this forest's PKIgpo_trusted_root_added · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. A GPO puts a certificate in the Trusted Root (or Third-Party Root) Certification Authorities store of every machine in scope, and that certificate is not one of the CA certificates published in this forest (Certification Authorities, AIA, NTAuth). Whoever holds its private key can issue TLS, code-signing or e-mail certificates that those machines trust, and intercept or sign anything. Often a TLS-inspection proxy or a partner CA: legitimate, but it must be known and guarded.
Remediation. Identify each listed thumbprint. Remove the certificate from the GPO if nobody owns it; otherwise document it, check where its key is kept, and scope the GPO to the machines that need it. Add an exception once it is reviewed.
Attack it enables. T1553.004 Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumClient Hardeninggpo1 trusted root certificate(s) not published in this forest's AD, SHA-1 thumbprint: E5F60718E5F60718E5F60718E5F60718E5F60718. GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).
MediumPrint Spooler not disabled on domain controllersspooler_on_dc · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO disables the Print Spooler service on the DCs. A running spooler on a DC is the lever for coercion attacks (PrinterBug / MS-RPRN) that force the DC to authenticate to an attacker, feeding NTLM relay and unconstrained-delegation chains.
Remediation. Disable the Print Spooler service on all domain controllers via GPO (service startup = Disabled).
Attack it enables. T1547.012 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoSpooler service Start = not configured by GPO (4 = Disabled).
MediumToo many cached logon credentialscached_credentials · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. The number of cached interactive logons is high or unset (default 10). Cached domain credentials can be extracted offline from a stolen or compromised machine; domain controllers and admin hosts should cache few or none.
Remediation. Set "Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache" to a low value (0 on DCs and PAWs, <= 4 elsewhere) via GPO.
Attack it enables. T1003.005 OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoCachedLogonsCount = not configured (default 10).
MediumUNC hardened paths not configured for SYSVOL / NETLOGONunc_hardening_disabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. Hardened UNC paths for \\*\SYSVOL and \\*\NETLOGON (RequireMutualAuthentication and RequireIntegrity) are not enforced. Without them, GPO and logon-script delivery can be tampered with or spoofed on the path to the DC (a GPO-over-SMB attack vector).
Remediation. Configure "Hardened UNC Paths" for \\*\SYSVOL and \\*\NETLOGON with RequireMutualAuthentication=1 and RequireIntegrity=1 via GPO.
Attack it enables. T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoHardened UNC Paths not configured for: \\*\SYSVOL, \\*\NETLOGON.
MediumCommand-line auditing not enabled in process creation eventscmdline_audit_not_enabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled is not set, so 4688 events do not record the full command line. Without it, malicious use of living-off-the-land binaries and scripts is far harder to detect.
Remediation. Enable "Include command line in process creation events" via GPO, together with Audit Process Creation (Success).
Attack it enables. T1562.002 Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(b), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.15, A.8.16; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 10(1); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled = not configured.
MediumPowerShell script block / module logging not enabledpowershell_logging_not_enabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. EnableScriptBlockLogging (and module logging) is not set, so PowerShell activity, a very common attacker tool, is not recorded for the SIEM.
Remediation. Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (and Module Logging) via GPO, and forward events 4104/4103 to the SIEM.
Attack it enables. T1562.002 Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(b), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.15, A.8.16; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 10(1); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
MediumDomain ControllersgpoEnableScriptBlockLogging = not configured.
LowActive workstation with no BitLocker recovery key in ADbitlocker_key_missing · Host Hardening3 objects
Why it matters. An enabled, recently active Windows workstation has no BitLocker recovery object (msFVE-RecoveryInformation) under its computer account. Either the disk is not encrypted, so a lost or stolen laptop gives away its cached credentials and data, or the key was never escrowed and the machine cannot be recovered. When no computer at all has a key in AD, one finding on the domain is raised instead. Only the presence of the objects is read, never a recovery password.
Remediation. Enforce BitLocker with a GPO or Intune policy that requires the recovery key to be backed up to AD DS before encryption starts ("Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored to AD DS"). If keys are escrowed to Entra ID or MBAM instead, add an exception.
Attack it enables. T1006 Direct Volume Access
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowEVILPC$computerNo BitLocker recovery object under the computer account (18 computer(s) in the domain have one). OS: Windows 10 Pro.
LowWKS-019$computerNo BitLocker recovery object under the computer account (18 computer(s) in the domain have one). OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.
LowWKS-020$computerNo BitLocker recovery object under the computer account (18 computer(s) in the domain have one). OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.
LowPassword never expirespassword_never_expires · Account Hygiene2 objects
Why it matters. Typical of service accounts whose passwords are never changed.
Remediation. Migrate services to gMSA; for humans, clear the flag.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowMSOL_a1b2c3d4e5f6userPassword age: 30 days.
Lowsvc_webuserPassword age: 500 days.
LowStale computer accountstale_computer · Account Hygiene2 objects
Why it matters. Enabled computer account with no recent logon. Its password no longer rotates and it clutters inventory and LAPS coverage.
Remediation. Disable, move to a quarantine OU, and delete after the retention period.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowWKS-017$computerLast logon: 120 days ago (threshold 90 days). OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.
LowWKS-W7-01$computerLast logon: 300 days ago (threshold 90 days). OS: Windows 7 Professional.
LowInbound trust without selective authenticationtrust_no_selective_auth · Domain Configuration2 objects
Why it matters. All users of the trusted domain can authenticate to any resource here.
Remediation. Consider selective authentication for external/forest trusts with third parties.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243485
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowlegacy-forest.localtrustBiDirectional forest trust, forest-wide authentication.
Lowpartner.exampletrustInbound external trust, forest-wide authentication.
LowNo authentication policy silo in useauth_policy_silo_unused · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. The domain defines no authentication policy silos. Silos (2012R2+) confine Tier 0 accounts so their TGTs can only be used from designated hosts and enforce Protected-Users-style restrictions, limiting credential theft and lateral movement. They are a key Tier 0 containment control and are unused here.
Remediation. Create an authentication policy and silo for Tier 0 accounts and admin workstations, pilot it, then assign the Tier 0 accounts. Combine with Protected Users.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNo authentication policy silo defined while 17 Tier 0 principal(s) exist.
LowDisabled account in privileged groupprivileged_disabled_member · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. A disabled account keeps its group memberships: re-enabling it (by anyone with that right) instantly restores Tier 0 access.
Remediation. Remove disabled accounts from privileged groups.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowadm.exdipendenteuserDisabled, still member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).
LowOrphaned adminCount=1orphaned_admincount · Privileged Access1 object
Why it matters. The account was protected by AdminSDHolder in the past but is no longer privileged. Inheritance stays disabled, so it keeps an ACL that nobody reviews, and it may reveal former admin accounts.
Remediation. Clear adminCount and re-enable ACL inheritance on the object.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.2; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowold.admin.2019useradminCount=1 but not an effective member of any protected group. Enabled: True.
LowCircular group nestingcircular_group_nesting · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. Two or more groups are nested into each other in a cycle. Circular nesting makes effective membership hard to reason about and review, hides who really has access, and can confuse tools and access reviews.
Remediation. Break the cycle: remove the nesting link that is not needed so the group hierarchy is a tree.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowG-Loop-AgroupGroups in a nesting cycle: G-Loop-A, G-Loop-B.
LowEnabled user inactiveinactive_user · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. Unused enabled accounts are valid credentials nobody would notice being used.
Remediation. Disable after owner confirmation, then delete after a retention period.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmario.rossi.olduserLast logon 400 days ago (threshold 180).
LowEnabled user never logged onnever_logged_on_user · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. Account created long ago and never used: often an onboarding leftover with an initial password known to several people.
Remediation. Disable or delete.
Attack it enables. T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18; DORA 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowtemp.useruserCreated 200 days ago, no logon recorded.
LowLAPS password overduelaps_stale · Account Hygiene1 object
Why it matters. The LAPS expiration time is well in the past: the client is no longer rotating the local admin password.
Remediation. Investigate the client (offline, broken GPO processing, removed from policy scope).
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.17, A.5.18, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(c), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
Benchmarks. STIG AD V-243471
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowWKS-015$computerLAPS password expired 100 days ago and was not rotated.
LowNo subnets declared in Active Directory Sitesdc_subnet_missing · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. With no subnets defined, clients cannot be mapped to a site: they may authenticate against any DC (including a remote or RODC), and site-aware security and locality are lost. It is also a sign of an incompletely managed directory.
Remediation. Declare every network subnet under Sites and Services and associate it with the correct site.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNo subnet objects are declared under Sites and Services.
LowAD Recycle Bin not enabledrecycle_bin_disabled · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Deleted objects cannot be restored with their attributes and group memberships, which slows recovery after an incident or an error.
Remediation. Enable-ADOptionalFeature 'Recycle Bin Feature'.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(c), 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.13, A.8.14; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 12(1); GDPR 32(1)(b), 32(1)(c)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainRecycle Bin Feature has no enabled scope.
LowTombstone lifetime below 180 daystombstone_lifetime_low · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. The tombstone lifetime sets how long a deleted object (and an AD backup) stays restorable. Below 180 days the recovery window is short: a backup older than it can no longer be used for an authoritative restore, which hurts recovery after ransomware or a bad change. An unset value falls back to the legacy 60-day default.
Remediation. Set tombstoneLifetime on CN=Directory Service,CN=Windows NT,CN=Services,<config NC> to at least 180 days (the modern default).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomaintombstoneLifetime = 90 days (recommended >= 180).
LowDomain controller on old operating systemdc_obsolete_os · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Domain controller running an OS that is out of support or close to end of support.
Remediation. Plan the DC replacement: DCs are the most exposed Tier 0 assets.
Attack it enables. T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.8, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(f); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowDC02dcWindows Server 2016 Standard: extended support ends January 2027, plan replacement.
LowJava object classes present in the schemaschema_java_objects · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. The schema contains the RFC 2713 Java classes (javaSerializedObject, javaObject...), usually left by an old LDAP/Unix integration. They let a client store serialized Java objects in the directory, which a vulnerable Java application can deserialize.
Remediation. Check that no application uses these classes. Schema classes cannot be deleted, but they can be deactivated (defunct); make sure nobody can create objects of these classes (default security descriptor and ACLs).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainJava classes in the schema: javaContainer, javaSerializedObject.
LowTrust that looks unusedtrust_inactive · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. The trust object (and so its password, which rotates every 30 days on a live trust) has not changed for months. The other domain is probably gone or the trust forgotten, yet it still extends authentication to a domain nobody maintains.
Remediation. Confirm with the owner of the other domain that the trust is still needed. If not, remove it (netdom trust /remove or Active Directory Domains and Trusts).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.15, A.5.16, A.5.18, A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(c); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowpartner.exampletrustInbound trust object last changed 400 days ago (threshold 180 days): the trust password should have rotated.
LowDNS aging/scavenging disableddns_scavenging_disabled · Domain Configuration1 object
Why it matters. Without aging/scavenging, stale records accumulate; an attacker can claim an abandoned name that still resolves for clients.
Remediation. Enable aging and scavenging on the zone with sensible refresh/no-refresh intervals.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.20; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdnszoneAging/scavenging not enabled on the zone.
LowNo machine inactivity limit on the domain controllersmachine_inactivity_limit_missing · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No effective GPO locks the console after a while (InactivityTimeoutSecs), or the limit is longer than 15 minutes. A session left open on a domain controller or an admin host is a logged-on Tier 0 token waiting for whoever walks past it.
Remediation. Set "Interactive logon: Machine inactivity limit" to 900 seconds or less (CIS 2.3.7.3).
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowDomain ControllersgpoInactivityTimeoutSecs = not configured.
LowNTLM neither audited nor restricted on domain controllersntlm_not_restricted · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO on the DCs turns on "Restrict NTLM" auditing or blocking (AuditNTLMInDomain, RestrictNTLMInDomain, AuditReceivingNTLMTraffic, RestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic). Nobody can tell which systems still use NTLM, so it can never be switched off, and pass-the-hash and NTLM relay stay possible everywhere.
Remediation. Enable "Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain" (Enable all) and "Audit incoming NTLM traffic" on the DCs, review the NTLM operational log, then deny NTLM for the servers and accounts that no longer need it (Tier 0 first).
Attack it enables. T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowDomain ControllersgpoNo effective GPO sets AuditNTLMInDomain, RestrictNTLMInDomain, AuditReceivingNTLMTraffic or RestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic.
LowWebClient (WebDAV) service not disabled by GPOwebclient_not_disabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO applied to the DCs or the domain root disables the WebClient service. Where it runs, coercion (PetitPotam, PrinterBug) can force authentication over HTTP instead of SMB, which can be relayed to LDAP without signing protection.
Remediation. Set the WebClient service to Disabled through a GPO (System Services) on servers and on workstations that do not need WebDAV.
Attack it enables. T1187 Forced Authentication
Seen in attacks: Coercion over WebDAV for NTLM relay to LDAP or AD CS.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowDomain ControllersgpoWebClient service startup = 3 (4 = Disabled).
LowNo GPO enables Credential Guardcredential_guard_not_configured · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO turns on virtualization-based security with Credential Guard (LsaCfgFlags). Without it, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets of logged-on users sit in LSASS memory on workstations and member servers.
Remediation. Enable "Turn On Virtualization Based Security" with Credential Guard (UEFI lock) for workstations and member servers that support it. Not on DCs, where it brings no protection.
Attack it enables. T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNone of the 4 GPO templates sets LsaCfgFlags (Credential Guard).
LowNo application control policy in any GPOapp_control_missing · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO deploys AppLocker rules or a Windows Defender Application Control policy. Any user can run any binary or script they download or drop, which is how most initial access payloads start.
Remediation. Deploy AppLocker (or WDAC) in audit mode, review, then enforce, starting with admin workstations and servers.
Attack it enables. T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNone of the 4 GPO templates holds AppLocker rules (SrpV2) or a WDAC policy.
LowSessions are not closed when logon hours expireforce_logoff_disabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. "Network security: Force logoff when logon hours expire" is off: an account restricted by logon hours keeps its open SMB sessions after its allowed time.
Remediation. Enable "Force logoff when logon hours expire" in the domain password policy GPO.
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainForceLogoffWhenHourExpire = not configured (off).
LowWindows Script Host not disabled by GPOwsh_enabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO turns off Windows Script Host (Settings\Enabled = 0), so .vbs / .js / .wsf attachments and droppers run with a double click.
Remediation. Disable Windows Script Host for users who do not need it (HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings\Enabled = 0), or block the script hosts with application control.
Attack it enables. T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets Windows Script Host Settings\Enabled = 0.
LowWPAD auto-discovery not disabled by GPOwpad_not_disabled · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO turns off Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WinHttp DisableWpad = 1, or the WinHTTP Web Proxy Auto-Discovery service disabled). Clients keep looking for a "wpad" host through DNS, LLMNR, mDNS and NBT-NS, and whoever answers becomes their proxy and can capture NTLM authentication.
Remediation. Set HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinHttp\Parameters\DisableWpad = 1 by GPO (or disable the WinHttpAutoProxySvc service) where no proxy auto-discovery is used, and keep "wpad" in the DNS global query block list.
Attack it enables. T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets WinHttp DisableWpad = 1 or disables the WinHttpAutoProxySvc service.
LowNo GPO limits idle or disconnected RDP sessionsrdp_session_timeout_missing · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. No GPO sets a time limit for disconnected Remote Desktop sessions (MaxDisconnectionTime) or for idle sessions (MaxIdleTime). Disconnected sessions, often of administrators, stay on servers for days with their credentials in memory, where a local admin can take them over (tscon session hijacking) or dump them.
Remediation. In Remote Desktop Session Host > Session Time Limits, set "Set time limit for disconnected sessions" (for example 1 hour) and "Set time limit for active but idle sessions" (for example 2 hours) in a GPO for servers.
Attack it enables. T1563.002 Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g); ISO27001 A.8.9; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
Lowmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets MaxDisconnectionTime (Remote Desktop session time limits).
LowKerberos armoring (FAST) not enforced on domain controllerskerberos_armoring_not_enforced · Host Hardening1 object
Why it matters. EnableCbacAndArmor / the KDC "fail unarmored" setting is not enforced, so Kerberos pre-authentication is not protected by FAST and remains exposed to AS-REP roasting and some downgrade attacks.
Remediation. Once the functional level and clients support it, enable KDC support for claims/armoring and require armored requests via GPO.
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(e), 21(2)(g), 21(2)(h); ISO27001 A.8.9, A.8.24; DORA 9(2), 9(4)(b), 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(a), 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowDomain ControllersgpoKDC EnableCbacAndArmor = not configured.
LowKerberos ticket lifetimes longer than the defaultskerberos_ticket_lifetime_long · Kerberos1 object
Why it matters. The domain Kerberos policy (a GPO linked to the domain root, normally the Default Domain Policy) lets tickets live longer than the defaults: user tickets 10 hours, renewal 7 days, service tickets 600 minutes. A stolen or forged ticket stays usable for longer, and disabling an account takes longer to bite.
Remediation. Set "Maximum lifetime for user ticket" back to 10 hours or less, "Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal" to 7 days or less and "Maximum lifetime for service ticket" to 600 minutes or less in the Default Domain Policy.
Attack it enables. T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Regulatory controls. NIS2 21(2)(i); ISO27001 A.5.17, A.8.5; DORA 9(4)(d); GDPR 32(1)(b)
SeverityObjectTypeDetail
LowDefault Domain PolicygpoKerberos policy: MaxRenewAge = 30 days (default 7).

Tier 0 inventory

Effective members of privileged groups, resolved by SID through nested groups and primaryGroupID. PU = Protected Users, ND = "sensitive and cannot be delegated".

PrincipalTypeEnabledPrivileged groupsMembership pathLast logonPassword ageSPNPU / NDNever expires
adm.bianchiuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > adm.bianchi | Administrators > Domain Admins > adm.bianchi2 days400 daysnononeno
adm.exdipendenteusernoDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > adm.exdipendente | Administrators > Domain Admins > adm.exdipendente300 days500 daysnononeno
adm.ferrariuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > adm.ferrari | Administrators > Domain Admins > adm.ferrari1 days50 daysnononeno
adm.gialliuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > IT-Tier0-Admins > adm.gialli | Administrators > Domain Admins > IT-Tier0-Admins > adm.gialli3 days100 daysnononeno
adm.neriuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > IT-Tier0-Admins > adm.neri | Administrators > Domain Admins > IT-Tier0-Admins > adm.neri1 days20 daysnononeno
adm.olduseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > adm.old | Administrators > Domain Admins > adm.old200 days900 daysnononeyes
adm.rossiuseryesDomain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > adm.rossi | Enterprise Admins > adm.rossi | Administrators > Domain Admins > adm.rossi | Administrators > Enterprise Admins > adm.rossi1 days60 daysnoNDno
adm.verdiuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > adm.verdi | Administrators > Domain Admins > adm.verdi1 days30 daysnononeno
AdministratoruseryesDomain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator OwnersDomain Admins > Administrator | Enterprise Admins > Administrator | Administrators > Administrator | Administrators > Domain Admins > Administrator | Administrators > Enterprise Admins > Administrator | Group Policy Creator Owners > Administrator5 days800 daysnononeyes
PARTNER\ext.adminforeignn/aAdministrators (builtin)Administrators > PARTNER\ext.adminnevernevernono
dns.adminuseryesDnsAdminsDnsAdmins > dns.admin5 days90 daysnononeno
helpdesk.leaduseryesAccount OperatorsAccount Operators > helpdesk.lead1 days80 daysnononeno
hidden.adminuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > hidden.admin (primaryGroupID) | Administrators > Domain Admins > hidden.admin (primaryGroupID)4 days40 daysnononeno
loop.useruseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > IT-Tier0-Admins > G-Loop-A > G-Loop-B > loop.user | Administrators > Domain Admins > IT-Tier0-Admins > G-Loop-A > G-Loop-B > loop.user1 days40 daysnononeno
SRV-BACKUP01$computeryesAdministrators (builtin)Administrators > SRV-BACKUP01$3 days10 daysyesno
svc_backupuseryesBackup OperatorsBackup Operators > svc_backup1 days700 daysyesnoneyes
svc_sql_adminuseryesDomain Admins, Administrators (builtin)Domain Admins > svc_sql_admin | Administrators > Domain Admins > svc_sql_admin1 days1200 daysyesnoneyes

Domain posture

ItemValue
Domain / forest functional levelWindows2012R2Domain / Windows2012R2Forest
krbtgt password age1500 days
Domain controllersDC01 (Windows Server 2022 Datacenter); DC02 (Windows Server 2016 Standard); RODC01 (Windows Server 2019 Standard, RODC)
Password policymin length 8, complexity True, lockout 0, max age 90d, history 24
Fine-grained policies2
ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota10
LAPS schema (legacy / Windows)False / True
Recycle BinFalse
dSHeuristics0000002
External / forest trusts2
SYSVOL scanned for cpasswordTrue

Thresholds: krbtgt 180/365 days, privileged inactivity 90 days, user inactivity 180 days, stale computer 90 days, password age 365 days, minimum length 12, max Domain Admins 5.

Collection and connection

ItemValue
Collected fromPAW-01 as MOOSEBANK\auditor
Server asked fordc01.moosebank.local
Served bydc01.moosebank.local over ADWS (TCP 9389), first answer in 412 ms
DNS servers of the collecting machine10.10.0.10, 10.10.0.11
DNS lookup of moosebank.local10.10.0.10, 10.10.0.11 in 4 ms
DC locator (DNS SRV)2 DC(s) in 6 ms: dc01.moosebank.local, dc02.moosebank.local
LDAP bind (RootDSE)23 ms, answered by dc01.moosebank.local, site Milano-HQ
Domain controller testeddc01.moosebank.local (chosen (-Server)) = 10.10.0.10 in 2 ms

TCP ports on dc01.moosebank.local, tested from the collecting machine (connect only, nothing sent).

PortServiceStateConnect timeUsed for
9389ADWSopen3 msevery Get-AD* read (the collection)
445SMBopen2 msSYSVOL (GPP passwords, GPO settings, scripts)
5985WinRMclosed no answer in 2000 ms (filtered?)CIM: DC health, DNS server, CA settings
636LDAPSclosed connection refusedLDAP over TLS, when 389 does not answer

All findings

SeverityCheckCategoryObjectTypeDetailMITRE
Criticaladcs_esc1Certificate ServicesMoose ESC1 VulnerablecerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set; client-auth EKU; no manager approval; no enrollment-agent signature.T1649
Criticaladcs_esc13Certificate ServicesMoose ESC13 PolicyLinkcerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; issuance policy 'High Assurance Policy' linked to group 'Domain Admins' (privileged): the certificate grants that group's rights.T1649
Criticaladcs_esc2Certificate ServicesMoose ESC2 AnyPurposecerttemplateEnrollable by NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users; Any Purpose EKU; no manager approval.T1649
Criticalalways_install_elevatedHost HardeningDefault Domain PolicygpoMachine-side AlwaysInstallElevated = 1; the user side is set too (in this or another GPO): any user gets SYSTEM. GPO linked to the domain root.T1548
Criticalasrep_roastableKerberosadm.gialliuserPre-authentication disabled on a privileged account (Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin)). Password age: 100 days.T1558.004
Criticalconstrained_delegation_protocol_transitionKerberossvc_iis_deleguserProtocol transition (any-auth) to: cifs/dc01.moosebank.local, cifs/DC01. Targets include domain controller services: cifs/dc01.moosebank.local, cifs/DC01.T1550.003
Criticaldangerous_ace_anywherePermissionsNT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersaclWriteDacl over organizationalUnit 'Servers'.T1098
Criticaldangerous_ace_tier0PermissionsMOOSEBANK\backdoor.useraclTarget: AdminSDHolder. GenericAll.T1098
Criticaldangerous_ace_tier0PermissionsMOOSEBANK\Exchange Windows PermissionsaclTarget: DomainRoot. WriteDacl on domain head. Exchange group: without split permissions it can grant itself DCSync (PrivExchange); remove the ACE with Exchange's split-permissions setup or the published fix.T1098
Criticaldangerous_ace_tier0PermissionsMOOSEBANK\IT-OpsaclTarget: DomainControllersOU. WriteProperty(gPLink).T1098
Criticaldcsync_rightsPermissionsMOOSEBANK\backdoor.useraclRights on domain head: ExtendedRight(DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All).T1003.006
Criticalgpo_autologon_passwordHost HardeningDefault Domain PolicygpoAutologon password in Winlogon DefaultPassword registry value; AutoAdminLogon = 1. Value not collected. GPO linked to the domain root.T1552.006
Criticalgpo_autologon_passwordHost HardeningGPO {22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222}gpoAutologon password in Group Policy Preferences registry item. Value not collected. GPO not found among the GPO templates. File: \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\Policies\{22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222}\Machine\Preferences\Registry\Registry.xmlT1552.006
Criticalgpo_dangerous_aclPermissionsMooseBank DC ExtragpoMOOSEBANK\Helpdesk holds GenericWrite on this GPO, linked (enabled) to the Domain Controllers OU.T1484.001
Criticalgpo_runs_code_from_sharePermissionsMooseBank DC Extra: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmdgpoMachine Startup script: \\fs01.moosebank.local\it$\dc-tools.cmd. GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.T1484.001
Criticalgpp_cpasswordPermissionsGPO {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}gpocpassword found in \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\Machine\Preferences\Groups\Groups.xmlT1552.006
Criticalhidden_primary_groupPrivileged Accesshidden.adminuserprimaryGroupID = 512 (Domain Admins): privileged group membership not visible in the member attribute.T1098
Criticalkrbtgt_password_oldKerberoskrbtgtuserkrbtgt password last set 1500 days ago (threshold 180 days, critical above 365).T1558.001
Criticalnetlogon_vulnerable_channelHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoNetlogon enforcement weakened (FullSecureChannelProtection = n/a, RequireStrongKey = 0).T1210
Criticalnopac_unpatched_dcHost Hardeningdc02.moosebank.localdcBuild 17763.2237, fixed from 17763.2300. Machine account quota: 10, so any user can exploit it.T1068
Criticalpoint_and_print_unsafeHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoRestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators = 0; NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall = 1; UpdatePromptSettings = not configured (drivers install with no prompt).T1068
Criticalprivileged_kerberoastableKerberossvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators. SPN: backup/bkp01.moosebank.local. Password age: 700 days.T1558.003
Criticalprivileged_kerberoastableKerberossvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin). SPN: MSSQLSvc/sql01.moosebank.local:1433. Password age: 1200 days.T1558.003
Criticalpwq_empty_passwordPassword Qualitytemp.useruserEmpty password.T1078
Criticalrbcd_configuredKerberosDC01$computerPrincipals allowed to act on behalf of other identities: EVILPC$. Target is a DOMAIN CONTROLLER.T1550.003
Criticalrodc_tier0_revealedPrivileged AccessRODC01dcPassword of Tier 0 account(s) cached on RODC RODC01: adm.neri. Administered (managedBy) by Helpdesk, not Tier 0.T1003
Criticalsid_historyAccount Hygieneevil.userusersIDHistory: S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512. S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512 is a privileged SID (RID 512).T1134.005
Criticalsysvol_writablePermissionsNETLOGON (scripts)fileWrite access for: MOOSEBANK\Domain Users (Modify, Synchronize). Folder: \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\scriptsT1484.001
Highad_backup_overdueOperational Healthmoosebank.localdomainLast AD backup of the domain naming context was 45 days ago (threshold 7).
Highadcs_esc10Certificate ServicesDomain ControllersgpoStrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 1 (0 = disabled, 1 = compatibility; 2 = full enforcement).T1649
Highadcs_esc11Certificate ServicesMOOSEBANK-CAcaInterfaceFlags = 0x41 without IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST (0x200).T1557.001
Highadcs_esc15Certificate ServicesMoose ESC15 SchemaV1certtemplateSchema v1 template enrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set; no manager approval: an arbitrary application policy (e.g. client auth) can be injected into the request.T1649
Highadcs_esc17Certificate ServicesMoose ESC15 SchemaV1certtemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users with a supplied subject, server authentication EKU, no approval. WSUS over HTTPS: https://wsus02.moosebank.local:8531 (GPO MooseBank DC Extra).T1557
Highadcs_esc3Certificate ServicesMoose ESC3 EnrollAgentcerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; Certificate Request Agent EKU; no manager approval.T1649
Highadcs_esc4Certificate ServicesMoose ESC4 WeakACLcerttemplateModifiable by non-administrators: MOOSEBANK\Domain Users: WriteDacl.T1649
Highadcs_esc5Certificate ServicesMOOSEBANK\IT-OpsaclControl of PKI objects: WriteDacl on CA:MOOSEBANK-CA.T1649
Highadcs_esc6Certificate ServicesMOOSEBANK-CAcaEditFlags = 0x15014E includes EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 (0x40000).T1649
Highadcs_esc7Certificate ServicesMOOSEBANK-CAcaNon-Tier 0 CA officers or managers: MOOSEBANK\Helpdesk (Issue and Manage Certificates).T1649
Highadcs_esc8Certificate ServicesMOOSEBANK-CAcaInstalled on ca01.moosebank.local: Certification Authority Web Enrollment. Confirm HTTPS with Extended Protection for Authentication on the site.T1557.001
Highadcs_esc9Certificate ServicesMoose ESC9 NoSecExtcerttemplateEnrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users; CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION set (no SID binding); client-auth EKU; no manager approval.T1649
Highadcs_weak_ca_keyCertificate ServicesMOOSEBANK-CAcaCA certificate weakness: RSA key 1024 bits. Host: ca01.moosebank.local.T1649
Highaltsecid_weak_mappingAccount Hygienesc.bianchiuserWeak altSecurityIdentities mapping(s): SubjectOnly (values not collected). StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 1 by GPO, so the mapping is honoured.T1649
Highanonymous_ldap_enabledDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomaindSHeuristics = '0000002'.T1087.002
Highasrep_roastableKerberossvc_legacyuserPre-authentication disabled. Password age: 1000 days.T1558.004
Highazuread_sso_key_oldKerberosAZUREADSSOACC$computerSeamless SSO key last rolled over 400 days ago (Microsoft recommends every 30 days).T1558.002
Highcoercion_unfiltered_dcHost Hardeningdc02.moosebank.localdcOpen: MS-EFSR (EFS service Manual/Stopped), MS-DFSNM (DFS Namespace running), MS-EVEN (EventLog running); no RPC filter for these interfaces. Relay targets open: LDAP signing not required; LDAPS channel binding not enforced; AD CS web enrollment on MOOSEBANK-CA (ESC8); AD CS RPC enrollment on MOOSEBANK-CA (ESC11).T1187
Highdangerous_ace_anywherePermissionsMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclGenericAll over user 'adm.bianchi'.T1098
Highdangerous_ace_anywherePermissionsMOOSEBANK\IT-OpsaclWriteProperty(User-Account-Restrictions) over computer 'SRV-SQL01$'.T1098
Highdangerous_ace_tier0PermissionsMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclTarget: DomainRoot. ExtendedRight(User-Force-Change-Password) on descendant user objects.T1098
Highdangerous_privilege_rightHost HardeningDebug programsgpoGPO 'MooseBank DC Extra' grants SeDebugPrivilege to: S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1103.T1078.002
Highdc_service_stoppedOperational Healthdc02.moosebank.localdcNot running: DFSR.
Highdcsync_rightsPermissionsMOOSEBANK\MSOL_a1b2c3d4e5f6aclRights on domain head: ExtendedRight(DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All). Looks like an Entra Connect / sync account: expected, but it is a Tier 0 credential and must be protected as such.T1003.006
Highdes_enabledKerberossvc_legacyuserUSE_DES_KEY_ONLY: True; msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes: not set.T1558
Highdns_dangerous_recordDomain Configurationwpad (moosebank.local)dnsrecordA record 'wpad' in zone moosebank.local.T1557
Highdns_insecure_updatesDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdnszoneDynamicUpdate = NonsecureAndSecure.T1557
Highdsrm_logon_behaviorOperational Healthdc02.moosebank.localdcDsrmAdminLogonBehavior = 2: the DSRM local administrator can log on while the DC runs normally.T1078.003
Highfgpp_weakDomain ConfigurationPSO-AdminsfgppMinimum length 10 (baseline 12), precedence 10. Applies to privileged principals: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=moosebank,DC=local.T1110
Highfirewall_disabled_gpoHost HardeningClient HardeninggpoEnableFirewall = 0 for the domain, public profiles. GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).T1562.004
Highfsmo_holder_invalidOperational HealthInfrastructureMasterfsmoInfrastructureMaster is held by dc-old.moosebank.local, which is not one of the current domain controllers.
Highgmsa_password_readablePermissionsgmsa_sql$msaPassword retrievable by non-Tier 0 principal(s): Helpdesk.T1649
Highgpo_broad_local_groupPrivileged AccessWorkstation Baseline: local AdministratorsgpoDomain Users added to local Administrators through Group Policy Preferences.T1078.002
Highkds_root_key_readablePermissionsMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclGenericRead on KDS root key(s): 3f1c8e2a-5d4b-4c1e-9a7f-2b6d0e8c4a11.T1003
Highkerberoastable_userKerberossvc_webuserSPN: HTTP/web01.moosebank.local. Password age: 500 days (over 365 days).T1558.003
Highlaps_readersPermissionsMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclNon-Tier 0 principal can read the LAPS password of 1 computer(s).T1098
Highldap_signing_not_requiredHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoLDAPServerIntegrity = not configured (2 = require).T1557.001
Highnonstandard_owner_tier0PermissionsMOOSEBANK\adm.oldaclOwner of Group:Domain Admins is MOOSEBANK\adm.old (S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1205).T1098
Highobsolete_osAccount HygieneSRV-OLD2008$computerWindows Server 2008 R2 Standard 6.1 (7601).T1210
Highoperator_groups_populatedPrivileged Accesshelpdesk.leaduserMember of Account Operators via: Account Operators > helpdesk.lead. Account enabled.T1078.002
Highoperator_groups_populatedPrivileged Accesssvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators via: Backup Operators > svc_backup. Account enabled.T1078.002
Highpassword_in_descriptionAccount Hygieneprinter.svcuserDescription (masked): '[masked by collector: 31 chars]'. Enabled: True.T1552
Highpassword_in_descriptionAccount HygieneWKS-018$computerDescription (masked): '[masked by collector: 28 chars]'. Enabled: True.T1552
Highpassword_not_requiredAccount Hygieneadm.ferrariuserPASSWD_NOTREQD set on a privileged account.T1078.002
Highpre_win2000_anonymousPermissionsPre-Windows 2000 Compatible AccessgroupMembers include Anonymous Logon or Everyone: CN=S-1-5-7,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=moosebank,DC=local.T1087
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosadm.bianchiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosadm.ferrariuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosadm.gialliuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosadm.neriuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosadm.olduserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosadm.verdiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosAdministratoruserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosdns.adminuserMember of DnsAdmins; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberoshelpdesk.leaduserMember of Account Operators; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberoshidden.adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberosloop.useruserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberossvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators; not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_account_delegableKerberossvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and NOT_DELEGATED not set.T1558
Highprivileged_computer_memberPrivileged AccessSRV-BACKUP01$computerMember of Administrators (builtin) via: Administrators > SRV-BACKUP01$.T1078.002
Highprivileged_foreign_memberPrivileged AccessPARTNER\ext.adminforeignMember of Administrators (builtin) via: Administrators > PARTNER\ext.admin.T1078.002
Highprivileged_inactivePrivileged Accessadm.olduserLast logon: 200 days ago (threshold 90 days). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Highprivileged_password_oldPrivileged Accessadm.bianchiuserPassword last set 400 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Highprivileged_password_oldPrivileged Accessadm.olduserPassword last set 900 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Highprivileged_password_oldPrivileged AccessAdministratoruserPassword last set 800 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners.T1078.002
Highprivileged_password_oldPrivileged Accesssvc_backupuserPassword last set 700 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Backup Operators.T1078.002
Highprivileged_password_oldPrivileged Accesssvc_sql_adminuserPassword last set 1200 days ago (threshold 365). Member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Highpwq_breached_passwordPassword Qualitymario.rossi.olduserPassword found in the breach corpus.T1110.004
Highpwq_breached_passwordPassword Qualitysvc_backupuserPassword found in the breach corpus.T1110.004
Highpwq_cleartext_storedPassword Qualityrevers.useruserCleartext recoverable (reversible encryption).T1003
Highpwq_default_passwordPassword Qualitynew.hireuserPassword equals username or a known default.T1078
Highpwq_default_passwordPassword Qualityprinter.svcuserPassword equals username or a known default.T1078
Highpwq_duplicate_passwordsPassword Quality2 accounts incl. user001clusterSame password: user001, user002.T1110.004
Highpwq_duplicate_passwordsPassword Quality3 accounts incl. svc_appclusterSame password: svc_web, svc_app, svc_legacy.T1110.004
Highreversible_encryption_accountAccount Hygienerevers.useruserENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED set.T1556.005
Highrodc_prp_too_broadPrivileged AccessRODC01dcRODC RODC01: allowed list contains the domain-wide group Domain Users. Administered (managedBy) by Helpdesk, not Tier 0.T1003
Highsccm_system_management_writablePermissionsMOOSEBANK\HelpdeskaclCreateChild on CN=System Management. Site servers with rights there: MOOSEBANK\SRV-APP01$. Management points published: srv-app01.moosebank.local (site MB1).T1072
Highschema_class_poss_superiorDomain ConfigurationmsExchStorageGroupschemaclasspossSuperiors includes computer; inherits from container. Known as CVE-2021-34470.T1136.002
Highshadow_credentials_presentPermissionssvc_sql_adminuser1 key credential(s) on a Tier 0 account (member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin)). Confirm each against an expected Windows Hello / device registration, or treat as Shadow Credentials persistence.T1556.003
Highsmb1_server_enabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoSMBv1 enabled via GPO (mrxsmb10 Start = n/a, LanmanServer SMB1 = 1).T1210
Highspn_account_rc4Kerberossvc_backupusermsDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 4: no AES, only RC4/DES tickets.T1558.003
Highsync_laps_rightsPermissionsMOOSEBANK\svc.dirsyncaclHolds DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set on the domain head.T1555
Highsysvol_script_secretsPermissionsmapdrives.batfilePassword-like string in SYSVOL script: \\moosebank.local\SYSVOL\moosebank.local\scripts\mapdrives.batT1552.001
Hightrust_sid_filtering_disabledDomain Configurationlegacy-forest.localtrustForest trust (BiDirectional) with SID history enabled (TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL): SIDs with RID >= 1000 from the other forest are accepted.T1134.005
Hightrust_sid_filtering_disabledDomain Configurationpartner.exampletrustExternal trust (Inbound) without quarantine (SID filtering).T1134.005
Hightrust_tgt_delegationDomain Configurationlegacy-forest.localtrustForest trust (BiDirectional) with TGT delegation enabled.T1558
Highuac_weakenedHost HardeningClient HardeninggpoLocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1 (full admin token for local accounts over the network); ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = 0 (admins elevate without a prompt). GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).T1548.002
Highunconstrained_delegationKerberosSRV-PRINT01$computerTRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION set on a computer that is not a domain controller. OS: Windows Server 2019 Standard.T1558
Highunconstrained_delegationKerberosunconstrained.useruserTRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION set on a user that is not a domain controller.T1558
Highunix_password_presentAccount Hygienesvc_appuseruserPassword / unixUserPassword attribute is populated (value not collected). Enabled: True.T1552
Highwdigest_cleartextHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoWDigest UseLogonCredential = 1 (cleartext credentials cached in LSASS).T1003.001
Highwebclient_on_dcHost Hardeningdc02.moosebank.localdcWebClient service: start mode Manual, state Running.T1187
Highwinrm_basic_authHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoService AllowBasic = 1.T1021.006
Highwsus_httpHost HardeningDefault Domain PolicygpoWUServer = http://wsus01.moosebank.local:8530. GPO linked to the domain root.T1557
Mediumadcs_ca_cert_expiringCertificate ServicesMOOSEBANK-CAcaCA certificate expires in 120 days (2027-01-26). Host: ca01.moosebank.local.
Mediumadcs_low_priv_enrollCertificate ServicesMoose Web ServercerttemplateClient-auth template enrollable by MOOSEBANK\Domain Users. Review whether such broad enrollment is needed.T1649
Mediumanonymous_sam_enumHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoRestrictAnonymousSAM = not configured; EveryoneIncludesAnonymous = 1; NullSessionShares = COMCFG, DFS$; extra NullSessionPipes = BROWSER.T1087
Mediumaudit_policy_insufficientHost HardeningDomain Controllersgpo12 subcategory gap(s): Kerberos Authentication Service (need Success+Failure, have None); Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (need Success+Failure, have None); User Account Management (need Success+Failure, have Success); Computer Account Management (need Success, have None); Security Group Management (need Success, have None); Directory Service Access (need Failure, have None); Directory Service Changes (need Success, have None); Special Logon (need Success, have None); Sensitive Privilege Use (need Success+Failure, have None); Audit Policy Change (need Success+Failure, have None); Security System Extension (need Success, have None); System Integrity (need Success+Failure, have None).T1562.002
Mediumbuiltin_administrator_hygienePrivileged AccessAdministratoruserRID 500 account: used 5 days ago (routine use suspected); password 800 days old.T1078.002
Mediumcached_credentialsHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoCachedLogonsCount = not configured (default 10).T1003.005
Mediumcloud_kerberos_trust_key_oldKerberoskrbtgt_AzureADuserEntra Kerberos server key last set 250 days ago (threshold 180 days).T1558.001
Mediumcmdline_audit_not_enabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled = not configured.T1562.002
Mediumconstrained_delegationKerberosSRV-SQL01$computerKerberos-only constrained delegation to: MSSQLSvc/sql02.moosebank.local:1433, cifs/srv-files-old.moosebank.local.T1550.003
Mediumdc_low_diskOperational Healthdc02.moosebank.localdcC: has 3.5 GB free of 59.4 GB (5.9%).
Mediumdc_password_oldDomain ConfigurationDC02$computerDC machine password last set 200 days ago (expected rotation ~30 days, threshold 90).T1207
Mediumdc_time_skewOperational Healthdomain controllersdcClocks differ by 95.4 s between dc01.moosebank.local and dc02.moosebank.local (Kerberos fails beyond 300 s).
Mediumdc_unreachableOperational Healthrodc01.moosebank.localdcNo LDAP answer from the collecting machine: Unable to contact the server.
Mediumdelegation_orphan_spnKerberosSRV-SQL01$computerDelegation targets held by no account in the snapshot: cifs/srv-files-old.moosebank.local.T1558.003
Mediumdhcp_on_dcOperational Healthdc02.moosebank.localdcAuthorized DHCP server dc02.moosebank.local (10.0.0.12) is a domain controller.T1557
Mediumdns_zone_create_childDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdnszoneCreate child objects (new DNS records) granted to: Authenticated Users.T1557
Mediumdns_zone_transfer_allowedDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdnszoneSecureSecondaries = TransferToAnyServer.T1590
Mediumdnsadmins_populatedPrivileged Accessdns.adminuserMember of DnsAdmins via: DnsAdmins > dns.admin. Account enabled.
Mediumfgpp_weakDomain ConfigurationPSO-ServiceAccountsfgppMinimum length 6 (baseline 12), precedence 20.T1110
Mediumfunctional_level_outdatedDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomainDomain mode: Windows2012R2Domain; forest mode: Windows2012R2Forest.
Mediumgpo_broad_local_groupPrivileged AccessWorkstation Baseline: local Remote Desktop UsersgpoAuthenticated Users added to local Remote Desktop Users through Restricted Groups.T1078.002
Mediumgpo_runs_code_from_sharePermissionsWorkstation Baseline: \\fs01\inventory\agent.exegpoMachine scheduled task 'Inventory': \\fs01\inventory\agent.exe. GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).T1484.001
Mediumgpo_trusted_root_addedHost HardeningClient Hardeninggpo1 trusted root certificate(s) not published in this forest's AD, SHA-1 thumbprint: E5F60718E5F60718E5F60718E5F60718E5F60718. GPO not linked to the domain root or the DC OU (check its other links).T1553.004
Mediumipv6_dhcpv6_takeoverHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets Tcpip6 DisabledComponents = 0xFF; relay targets: LDAP signing not required, machine account quota 10. A firewall rule blocking DHCPv6 would also do, and is not read.T1557
Mediumkerberoastable_userKerberossvc_appuserSPN: HTTP/app01.moosebank.local, HTTP/app01. Password age: 100 days.T1558.003
Mediumkerberoastable_userKerberossvc_iis_deleguserSPN: HTTP/iis01.moosebank.local. Password age: 50 days.T1558.003
Mediumkerberoastable_userKerberossvc_smsa$msaStandalone managed service account (sMSA) with SPN and a settable password. SPN: MSSQLSvc/legacy.moosebank.local:1433.T1558.003
Mediumkerberos_rc4_allowedHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoSupportedEncryptionTypes = 7 allows DES/RC4.T1558.003
Mediumlaps_missingAccount HygieneEVILPC$computerNo LAPS expiration timestamp. OS: Windows 10 Pro.T1550.002
Mediumlaps_missingAccount HygieneSRV-OLD2008$computerNo LAPS expiration timestamp. OS: Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard.T1550.002
Mediumlaps_missingAccount HygieneWKS-016$computerNo LAPS expiration timestamp. OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.T1550.002
Mediumldap_channel_binding_offHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoLdapEnforceChannelBinding = not configured (2 = always).T1557.001
Mediumldap_client_signing_not_requiredHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoLDAPClientIntegrity = 0 (0 = none, 1 = negotiate, 2 = require).T1557.001
Mediumllmnr_enabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoDNSClient EnableMulticast = not configured (0 = LLMNR disabled).T1557.001
Mediumlsass_not_protectedHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoRunAsPPL = not configured.T1003.001
Mediummachine_account_quotaAccount Hygienemoosebank.localdomainms-DS-MachineAccountQuota = 10.T1136.002
Mediummachine_password_rotation_offHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoDisablePasswordChange = 1: machine account passwords never change.T1558.002
Mediummdns_enabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoDnscache EnableMDNS = not configured (on by default) (0 = mDNS disabled).T1557.001
Mediumnbtns_enabled_dcHost Hardeningdc02.moosebank.localdcNetBIOS over TCP/IP on: vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter (default: from DHCP).T1557.001
Mediumntlm_weak_lmcompatHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoLmCompatibilityLevel = 3 (5 = NTLMv2 only, refuse LM & NTLM).T1550.002
Mediumobsolete_osAccount HygieneWKS-W7-01$computerWindows 7 Professional 6.1 (7601) (also stale).T1210
Mediumpassword_not_requiredAccount Hygieneprinter.svcuserPASSWD_NOTREQD set.T1078.002
Mediumpassword_policy_no_lockoutDomain ConfigurationDefault Domain PolicypolicyLockout threshold = 0.T1110.003
Mediumpassword_policy_shortDomain ConfigurationDefault Domain PolicypolicyMinimum length 8 (baseline 12).T1110
Mediumpowershell_logging_not_enabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoEnableScriptBlockLogging = not configured.T1562.002
Mediumprecreated_computer_accountAccount HygienePRESTAGE01$computerPASSWD_NOTREQD set on an enabled computer account (predictable default machine password). OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard.T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_group_oversizedPrivileged AccessDomain Adminsgroup11 enabled effective members (threshold 5): Administrator, adm.rossi, adm.bianchi, adm.verdi, adm.old, svc_sql_admin, adm.ferrari, hidden.admin, adm.neri, adm.gialli, loop.user.T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.bianchiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.ferrariuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.gialliuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.neriuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.olduserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.rossiuserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessadm.verdiuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged AccessAdministratoruserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessdns.adminuserMember of DnsAdmins; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accesshelpdesk.leaduserMember of Account Operators; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accesshidden.adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accessloop.useruserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accesssvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators; not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_logon_unrestrictedPrivileged Accesssvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin); not in Protected Users and smart-card logon not required (authenticates with a reusable password).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_password_never_expiresPrivileged Accessadm.olduserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_password_never_expiresPrivileged AccessAdministratoruserMember of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators (builtin), Group Policy Creator Owners.T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_password_never_expiresPrivileged Accesssvc_backupuserMember of Backup Operators.T1078.002
Mediumprivileged_password_never_expiresPrivileged Accesssvc_sql_adminuserMember of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Mediumprotected_users_emptyKerberosProtected UsersgroupProtected Users has no members while 17 principal(s) hold Tier 0 group membership.T1550
Mediumrbcd_configuredKerberosSRV-APP01$computerPrincipals allowed to act on behalf of other identities: SRV-WEB01$.T1550.003
Mediumrdp_nla_disabledHost HardeningMooseBank DC ExtragpoTerminal Services UserAuthentication = 0 (NLA not required). GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.T1021.001
Mediumrdp_restricted_adminHost HardeningMooseBank DC ExtragpoLsa DisableRestrictedAdmin = 0 (Restricted Admin allowed). GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.T1550.002
Mediumreplication_failuresOperational Healthdc02.moosebank.localdc6 consecutive replication failure(s) with partner dc01.moosebank.local.
Mediumreplication_staleOperational Healthrodc01.moosebank.localdcLast successful replication with dc01.moosebank.local: 3 days ago.
Mediumrodc_krbtgt_password_oldKerberoskrbtgt_12345userRODC krbtgt password last set 400 days ago.T1558.001
Mediumrodc_tier0_unprotectedPrivileged AccessDenied RODC Password Replication GroupgroupRODC present; these Tier 0 principals are not in the Denied RODC Password Replication Group: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, krbtgt.T1207
Mediumschema_enterprise_admins_populatedPrivileged Accessadm.rossiuserMember of Enterprise Admins via: Enterprise Admins > adm.rossi. Account enabled.T1078.002
Mediumschema_enterprise_admins_populatedPrivileged AccessAdministratoruserMember of Enterprise Admins via: Enterprise Admins > Administrator. Account enabled.T1078.002
Mediumsid_historyAccount Hygienemigrated.userusersIDHistory: S-1-5-21-777777777-888888888-999999999-1234.T1134.005
Mediumsmartcard_password_not_rotatedAccount Hygienesc.bianchiuserSmart card required; password (NT hash) last set 900 days ago (threshold 365 days). Domain automatic rotation: off.T1550.002
Mediumsmb_client_signing_not_requiredHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoLanmanWorkstation RequireSecuritySignature (client) = not configured.T1557.001
Mediumspn_account_rc4Kerberossvc_appusermsDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes not set: encryption type falls back to domain/DC defaults, RC4 possible.T1558.003
Mediumspn_account_rc4Kerberossvc_smsa$msasMSA msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 4: RC4 possible.T1558.003
Mediumspn_account_rc4Kerberossvc_sql_adminusermsDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes not set: encryption type falls back to domain/DC defaults, RC4 possible.T1558.003
Mediumspooler_on_dcHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoSpooler service Start = not configured by GPO (4 = Disabled).T1547.012
Mediumsysvol_frsDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomainSYSVOL is still replicated by FRS (no DFSR content set found). Migrate to DFSR.
Mediumtimeroast_computer_passwordAccount HygieneKIOSK-PRE01$computerNever logged on; password set 60 days ago, when the account was created. No OS recorded (never joined).T1110.002
Mediumtrust_rc4Domain Configurationpartner.exampletrustUsesRC4Encryption: True; UsesAESKeys: False. Trust object (and key) last changed 400 days ago.T1558
Mediumunc_hardening_disabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoHardened UNC Paths not configured for: \\*\SYSVOL, \\*\NETLOGON.T1557
Lowapp_control_missingHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainNone of the 4 GPO templates holds AppLocker rules (SrpV2) or a WDAC policy.T1204.002
Lowauth_policy_silo_unusedPrivileged Accessmoosebank.localdomainNo authentication policy silo defined while 17 Tier 0 principal(s) exist.T1078.002
Lowbitlocker_key_missingHost HardeningEVILPC$computerNo BitLocker recovery object under the computer account (18 computer(s) in the domain have one). OS: Windows 10 Pro.T1006
Lowbitlocker_key_missingHost HardeningWKS-019$computerNo BitLocker recovery object under the computer account (18 computer(s) in the domain have one). OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.T1006
Lowbitlocker_key_missingHost HardeningWKS-020$computerNo BitLocker recovery object under the computer account (18 computer(s) in the domain have one). OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.T1006
Lowcircular_group_nestingAccount HygieneG-Loop-AgroupGroups in a nesting cycle: G-Loop-A, G-Loop-B.
Lowcredential_guard_not_configuredHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainNone of the 4 GPO templates sets LsaCfgFlags (Credential Guard).T1003.001
Lowdc_obsolete_osDomain ConfigurationDC02dcWindows Server 2016 Standard: extended support ends January 2027, plan replacement.T1210
Lowdc_subnet_missingDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomainNo subnet objects are declared under Sites and Services.
Lowdns_scavenging_disabledDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdnszoneAging/scavenging not enabled on the zone.
Lowforce_logoff_disabledHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainForceLogoffWhenHourExpire = not configured (off).
Lowinactive_userAccount Hygienemario.rossi.olduserLast logon 400 days ago (threshold 180).T1078.002
Lowkerberos_armoring_not_enforcedHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoKDC EnableCbacAndArmor = not configured.T1558
Lowkerberos_ticket_lifetime_longKerberosDefault Domain PolicygpoKerberos policy: MaxRenewAge = 30 days (default 7).T1558
Lowlaps_staleAccount HygieneWKS-015$computerLAPS password expired 100 days ago and was not rotated.T1550.002
Lowmachine_inactivity_limit_missingHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoInactivityTimeoutSecs = not configured.
Lownever_logged_on_userAccount Hygienetemp.useruserCreated 200 days ago, no logon recorded.T1078.002
Lowntlm_not_restrictedHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoNo effective GPO sets AuditNTLMInDomain, RestrictNTLMInDomain, AuditReceivingNTLMTraffic or RestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic.T1550.002
Loworphaned_admincountPrivileged Accessold.admin.2019useradminCount=1 but not an effective member of any protected group. Enabled: True.
Lowpassword_never_expiresAccount HygieneMSOL_a1b2c3d4e5f6userPassword age: 30 days.T1078.002
Lowpassword_never_expiresAccount Hygienesvc_webuserPassword age: 500 days.T1078.002
Lowprivileged_disabled_memberPrivileged Accessadm.exdipendenteuserDisabled, still member of Domain Admins, Administrators (builtin).T1078.002
Lowrdp_session_timeout_missingHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets MaxDisconnectionTime (Remote Desktop session time limits).T1563.002
Lowrecycle_bin_disabledDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomainRecycle Bin Feature has no enabled scope.
Lowschema_java_objectsDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomainJava classes in the schema: javaContainer, javaSerializedObject.
Lowstale_computerAccount HygieneWKS-017$computerLast logon: 120 days ago (threshold 90 days). OS: Windows 11 Enterprise.T1078.002
Lowstale_computerAccount HygieneWKS-W7-01$computerLast logon: 300 days ago (threshold 90 days). OS: Windows 7 Professional.T1078.002
Lowtombstone_lifetime_lowDomain Configurationmoosebank.localdomaintombstoneLifetime = 90 days (recommended >= 180).
Lowtrust_inactiveDomain Configurationpartner.exampletrustInbound trust object last changed 400 days ago (threshold 180 days): the trust password should have rotated.
Lowtrust_no_selective_authDomain Configurationlegacy-forest.localtrustBiDirectional forest trust, forest-wide authentication.
Lowtrust_no_selective_authDomain Configurationpartner.exampletrustInbound external trust, forest-wide authentication.
Lowwebclient_not_disabledHost HardeningDomain ControllersgpoWebClient service startup = 3 (4 = Disabled).T1187
Lowwpad_not_disabledHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets WinHttp DisableWpad = 1 or disables the WinHttpAutoProxySvc service.T1557.001
Lowwsh_enabledHost Hardeningmoosebank.localdomainNo GPO sets Windows Script Host Settings\Enabled = 0.T1059.005
241 rows

Generated by IDWolf from a read-only snapshot. The report contains directory data: handle as confidential.